Fakhr al-Din II

Around 1590 Fakhr al-Din succeeded his father as the muqaddam of all or part of the Chouf.[16][17] Tax records indicate he had gained the iltizam of the Sidon and Beirut nahiyas and the port of Beirut from 14 July 1589.[21] Unlike his Ma'nid predecessors, he cooperated with the Ottomans, who, though able to suppress Mount Lebanon's local chiefs with massive force, were unable to pacify the region in the long term without local support.[22] When the veteran general Murad Pasha was appointed beylerbey of Damascus, Fakhr al-Din hosted and gave him expensive gifts upon his arrival to Sidon in September 1593.[21][23] Murad Pasha reciprocated by appointing him the sanjak-bey (district governor, called amir liwa in Arabic sources) of Sidon-Beirut in December.[22] While his ancestors were locally referred to as emirs, Fakhr al-Din had attained the official rank of emir or its Turkish equivalent, bey.[24] The Ottomans' preoccupation with the wars against Safavid Iran (1578–1590; 1603–1618) and the war with Hapsburg Austria afforded Fakhr al-Din the space to consolidate and expand his semi-autonomous power.[25] Between 1591 and 1594 government records indicate Fakhr al-Din's tax farms grew to span the Chouf, Matn, Jurd, Biqa' al-Aziz (southern Beqaa Valley), Shaqif and Tibnin nahiyas, as well as the salt profits from the ports of Acre, Sidon and Beirut.[26] Most of his tax farms were renewed by the Porte between 1596 and 1598.[27]

The saray in Deir al-Qamar, seat of the Ma'n under Fakhr al-Din

Coinciding interests between Fakhr al-Din and the Ottomans frequently recurred in his career through which he advanced against his local rivals.[28] In 1594/95 Murad Pasha executed Ibn Furaykh and ordered Fakhr al-Din to kill Ibn Furaykh's son Qurqumaz.[29] The sources attribute the acts to Fakhr al-Din's influence over Murad Pasha, though his role was exaggerated according to Abu-Husayn. Nonetheless, the elimination of the Furaykhs, known for their exactions on the local population and harassment of the Druze, had been a mutual interest of the Ma'nid emir and the government.[30] Mutual interests played out again in 1598 when Fakhr al-Din was commissioned by the beylerbey of Damascus, Seyyed Mehmed Pasha, to drive out from Beirut and Keserwan Yusuf Sayfa Pasha, the beylerbey of Tripoli and the local chief of Akkar. Fakhr al-Din had been wary of Yusuf's growing proximity to his domains, while Damascus, to which Beirut and Keserwan was administratively subordinate, opposed Tripoli's encroachment into its jurisdiction. Fakhr al-Din routed Yusuf's forces at the Dog River and took control of the two nahiyas for a year before returning them to Yusuf in return for payment.[28] The battle inaugurated a rivalry between Fakhr al-Din and the Sayfas, which lasted for the remainder of his career.[31][32]

In July 1602,[27] after his patron Murad Pasha became a vizier in Constantinople,[33] Fakhr al-Din was appointed the sanjak-bey of Safed. Shortly before, he had gained the iltizam of the Acre, Tiberias and Safed nahiyas.[27][28] With the Druze of Sidon-Beirut and Safed under his authority, he effectively became their paramount chief. Although the Druze were often in conflict with the Ottomans, the community was loyal to the ruling Sunni Muslim states, in principal, in contrast with the Shia Muslims, who formed a large component of Safed Sanjak's population. Fakhr al-Din, his military talents proven, may have been appointed to the post to leverage his Druze power base against the Shia.[34] He cultivated close ties with Safed's Sunni ulema (religious scholarly class), entering into his service the city's Hanafi mufti, Ahmad al-Khalidi. The Ottoman state favored the Hanafi fiqh (Islamic school of law) and Khalidi was closely connected to the Damascene authorities and ulema. Fakhr al-Din, who was careful to present himself as a Sunni before the authorities, later commissioned Khalidi to serve as his practical court historian.[35][lower-alpha 4]

In 1606 Fakhr al-Din made common cause with the Kurdish rebel Ali Janbulad of Aleppo against Yusuf; the latter had been invested as commander-in-chief of the Ottoman armies in the Levant to suppress Janbulad.[36] Fakhr al-Din, "who no doubt shared Canpolad's [Janbulad's] thirst for greater regional autonomy", according to the historian Stefan Winter,[37] had ignored government orders to join Yusuf's army.[38] Yusuf's rout by Janbulad and his sekbans at Hama demonstrated the weakness of the government's troops in the Levant; after the battle, Fakhr al-Din united forces with the Kurdish rebel near Hermel.[39][40] Although Khalidi held Fakhr al-Din's motive was to defend his territory, he also sought to expand his control to Beirut and Keserwan, both held by Yusuf.[38] The rebel allies advanced through the Beqaa Valley toward Damascus where Yusuf was headquartered.[41] Fakhr al-Din and Janbulad gathered the Shihabs of Wadi al-Taym under Ahmad ibn Qasim, old allies of the Ma'ns, and besieged Damascus from their base at Mezzeh. They defeated Yusuf's troops outside the city and sacked its suburbs for three days, demanding Yusuf's surrender. Yusuf escaped after bribing the city's officials and Fakhr al-Din and Janbulad withdrew after the officials bribed them with Yusuf's money to lift the siege. Janbulad pursued Yusuf to his redoubt at Krak des Chevaliers where the latter sued for peace, but Fakhr al-Din did not join the siege.[42] In the course of the fighting, Fakhr al-Din took over the Keserwan.[41]

Murad Pasha, who had become grand vizier in 1606, moved against Janbulad in late 1607 and demanded that Fakhr al-Din join his imperial forces at Payas off the Gulf of Alexandretta. Al-Burini reported that Fakhr al-Din ignored the summons, waiting for the outcome of the war to decide his position.[38] When Janbulad was defeated, Fakhr al-Din immediately dispatched three hundred men under his son Ali with considerable gifts in the form of 150,000 piasters and 150,000 piasters' worth in silk to appease Murad Pasha in Aleppo.[38][43] The high amount was a testament to the Ma'ns' wealth and demonstrated why Murad Pasha was invested in their alliance, according to Olsaretti.[43] The grand vizier had been petitioned by a Damascene delegation to punish Fakhr al-Din for joining Janbulad and damaging their city, but Murad Pasha left him alone, promising the Damascenes he would deal with Fakhr al-Din at a later time.[44] The Aleppine historian al-Urdi (d. 1660) and Sandys attributed Murad Pasha's favorable treatment of Fakhr al-Din in the aftermath of Janbulad's defeat to Fakhr al-Din's large bribes and their cordial ties during Murad Pasha's governorship of Damascus.[45] He was kept as sanjak-bey of Safed, his son Ali was appointed as sanjak-bey of Sidon-Beirut and their control of Keserwan was recognized by the Porte.[46] In early 1610 Fakhr al-Din was instructed by Murad Pasha to assist the new beylerbey of Tripoli, Husayn Pasha al-Jalali, to collect taxes from the eyalet against the interference of Yusuf, who had been dismissed from the post but was still in practical control of Tripoli's countryside.[47]

Fakhr al-Din and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand I, entered a treaty in 1608 stipulating Ma'nid support for a future crusade in the Holy Land in return for military aid and Maronite support for Fakhr al-Din

Toward the close of the 16th century the Medici grand dukes of Tuscany had become increasingly active in the eastern Mediterranean, pushed for a new crusade in the Holy Land, and began patronizing the Maronite Christians of Mount Lebanon.[48] Fakhr al-Din rebuffed two Tuscan entreaties between 1599 and 1602, while the Grand Duke Ferdinand I did not act upon his adviser's suggestion in 1605 to communicate with Fakhr al-Din about a new crusade and trade relations with Beirut. The Tuscans focused instead on Janbulad, with whom they signed a treaty stipulating his assistance in a new crusade and special interests for the Tuscans in the Levantine ports months before Janbulad was defeated.[49] Afterward, the Tuscans shifted focus to Fakhr al-Din, sending him an arms shipment originally bound for Janbulad and promising him sanctuary in Tuscany in 1608 if he backed a future crusade.[50] Fakhr al-Din and Tuscany forged a treaty that year promising military aid and support from the Maronite clergy to the Ma'nid emir against the Sayfas, who controlled the Maronite-populated areas of northern Mount Lebanon, in return for supporting a future Tuscan conquest of Jerusalem and Damascus.[51]

After the Tuscans' Ottoman ally, the pretender to the Ottoman throne Sultan Yahya, proved incapable of mustering sufficient support within the Empire in 1609, Fakhr al-Din became Tuscany's "last hope for an ally of the region", according to the historian Alessandro Ossaretti.[52] The Tuscans, their Papal allies, and Fakhr al-Din maintained correspondence between then and 1611.[53] In mid-1609 Fakhr al-Din gave refuge to Maronite Patriarch Yuhanna Makhlouf upon the latter's flight from northern Mount Lebanon.[54] In a 1610 letter from Pope Paul V to Makhlouf,[55] the pope entrusted Fakhr al-Din with the protection of the Maronite community.[51] Sandys noted in 1610 that Fakhr al-Din had reactivated the port of Tyre for clandestine exchanges and trade with the Tuscans.[56][57] The following year Fakhr al-Din dispatched a Maronite bishop to be his representative in the Tuscan Grand Duke Cosimo II's court and in the Holy See.[51]

Fakhr al-Din lost his favorable position in Constantinople with the death of Murad Pasha in July 1611 and the succession of Nasuh Pasha.[46] By then the Porte, freed up from the wars with Austria and Iran and the Jelali revolts in Anatolia, had turned its attention to affairs in the Levant.[58] The authorities had become wary of Fakhr al-Din's expanding territorial control, his alliance with Tuscany, his unsanctioned strengthening and garrisoning of fortresses, particularly Shaqif Arnun, and his employment of outlawed sekbans.[59] Nasuh Pasha had old grievances with Fakhr al-Din stemming from the latter's assistance to Damascene Janissaries in a standoff with imperial troops in Aleppo when the grand vizier had been governor there. In 1612 Fakhr al-Din sent his kethuda Mustafa with 25,000 piasters to gain the goodwill of the grand vizier, who may have been offended by the gesture when compared with the much larger gift given to his predecessor with Fakhr al-Din's son.[60] The grand vizier demanded Fakhr al-Din disband his sekbans, surrender Shaqif Arnun and Subayba, and execute his ally, the chieftain of Baalbek Yunus al-Harfush; the orders were ignored. Not long after, Fakhr al-Din repulsed an assault by the beylerbey of Damascus, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, against Yunus al-Harfush and Ahmad Shihab.[61]

Shaqif Arnun was a stronghold of Fakhr al-Din, guarding his domains from the south.

To check Fakhr al-Din the Ottomans appointed Farrukh Pasha to the neighboring sanjaks of Ajlun and Nablus,[62] and drove out two of his allied Bedouin chiefs from Ajlun and the Hauran, who both took refuge with Fakhr al-Din.[61] The latter initially avoided direct conflict with the Porte by deferring the Bedouin chiefs' requests for assistance while awaiting the Porte's response to a gift of money and goods he sent.[61] Nonetheless, at the urging of his Damascene Janissary ally Hajj Kiwan, Fakhr al-Din moved to restore his allies to their home regions, sending with them his son Ali at the head of 3,000 men.[63] With help from the Sayfas, who had been dismissed from Tripoli and sought to mend ties with the Ma'ns,[64] Ali defeated the faction of Damascene Janissaries opposed to the Ma'ns and Farrukh Pasha at Muzayrib on 21 May 1613. In response, Nasuh Pasha appointed Ahmed Pasha over 2,000 Janissaries from Constantinople and the troops of over sixty provincial and district governors from across the Empire to move against Fakhr al-Din.[63]

Fakhr al-Din garrisoned Shaqif Arnun and Subayba, both containing five years' worth of provisions and ammunition, with his sekbans under the commanders Husayn Yaziji and Husayn Tawil, respectively. He sent his son Ali to take safety with his Bedouin allies in the desert, while sending a Sunni delegation to Damascus led by Khalidi with a peace proposal entailing large payments to the authorities.[65] The proposal was rejected, and on 16 September Ahmed Pasha had all the roads from Mount Lebanon into the desert blocked and the port of Sidon blockaded to prevent Fakhr al-Din's escape by land or sea.[66] He appointed a certain Muhammad Agha sanjak-bey of Safed, where Fakhr al-Din was headquartered at the time, prompting the Ma'nid's flight to Sidon. He bribed the deputy admiral of the blockade to allow his escape and boarded a European ship for Livorno, Tuscany.[67]

Fakhr al-Din's sekbans defected to Ahmed Pasha during the campaign and most of Fakhr al-Din's allies and other local chiefs, namely the Shihabs, Harfushes, Turabays, Hayars, and Qansuhs,[lower-alpha 5] also joined the Ottomans, with the exception of his Bedouin ally, the Mafarija chief Amr ibn Jabr, who refused to surrender Fakhr al-Din's son Ali.[67] Abu-Husayn explains their defections as a reflection of "the precariousness of the alliances made by Fakhr al-Din" and the Ottomans' ability to reassert control over the Levant when they were "seriously challenged" there.[72] The Sayfas used the campaign to restore their ties with the Porte and their former power. Yusuf's son Husayn backed Ahmed Pasha's siege of Shaqif Arnun and proceeded to burn Deir al-Qamar, the headquarter village of the Ma'ns.[73] In the invasion of the Chouf Ahmed Pasha and the Sayfas were helped by the Druze chiefs Muzaffar al-Andari and Abu Harmush. The Ma'ns led by Fakhr al-Din's brother Yunus sued for peace, sending Sitt Nasab and a delegation of thirty Druze religious notables to Ahmed Pasha with a 25,000-piaster payment to him personally and a promised payment of 300,000 piasters to the Porte.[74] Ahmed Pasha accepted and ordered Husayn to halt the burning of Deir al-Qamar.[73]

In June 1614 the Porte administratively reorganized Fakhr al-Din's former domains to curtail Ma'nid power, combining the sanjaks of Sidon-Beirut and Safed into a separate eyalet called Sidon and appointing to it a beylerbey from Constantinople. The new appointee redistributed control of the Druze Mountain's iltizam among pro-Ottoman Druze chiefs, restricting the Ma'ns' iltizam to the Chouf.[82] Political circumstances in the Empire soon after shifted to the Ma'ns' favor, beginning with the replacement of Nasuh Pasha in November 1614, the dissolution of the Sidon Eyalet in early 1615, and the dismissal of Ahmed Pasha in Damascus in April 1615. The Ottoman–Safavid wars resumed about the same time, siphoning Ottoman troops from the Levant to the Iranian front. The authorities resolved to negotiate with Yaziji on behalf of the weakened Ma'ns, agreeing to appoint Ali to the governorships of Sidon-Beirut and Safed, respectively, in December 1615, in return for large payments. The Porte's principal objective, the dismantlement of Ma'nid-held Shaqif Arnun and Subayba, was carried out in May 1616 as a result of joint efforts with Yunus al-Harfush and Yaziji.[83]

Despite their official appointments, the Ma'ns faced continued opposition from their traditional Druze rivals, who were backed by the Sayfas. The Ma'ns defeated them in four engagements in the heart of the Druze Mountain, and subsequently burned the provisions of the Druze in the Gharb, Jurd and Matn and the homes of Muhammad ibn Jamal al-Din in Choueifat and Aramoun and those of the Sawwafs in Chbaniyeh.[84] In the course of the fighting, the Ma'ns recaptured Beirut and Keserwan from the Sayfas. Ali granted his uncle Yunus the iltizam of the Chouf, Keserwan and Bilad Bishara, the Ma'ns' Tanukhid allies the iltizam of Beirut, the Gharb, and the Jurd, and the Abu'l-Lama muqaddams of Kafr Silwan the iltizam of the Matn.[85] Growing opposition to the Ma'ns by the Shias of Safed Sanjak culminated with their backing of Yaziji's efforts to replace Ali as sanjak-bey there and their alliance with the Harfushes in 1617–1618. Yaziji was killed almost immediately after taking up office in Safed in June 1618, and Ali was restored to the post.[86] Meanwhile, tensions rose between the Ma'ns and their Tanukhid and Abu'l-Lama allies relating to property disputes in Beirut.[87]

The Ottomans pardoned Fakhr al-Din and he returned to Mount Lebanon, arriving in Acre on 29 September 1618.[86] Upon hearing of his return, the Ma'ns' Druze allies immediately reconciled with Ali and from that point there was no further active Druze opposition to Fakhr al-Din.[87] In Acre Fakhr al-Din held a reception for the rural chieftains across the Levant arriving to greet him, which included all those who joined the 1613 expedition against the Ma'ns. Uneasy about the growing ties between the Harfushes and the Shia chiefs of Safed, he arrested a Shia chief and released him after a ransom paid by Yunus al-Harfush.[86] He moved to supervise the collection of taxes in Bilad Bishara in December, prompting the Shia notable families of Ali Saghir, Munkir, Shukr and Daghir to take refuge with Yunus al-Harfush and evade payment. Fakhr al-Din responded by destroying their homes. In response to the flight of the Jallaqs, a Shia family from Safed city, to Afiq, he captured Afiq, killed fifteen Shia refugees there and took captive the Jallaq women. Afterward, the Shia chiefs of the sanjak agreed to return and concede to Fakhr al-Din's rule; he subsequently released the Shia captives.[88] Shia levies thereafter joined his army in his later military campaigns.[89]

The Bsharri area in 2016. In 1619–1622 Fakhr al-Din occupied and gained the tax farms of the predominantly Maronite nahiyas of Byblos, Batroun, Bsharri and Dinniyeh in northern Mount Lebanon from Yusuf Sayfa

During his reception of the Levantine chiefs, Fakhr al-Din berated the Sayfas for their hostility in the preceding five years. In 1618/19, he moved against the Sayfas with the Porte's sanction under the guise of assisting Tripoli's beylerbey Umar Kittanji Pasha collect the taxes in his eyalet, which continued to be controlled by the Sayfas. On 4 February 1619 he captured and looted their Gibelacar (Hisn Akkar) stronghold and four days later besieged Yusuf and the latter's Druze allies in Krak des Chevaliers.[90] During the siege, word had reached Fakhr al-Din that the Porte, likely seeking to avoid a total victory by the Ma'ns, reappointed Yusuf to the governorship of Tripoli. Fakhr al-Din pressed on with the siege and demanded a payment of 150,000 piasters from the Sayfas, while he sent a detachment to burn the Sayfas' home village of Akkar and gained the defection of the Sayfas' men in the forts of Byblos and Smar Jbeil.[91] The beylerbeys of Damascus and Aleppo mobilized their troops in Homs and Hama, respectively, in support of Yusuf, who afterward persuaded Fakhr al-Din to accept a promissory payment of 50,000 piasters and lift the siege in March. Fakhr al-Din's control of the Byblos and Batroun nahiyas and his earlier leasing of their iltizam from Umar Kittanji Pasha was recognized by Yusuf in May in lieu of the promised payment.[92]

In April 1620 Fakhr al-Din dismissed a proposal by Yusuf to transfer Byblos, Batroun and Keserwan to the Sayfas in return for a permanent peace. During the ensuing intrigues by the representatives of Fakhr al-Din and Yusuf with the Porte, the former succeeded in having Yusuf replaced as beylerbey by Husayn Pasha al-Jalali, only to have the order rescinded as a result of Yusuf's promise of large payments to the Porte.[93] Fakhr al-Din was charged by the Porte with collecting tax arrears from Yusuf in June/July 1621, thereby giving the Druze emir imperial cover to assault the Sayfas.[94] He captured the Bahsas fort on Tripoli's southern outskirts and besieged the Citadel of Tripoli. Under pressure, Yusuf, who had fled to Jableh, agreed to sell Fakhr al-Din his properties in Ghazir and Antelias, both in Keserwan, and Beirut, in return for cancelling Yusuf's personal debts to him. The siege was maintained pending Yusuf's payment of the tax arrears to the Porte, until Yusuf persuaded the imperial authorities that Fakhr al-Din was using his imperial commission to annex Tripoli. Upon the Porte's orders, Fakhr al-Din withdrew from Tripoli on 2 October 1621.[95]

Yusuf was dismissed again in October/November 1622 after failing to remit the promised tax payments, but refused to hand over power to his replacement Umar Kittanji Pasha, who in turn requested Fakhr al-Din's military support. Fakhr al-Din complied in return for the iltizam of the Tripoli nahiyas of Dinniyeh, Bsharri and Akkar. Once Fakhr al-Din set out from Ghazir, Yusuf abandoned Tripoli for Akkar.[96] The Druze emir thereafter sent his Maronite ally Abu Safi Khazen, the brother of his mudabbir (fiscal and political adviser, scribe) Abu Nadir Khazen, to occupy Maronite-populated Bsharri, thereby ending the rule of the local Maronite muqaddams established since the late 14th century.[97] The dismissed muqaddam and his son were soon after executed by Fakhr al-Din in connection to the son's raid of a Maronite monastery near Hasroun.[98] The Maronites of Bsharri likely welcomed the end of the muqaddams, the last several of whom failed to protect the interests of their church and community.[99][lower-alpha 6]

Fakhr al-Din secured the defection of Yusuf's on Beylik and their combined forces reentered Tripoli on 13 March 1623. An imperial order arrived a few days later reappointing Yusuf to the eyalet. Umar Kittanji Pasha attempted to resist his dismissal, but Fakhr al-Din, by then in practical control of most of the eyalet, insisted that the Porte's orders be followed.[96] He subsequently escorted the outgoing beylerbey to Beirut and ordered Beylik to return to his father.[100] In May/June Fakhr al-Din mobilized his forces in Bsharri in support of Yusuf's rebellious nephew Sulayman, who controlled Safita. Yusuf had moved against Sulayman, but relented after Fakhr al-Din's attempted intervention, thereby confirming the Ma'ns as the practical overlords of Safita. Meanwhile, Beylik, who had been appointed by his father to govern Akkar, expelled Yusuf's sekbans from the nahiyas and declared his support to Fakhr al-Din.[101]

An engraving by Olfert Dapper from 1677 depicting Fakhr al-Din's capture of Mustafa Pasha, beylerbey of Damascus, at the Battle of Anjar in 1623. Fakhr al-Din is shown as the standing, turbaned figure pointing toward Mustafa Pasha, who is being held to the ground.

In 1623 Yunus al-Harfush prohibited the Druze of the Chouf from cultivating their lands in the southern Beqaa, angering Fakhr al-Din.[102] In August/September 1623 he stationed sekbans in the southern Beqaa village of Qabb Ilyas and evicted the Harfushes.[103] Meanwhile, in June/July the Porte had replaced Fakhr al-Din as sanjak-bey of Safed with a certain Bustanji Bashi and replaced Mustafa Kethuda and Fakhr al-Din's son Husayn as the sanjak-beys of Nablus and Ajlun with local opponents of Fakhr al-Din.[104] The Porte soon after restored the Ma'ns to Ajlun and Nablus, though Fakhr al-Din was not restored to Safed. The Ma'ns thereupon moved to assume control of Ajlun and Nablus, prompting Yunus al-Harfush to call on Kurd Hamza, who wielded significant influence over the beylerbey of Damascus, Mustafa Pasha, to block their advance.[105] Kurd Hamza then secured Yunus al-Harfush's appointment to Safed, followed by a failed attempt by Fakhr al-Din to outbid him for the governorship.[106]

Fakhr al-Din launched a campaign against the Turabays and Farrukhs in northern Palestine, but was defeated in a battle at the Awja River near Ramla. While he was away, Yunus al-Harfush and the Sayfas mobilized in Baalbek. In response, Ali dispatched Druze fighters to Qabb Ilyas.[107] On his way back to Mount Lebanon from the abortive Palestine campaign, Fakhr al-Din was notified that the Porte reappointed his sons and allies to Safed, Ajlun and Nablus. The reversal by the Porte was linked to the successions of Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) and Grand Vizier Kemankeş Ali Pasha, the latter of whom had been bribed by Fakhr al-Din's agent in Constantinople to restore the Ma'ns to their former sanjaks.[107] Mustafa Pasha and Kurd Hamza, nonetheless, proceeded to launch an expedition against the Ma'ns. Fakhr al-Din arrived in Qabb Ilyas on 22 October, and immediately moved to restore lost money and provisions from the Palestine campaign by raiding the nearby villages of Karak Nuh and Sar'in, both held by the Harfushes.[108]

Afterward, the Damascenes, the Harfushes and the Sayfas set out from Damascus,[109] while Fakhr al-Din mobilized his Druze fighters, sekbans, and Shia levies.[110][111] He sent the Shihabs to serve as his vanguard in the tower of Anjar,[109][111] but by the time Fakhr al-Din arrived there in early November 1623, the Shihabs had been driven off and the Sayfas and Harfushes had taken over the tower.[109] Fakhr al-Din immediately routed the Damascene Janissaries at Anjar and captured Mustafa Pasha, while Kurd Hamza and Yunus al-Harfush escaped to Aleppo.[111][112] Fakhr al-Din extracted from the beylerbey his appointments to the sanjaks of Safed and Gaza and the appointments of his sons and Mustafa Kethuda to the sanjaks or nahiyas of Nablus, Ajlun, Lajjun, and the southern Beqaa. The appointments to Gaza, Nablus and Lajjun were not implemented due to the opposition of local powerholders.[113]

Fakhr al-Din plundered Baalbek soon after Anjar and captured and destroyed its citadel on 28 March after a months-long siege.[114] The Aleppine historian Utayfi observed in 1634 that "the city of Baalbek ... was in ruins ... destroyed by Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n in his war with Banu al-Harfush".[115] Yunus al-Harfush was imprisoned by the beylerbey of Aleppo and executed in 1625, the same year Fakhr al-Din gained the governorship of Baalbek, according to Duwayhi.[116] The Porte had replaced Mustafa Pasha in January 1624, but without Fakhr al-Din's agreement, the new beylerbey could not assume office in Damascus. Mustafa Pasha remained in place, and Fakhr al-Din secured from him the governorship of the Zabadani nahiya for his Shihab proxy Qasim ibn Ali. By March the Ma'nid emir turned against the latter, but the new beylerbey soon after died and Mustafa Pasha was reinstated in April.[117] Relations between Fakhr al-Din and Mustafa Pasha subsequently soured.[118]

A sketch of Fakhr al-Din, published in a 1646 work by his physician in 1632–1633, the Nazareth-based Franciscan Eugene Roger. The portrait was likely not drawn from life, but rather depicted what the illustrator thought what a Middle Eastern figure would look like.

Information about the career of Fakhr al-Din after 1624 is limited due to the deaths of his main contemporary chroniclers and the increasing silence of known Ottoman government sources. Most information about his post-1624 years are provided by Duwayhi.[118] The claim by the local 19th-century chroniclers Haydar al-Shihabi and Tannus al-Shidyaq that Sultan Murad IV, powerless against Fakhr al-Din's de facto control over large parts of the Levant, recognized him as sultan al-Barr in 1624, is a fabrication.[119]

Fakhr al-Din lent his backing to Umar Kittanji Pasha, who had been reappointed to Tripoli in 1624, but denied entry into the city by Yusuf Sayfa. After mobilizing with the new beylerbey in Batroun in April, Fakhr al-Din stalled from further military action while negotiating with Yusuf over fiscal concessions.[120] The Ma'nid emir secured another four-year term iltizam over Byblos, Batroun and Bsharri. Yusuf was restored as beylerbey in August, but his practical control was limited to Tripoli city, Krak des Chevaliers, the Koura nahiya, and the Jableh sanjak, while most of the remaining areas, including Homs, were held by Fakhr al-Din or his allies and son-in-laws among Yusuf's sons and nephews.[121]

A few months after Yusuf's death in July 1625, Fakhr al-Din launched an abortive assault against the city. He cooperated with the new beylerbey of Tripoli, Mustafa Pasha ibn Iskandar, in the latter's offensive against the Sayfas in the eyalet. He forced out his old ally Sulayman Sayfa from the Safita fortress and later was ceded the Krak des Chevaliers and Margat (Marqab) fortresses by Yusuf's sons. In return, Fakhr al-Din influenced the beylerbey to leave the Sayfas undisturbed.[122] In September 1626 he captured the fortress of Salamiyah, followed by Hama and Homs, appointing his deputies to govern them.[123]

Following the appointments of two more beylerbeys to the eyalet, Fakhr al-Din was appointed beylerbey of Tripoli in 1627, according solely to Duwayhi.[124] The Aleppine historian Ramadan al-Utayfi (d. 1684) noted that Fakhr al-Din controlled Tripoli until his downfall, but does not specify if he held office there.[125] Ottoman government records affirm that he held the iltizam of the Tripoli nahiyas of Arqa, Akkar, Dinniyeh, Safita, Krak des Chevaliers, Byblos, Batroun, in addition to the iltizam of Sidon-Beirut, Safed and Baalbek, for most of 1625—1630. His iltizam were expanded to Jableh and Latakia in 1628–1629.[123]

In 1630/31 Fakhr al-Din denied the attempted winter housing of imperial troops returning from a failed campaign against the Safavids in the parts of the Levant under his control. The Ottoman historian Mustafa Naima (d. 1716) holds that Fakhr al-Din's growing army and power by this point induced fear among the Ottomans that he would take over Damascus.[126] Muhibbi noted that the Druze emir had captured many places around Damascus, controlled thirty fortresses, commanded a large army of sekbans, and the "only thing left for him to do was to claim the Sultanate".[126]

The port town of Sidon, capital of the Sidon-Beirut Sanjak, which Fakhr al-Din and his family governed between 1593 and 1633 with occasional interruption. Sidon thrived under Fakhr al-Din, who fostered European trade in the port.

Fakhr al-Din's basic governing policy was based on the collection of sufficient revenue to satisfy the exorbitant demands of the Sublime Porte and to elicit the goodwill of the pashas of Damascus through bribes. To raise revenue, he introduced more productive agricultural methods to his territories and promoted commerce.[135] The English traveler George Sandys, who visited Sidon in 1611, observed that Fakhr al-Din had amassed a fortune "gathered by wiles and extortion" from locals and foreign merchants, counterfeited Dutch coins, and was a "severe justice", who restored the ruined structures and repopulated the once-abandoned settlements in his domains.[136] The tax farms which Fakhr al-Din and his family held practically undisturbed from the 1590s, were the principal source of his income. The price the Ma'ns paid the Porte for the tax farms remained fixed despite their increasing value, enabling Fakhr al-Din to keep the greater part of their revenue.[137]

Fakhr al-Din protected commercial agriculture in his tax farms and encouraged the growing of cash crops which were purchased by foreign merchants at a relatively high cost. Special attention was paid to silk production due to high demand in Europe.[13] The Levantine raw silk market had developed in the mid-16th century due to fluctuations in the Iranian silk supply. Mount Lebanon became a center of production by 1550 and its silk exports became an important commodity in Venetian trade by the 1570s.[138] Once in control of Tripoli Eyalet in 1627, Fakhr al-Din planted 12,000 or 14,000 mulberry trees in Tripoli's outskirts and another large mulberry grove in nearby Hisah.[139] As part of his efforts to foster the export of silk, he sent a gift of silk to Tuscany, which reciprocated the following year by sending him five vessels of goods.[140] Significant profits were also derived from cotton, grain, olive oil, and wine.[141] In Safed, where political and economic conditions in the sanjak had deteriorated in the years preceding Fakhr al-Din's appointment, the Porte lauded him in 1605 for "guarding the country, keeping the Bedouins in check, ensuring the welfare and tranquility of the population, promoting agriculture, and increasing prosperity",[25] a state of affairs affirmed by Khalidi.[25]

The Ottoman defeat by a Spanish–Venetian coalition at Lepanto in 1571 had increased European economic and political influence in the eastern Mediterranean, including a revival of European–Levantine trade.[13] Towards the end of the 16th century and during the early 17th century, the Ottoman Empire experienced a long-term economic crisis characterized by high inflation, heavy taxation, and political instability.[13][142][143] Fakhr al-Din turned the changing economic circumstances to his advantage by opening the ports of Sidon, Beirut and Acre to European trade ships, building khans (hostel-warehouses) for merchants there and establishing friendly ties with European powers.[13][lower-alpha 7] In contrast to the extortion of foreign merchants by the Assafs and Sayfas, the contemporary Arabic, Venetian, and Tuscan sources all emphasized the close relations between Fakhr al-Din, the French, English, Dutch, and Tuscan merchants and the English and the French consuls in Sidon.[146] Fakhr al-Din used a local merchant as his representative in negotiations with foreign traders.[140] In 1622 he secured the release of French traders captured by Moroccan pirates in Acre and assisted the completion of their activities in the town.[140] In 1625, before Fakhr al-Din's capture of Tripoli, the governor of Aleppo had that city's fortifications dismantled to sway foreign merchants there to operate in Aleppine ports; instead, the mostly French and Flemish traders relocated to Fakhr al-Din's Sidon. Under his watch, Sidon was poised to continue prospering at the expense of Aleppo and its Mediterranean ports.[147] In 1630 the Medicis granted Fakhr al-Din's request to post a permanent representative to Sidon by dispatching an unofficial consul who operated under the French flag to avoid violating Ottoman capitulation agreements.[140] In the assessment of Salibi, at a time when the Empire "was sinking to destitution because of its failure to adapt to changing circumstances, the realm of Faḫr al-dīn Maʿn [sic], in the southern Lebanon [range] and Galilee, attracted attention as a tiny corner into which the silver of Europe flowed."[148]

Fakhr al-Din spent the surpluses from his iltizam mainly on fortifications and other infrastructure, which promoted the order and stability required for agriculture and trade to thrive.[149] He obtained and strengthened fortresses throughout his early career, starting with the Chouf redoubt of Niha in 1590, followed in 1594 by fortifications in Beirut, Sidon's inland fort, and a fort guarding Sidon's port, the last of which he founded and is today called after him.[150] After his appointment to Safed, he obtained the fortress of Shaqif Arnun in Jabal Amil, formerly held by the Shia Sa'b family and which he heavily provisioned and garrisoned, and the Subayba fortress in Mount Hermon.[63][151] Sandys noted that Fakhr al-Din's "invincible forts" were equipped for a lengthy war.[46] After returning from exile in 1618, he strengthened the fortifications of Acre.[150] The coastal forts of Sidon, Beirut and Acre were "remarkable for both their strength and the fact they incorporated storage for merchandise", according to Olsaretti.[150] The expansion of commercial activity and increasing wealth in Sidon overseen by Fakhr al-Din is architecturally testified by construction of the Khan al-Franj (French Caravanserai) in 1618 and the mosques built in Sidon at the end of the 16th century.[150] He built watchtowers to guard the mulberry groves he planted in and around Tripoli.[152]

Fakhr al-Din kept the costs of his private army relatively low during his early career as he relied mainly on local peasant levies. Although generally less skilled militarily than professional soldiers, their permanent presence made them readily available in times of war.[153] European government estimates of his local forces between 1605 and 1614 ranged from 10,000 to 30,000,[154] while Sandys estimated the number to be 40,000 Muslims and Christians.[46] Local levies constituted the bulk of the Ma'nid army until the Battle of Anjar in 1623.[155] The peasants' principal responsibility was in agriculture, which limited the amount of time and the distance in which the Ma'ns could deploy them during campaigns. As their territories and agricultural production grew, the Ma'ns' utilization of peasant armies decreased. Khalidi noted that in 1617 the Ma'ns were not able to mobilize more than a small number of troops because the bulk of the levies were needed to work the mulberry groves.[134]

According to Khalidi and a Tuscan agent sent to Sidon, in 1614 Fakhr al-Din employed 1,500 professional infantry and 150 mounted sekban musketeers,[lower-alpha 8] who accounted for his largest single expense. The sekbans were a mobile force used in small-scale engagements, sieges, patrols over key roads, and against pirates and brigands.[155] From the 1620s onward Fakhr al-Din relied on increasing numbers of sekbans.[134] He compensated for the higher cost of their employment by taking larger shares of the surplus from his iltizam at the expense of the peasantry.[134]

Nationalist narratives by Lebanese Druze and Maronites agree on Fakhr al-Din's "decisive influence and contribution to Lebanon's history", according to the historian Yusri Hazran, though they differ significantly in determining the emir's motives and the historic significance of his rule.[168] Druze authors describe him as the ideal ruler who strove to achieve strong domestic unity, build a prosperous economy, and politically free Lebanon from Ottoman oppression. Making the case that the Ma'nids worked toward Lebanon's integration into the Arab regional environment, the Druze authors generally deemphasize his relations with Europe and portray his drive for autonomy as the first forerunning of the Arab nationalist movement.[169] On the other hand, Maronite authors viewed the legacy of Fakhr al-Din as one of isolation from the Arab–Islamic milieu. Fakhr al-Din himself has been adopted by a number of Maronite nationalists as a member of the religious group, citing the refuge he may have taken with the Khazens in Keserwan during his adolescence, or claiming that he had embraced Christianity at his deathbed.[170] In the view of the historian Philip Hitti the Druze emir's "long career (1590–1635) stood between Lebanon past and Lebanon future. It pointed to the Lebanese their destiny and established a clear-cut break between their country and Syria."[171] According to the historian Christopher Stone, Fakhr al-Din was utilized by the Rahbani brothers in their Lebanese nationalist play, The Days of Fakhr al-Din, as "a perfect historical predecessor for Lebanon's Christian nationalism of the twentieth century".[170] As inferred by contemporary or near-contemporary poets and scholars, the Sunni Muslim establishment in Ottoman-era Damascus generally considered Fakhr al-Din as a tyrant, rebel and infidel.[172]

Fakhr al-Din had his saray (government house) built in Sidon as early as 1598.[174] It consisted of a large courtyard, an iwan on the ground floor, several rooms and qa'as, a fountain, and gardens. It was positioned immediately south of a large square in the city, today called "Saray Square" after the emir's construction.[175] Other than the entrance of the building, which is characterized by ablaq masonry and muqarnas, the rest of the original structure had been gradually replaced through the early 19th century, when it was converted into a school; the courtyard is now a schoolyard and the garden is a playground. In its original form it was the tallest structure in Sidon and its garden had a wide variety of plants.[174]

Fakhr al-Din is commonly, though erroneously, credited with the construction of the caravansary complex today known as Khan al-Franj (the caravansary of the Franks). The complex's actual founder was Grand Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha (d. 1579). It received its modern name from its French mercantile occupants in the 17th century. It housed the French consul around 1616 until the consul relocated to a neighboring, formerly Ma'nid-owned property, the Dar al-Musilmani, in the 1630s.[176] The Dar al-Musilmani was built by Fakhr al-Din and it may have been used by him as his original residence in the city and that of his wives. It was later administered by the brothers Mustafa and Ali Agha al-Hammud, who rented it out to French consuls as late as 1712. It is currently a school.[177] Following the capture of Fakhr al-Din by Kuchuk Ahmed Pasha, the latter confiscated all of the Ma'ns' properties in Sidon, Tyre, Banias, and other places. He initially endowed the family's properties in Sidon, sixty-nine in total and mostly owned by Fakhr al-Din, his son Ali and brother Yunus, in a waqf administered from Damascus for the benefit of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Among the properties were dozens of houses and shops, two khans, several mills, a soap factory, a coffeehouse, and a hamaam (bathhouse).[178] The pasha sold Fakhr al-Din's and his brother's properties in Tyre, which were a mulberry and fig orchard, a large house, three mills, and a mulberry nursery.[179]

Fakhr al-Din's two khans in Sidon were the Khan al-Ruzz (the Caravansary of Rice) and the Khan al-Qaysariyya, both built directly on the Mediterranean shore of the old city. The first was observed by d'Arvieux as having large stores for the storage of rice and other commodities on the ground floor, a covered gallery for the rooms housing visitors on the top floor, a large courtyard, and a small mosque. In the present, the Khan al-Ruzz is in a poor state, with the lower floor used for a small workshops and the upper floor permanently housing Sidonian and Palestinian families, while the mosque has been replaced by a different structure. The smaller, neighboring Khan al-Qaysariyya, which abutted the Bahri Mosque, had a small, square courtyard with four stores, a second floor with a covered gallery leading to twelve rooms for visitors. D'Arvieux considered it the most beautiful of three khans of Sidon, including the Khan al-Franj. It is a sandstone structure and at present the courtyard has been built on, the lodging rooms and half of the stores have been subdivided and their structure changed. Two of the larger original stores of the Khan al-Qaysariyya remain intact and are used as shops.[180] Fakhr al-Din built dozens of shops in the markets of Suq al-Ars and Suq al-Harir, around the three khans. A number of them continue to function in the present day in the Saray Square.[181]

Fakhr al-Din's palace in Beirut, possibly built by Cioli, combined Arabic and Tuscan architectural influences, and contained an intrinsic marble fountain and extensive gardens. It was no longer extant by the end of the 19th century.[182]

The emir's palace in Deir al-Qamar was built in the Mamluk architectural style with little ornamentation, except its arched doorway entrance with its alternating yellow and white ablaq bands of limestone.[183]