Hubert Lyautey

In 1894 he was posted to Indochina, serving under Joseph Gallieni. He helped crush the so-called piracy of the Black Flags rebellion along the Chinese border. Then set up the colonial administration in Tonkin, and was then head of the military office of the Government-General in Indochina. By time he left Indochina in 1897 he was a lieutenant colonel and had received the Legion of Honour.[8]

In Indochina he wrote:

Here I am like a fish in water, because the manipulation of things and men is power, everything I love.[9]

From 1897 to 1902 Lyautey served in Madagascar, again under Gallieni. He pacified northern and western Madagascar, administering a region of 200,000 inhabitants, beginning the construction of a new provincial capital at Ankazobe and a new roadway across the island. He encouraged the cultivation of rice, coffee, tobacco, grain and cotton, and opened schools. In 1900 he became Governor of Southern Madagascar, an area a third the size of France, with a million inhabitants; 80 officers and 4,000 soldiers served under him.[7] He was also promoted to colonel in 1900. In Madagascar he wrote to his father:

I am Louis XIV and that suits me.

He believed that he did not crave power for its own sake.[9] He returned to France to command a cavalry regiment in 1902, before being promoted to brigade general a year later, largely a result of the military skill and success which he had shown in Madagascar.[6]

General Lyautey reaches Marrakesh, Le Petit Journal, October 1912

In 1903 he was posted to command first a subdivision south of Oran and then the whole Oran district, his official task being to protect a new railway line against attacks from Morocco.[10] French commanders in Algeria moved into Morocco largely on their own initiative, early in 1903. Later in the year Lyautey marched west and occupied Bechar, a clear breach of 1840s treaties. The following year he advanced further into Morocco, in clear disobedience to the Minister of War, threatening to resign if he were not supported by Paris. The French Foreign Minister issued a vague disavowal of Lyautey, because he was concerned at clashing with British influence in Morocco[11] – in the event Britain, Spain and Italy were placated by France agreeing to allow them a free hand in Egypt, northern Morocco and Libya respectively, and the only objections to French expansion in the region came from Germany (see First Moroccan Crisis).[12]

Lyautey met Isabelle Eberhardt in 1903, and employed her for intelligence missions. After her death in 1904, he chose her tombstone.[13]

Early in 1907 a prominent French doctor was killed in Marrakesh, possibly as he was attempting to lay the groundwork for French expansion, causing Lyautey to occupy Oujda in eastern Morocco on the Algerian border.[14] Having been promoted to division general, Lyautey was Military Governor of French Morocco from 4 August 1907. After taking Oudja, he went to Rabat to put pressure on the Sultan, getting embroiled in a power struggle between the Sultan and his brother, with Germany and France taking sides in the dispute.[10]

On 14 October 1909, in Paris, Lyautey married Inès Fortoul, widow of Joseph Fortoul an artillery colonel, god daughter of Empress Eugénie and president of the French Red Cross, who had just organized the Red Cross in Morocco.[15] He returned to France in 1910, and in January 1911 he took up command of a corps at Rennes.[6][10]

In 1912 Lyautey was posted back to Morocco, and relieved Fez, which was being besieged by 20,000 Moroccans. After the Convention of Fez established a protectorate over Morocco, Lyautey served as Resident-General of French Morocco from 28 April 1912 to 25 August 1925. Sultan Moulay Hafid abdicated at the end of 1912, replaced by his more pliable brother, although the country was not fully pacified until 1934.[16]

On 31 October 1912, he was elected at the seat 14 of the Académie française.[17]

On 27 July 1914, Resident-General Lyautey received a cable from Paris from the undersecretary of foreign affairs Abel Ferry.[18] He was quoted as telling his officers:

They are completely mad. A war between Europeans is a civil war. This is the most monumental foolishness that they have ever done.[19]

However, like many professional soldiers, he disliked the Third Republic, and in some ways welcomed the outbreak of war "because the politicians have shut up".[20] The same day War Minister Messimy told Lyautey to prepare to abandon Morocco except for the major cities and ports, and to send all seasoned troops to France. Messimy later said this had been a "formal" order.[21]

At the outbreak of war Lyautey was commanding 70,000 troops, all members of the Armée d'Afrique or part of La Coloniale. Under French law, metropolitan conscripts might only under very exceptional circumstances be made to serve abroad. Initially he sent two Algerian-Tunisian divisions to the western front, then another two, plus two brigades of Algerians serving in Morocco, and a brigade of 5,000 Moroccans. Over seventy battalions of Algerians and Tunisians served on the Western front, while one Moroccan and seven Algerian regiments of Spahis (cavalry) served dismounted on the Western Front – others fought in Macedonia or – mounted – in the Levant.[22]

In 1914 33 officers, 580 soldiers and the weapons of two battalions were lost in an expedition near Khenifra. Although this was to prove the only incident in Morocco during the war, Lyautey was worried about the threat of jihad as a result of German propaganda in Morocco, and many of the remaining legionnaires were German. Four territorial regiments were sent from the south of France and served alongside the mobilised European colonists.[23] By mid-1915 Lyautey had sent 42 battalions to the Western Front, receiving in return middle-aged reservists (who to his delight were regarded as seasoned warriors by the Moroccans), battalions of Tirailleurs sénégalais and Tirailleurs marocains, as well as irregular Moroccan goumiers. With 200,000 men Lyautey had to hold down the Middle Atlas and the Rif, suppressing rebellions by Zaians at Khenifra, Abd al Malik at the Taza, and al Hiba in the south, the latter aided by German U-boats. Lyautey argued that Verdun and Morocco were part of the same war.[24]

Lyautey disregarded advice to concentrate major forces in a few cities and took a personal risk by spreading them all over the country. At the end, his gamble turned right as he got a psychological edge over potentially mutinous tribal chiefs.[18] Lyautey had 71,000 men by July 1915. He insisted France would win the war and continued with the usual trade fairs and road and rail construction.[23]

His personal beliefs evolved from monarchism and conservatism to a belief in social duty. He wrote a journal article "On the Social Function of the Officer under Universal Military Service". However, his colonial policies were similar in practice to those of Gallieni, a secular republican.[6] He was suspicious of republicanism and socialism, and believed in the social role of the Army in regenerating France.[9]

Lyautey adopted and emulated Gallieni's policy of methodical expansion of pacified areas followed by social and economical development (markets, schools and medical centres) to bring about the end of resistance and the cooperation of former insurgents. This method became known as tache d'huile (literally, "oil stain"), as it resembles oil spots spreading to cover the whole surface. Lyautey's writings have had a significant influence on contemporary counterinsurgency theory through its adoption by David Galula.[25] He also practiced politique des races, i.e. dealing separately with each tribe, analogous to the British policy of divide and rule.[26]

Lyautey is considered to have been an apt colonial administrator. His governing style evolved into the Lyautey system of colonial rule. The Lyautey system invested in pre-established local governing bodies and advocated for local control. He advocated for finding a sub-group that didn't have nationalistic tendencies but had a strong desire for local autonomy then investing in this sub-group as political leaders.[27] He tried to balance blunt military force with other means of power and promoted a vision of a better future for the Moroccans under the French colonial administration. For example, he invited a talented young French urban planner Henri Prost to design comprehensive plans for redevelopment of the major Moroccan cities.[28][29]

In Morocco from 1912 he was publicly deferential to the sultan[10] and told his men not to treat the Moroccans as a conquered people.[6] He opposed Christian proselytising and the settlement of French migrants in Morocco,[30] and quoted with approval Governor Lanessan of Indo-China "we must govern with the mandarin and not against the mandarin".[9]

Lyautey briefly served as France's Minister of War for three months in 1917, which were clouded by the unsuccessful Nivelle Offensive and the French Army Mutinies. Lyautey was apparently surprised to receive a telegram offering him the job (10 December 1916) and demanded, and was given, authority to issue orders to Nivelle (the new Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front) and Sarrail (Commander-in-Chief at Salonika); Nivelle's predecessor Joffre had enjoyed much greater freedom from the War Minister and had also had command over Salonika. Prime Minister Aristide Briand, not going into detail about Joffre's removal, replied that Lyautey would be one of a War Committee of five members, controlling manufacturing, transport and supply, and thus giving him greater powers than his predecessors. Lyautey replied "I shall answer your call". Lyautey had to spend a good deal of time touring units and learning about the Western front.[31][32]

Lyautey was strongly disliked by the political Left, and when Briand reconstructed his government in December 1916, Painlevé declined to stay part (he had been Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts) as he was reluctant to be associated with him, although doubts about the replacement of Joffre by Nivelle rather than Philippe Petain also played a role (Painlevé was later himself Minister of War for much of 1917, then briefly Prime Minister late in the year).[33]

Lyautey was met with a fait accompli as Nivelle, whom he would not have chosen, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief by the acting War Minister Admiral Lacaze, whilst munitions under Albert Thomas (formerly Under-Secretary for War) were hived off into a separate ministry assisted by the industrialist Louis Loucheur as Under-Secretary of State. Lyautey had hoped to rely on Joffre, Ferdinand Foch and de Castelnau, but the first soon resigned from his job as advisor, Foch had already been sacked as commander of Army Group North, de Castelnau was sent on a mission to Russia, and Lyautey was not permitted to revive the post of Chief of the Army General Staff.[34]

Lyautey was hard of hearing and inclined to dominate conversation. As minister and cabinet member, he preferred to deal directly with the British government via the British Embassy, to the annoyance of the British CIGS Robertson (at a time when generals of both countries tried to prevent politicians from "interfering" in the details of strategy), who disliked Lyautey. On the train to the Rome Conference (5–6 January 1917) Lyautey stood before a map lecturing the British delegation on their Palestine campaign. Robertson, a man of notorious bluntness, listened to the lecture then asked Lloyd George "has he finished?" before retiring to bed.[32] Robertson told Lloyd George "that fellow won’t last long". He wrote to the King’s adviser Clive Wigram (12 January):

Lyautey … is a dried up person of the Anglo-Indian type who has been in the colonies all his life and talks of nothing else. He talks a good deal. He has no grasp whatever of the war as yet and I should doubt if he remains long where he is now.[35]

Lyautey attended the infamous Calais Conference on 27 Feb 1917, at which Lloyd George attempted to subordinate British forces in France to Nivelle. After a serious argument had broken out between Lloyd George and the British generals, Lyautey claimed that he had not seen the proposals until he boarded the train for Calais.[36] On being shown Nivelle's plan, Lyautey declared that it was "a plan for "the Duchess of Gerolstein" " (a light opera satirising the army). He contemplated trying to have Nivelle dismissed, but backed down in the face of traditional Republican hostility to military men with political aspirations.[37][38] Lyautey shared his concerns about Nivelle with Petain, commander of Army Group Centre, who would eventually replace him.[39]

Lyautey refused to discuss military aviation even at a closed session of the French Chamber, and at the subsequent open session declared that to discuss such matters even in closed session would be a security risk. He resigned as Minister of War after being shouted down in the Chamber on March 15, 1917, and after several leading politicians declined the post of Minister of War, Aristide Briand's sixth cabinet (12 December 1916 – 20 March 1917) fell four days later.[40][41][42]

Lyautey was commissioner of the Paris Colonial Exposition of 1931, designed to encourage support for the Empire in Metropolitan France. The introduction to the visitors guide contained Lyautey’s instruction: "you must find in this exhibition, along with the lessons of the past, the lessons of the present and above all lessons for the future. You must leave the exhibition resolved always to do better, grander, broader and more versatile feats for Greater France." A special extension line of the Paris Metro was built to Bois de Vincennes. Despite costing the French government and City of Paris 318m francs, the exhibition made a profit of 33m francs. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and the USA also contributed exhibitions on their overseas possessions, but not Britain, which despite repeated pleas by Lyautey cited the cost of its own exhibition of 1924.[45]

The Palais de la Porte Dorée in Bois de Vincennes housed part of the Colonial Exhibition of 1931; Lyautey's study is preserved as part of the foyer.[46]

The sarcophagus of Marshal Lyautey at Les Invalides, Paris

In his final years, Lyautey became associated with France's growing fascist movement. He admired Italian leader Benito Mussolini, and was associated with the far right Croix de Feu. In 1934, he threatened to lead the Jeunesses Patriotes to overthrow the government.[47] The same year he contributed to the effort to warn French people against Hitler through a critical introduction of an unauthorised edition of Mein Kampf.

Lyautey would have liked to have been a national saviour; he was disappointed to have played only a minor role in France's political life and in the First World War.[48]

Lyautey died in Thorey in 1934 and was buried in Morocco, but his body was reinterred in Les Invalides in 1961.[10][49]

•  France:
  • Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour
  • Officer of the Order of Agricultural Merit
  • Military Medal[62]
• French Morocco:
  • Grand Cordon of the Order of Ouissam Alaouite
  • Member of Order of Sherifian Military Merit
  • Colonial Medal (Morocco Bars)
  • Morocco commemorative medal
• French Protectorate of Cambodia
  • Commander of the Royal Order of Cambodia
• French Annam
  • Commander of the Order of the Dragon of Annam
• Anjouan
  • Commander of the Order of the Star of Anjouan

•  Belgium:
  • Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold
•  Japan:
  • Officer of the Order of the Rising Sun
•  Portugal:
  • Knight of the Order of Christ
•  Russian Empire
  • Knight of the Order of Saint Stanislaus
•  Spain
  • Knight Grand Cross with collar of the Royal and Distinguished Spanish Order of Charles III
•   Vatican
  • Knight Grand Cross of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great

• Royal House of Orléans
  • Knight of the Order of the Holy Spirit

• Portions of this article were translated from the French language Wikipedia article fr:Hubert Lyautey.
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• Bonham-Carter, Victor (1963). Soldier True:the Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson. London: Frederick Muller Limited.
• Clayton, Anthony (2003). Paths of Glory. London: Cassell. ISBN 0-304-35949-1.
• Doughty, Robert A. (2005). Pyrrhic Victory. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02726-8.
• Greenhalgh, Elizabeth (2014). The French Army and the First World War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60568-8.
• Herwig, Holger (2009). The Marne. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8129-7829-2.
• Woodward, David R. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson. Westport, Connecticut & London: Praeger, 1998. ISBN 0-275-95422-6

• Cooke, James J. "Insubordination in the French Colonial Army: Lyautey, A Case Study, 1903-1912." Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society Vol. 2. 1977. online
• Dean, III, William T. "Strategic Dilemmas of Colonization: France and Morocco during the Great War." Historian 73.4 (2011): 730–746.
• Hoisington, William A., Jr. Lyautey and the French conquest of Morocco. Palgrave, Macmillan, 1995.
• Jeffery, Keith (2006). Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820358-2.
• La Porte, Pablo. "Lyautey l’Européen: metropolitan ambitions, imperial designs and French rule in Morocco, 1912–25." French History 30.1 (2016): 99-120.
• Maurois, André. Marshal Lyautey. Paris, Plon, 1931. Translated to English and published in London and New York in 1931.
• Munholland, Kim. "Rival Approaches to Morocco: Delcasse, Lyautey, and the Algerian-Moroccan Border, 1903-1905." French Historical Studies 5.3 (1968): 328–343.
• Singer, Barnett. "Lyautey: an interpretation of the man and French imperialism." Journal of contemporary history 26.1 (1991): 131–157.