Media portrayal of the Ukrainian crisis

According to war reporter and veteran of the First Chechen War Arkadiy Babchenko, Russian mass media played a significant role in starting the war in Donbass stating that "this is the first war in history started exclusively by Goebbels-like propaganda".[122][123] Writing in March 2014 for Gazeta.ru, Yekaterina Bolotovskaya said the Russian media was presenting an "apocalyptic" image of Ukraine.[124] After a Russian channel claimed Ukrainians had crucified a child in Slovyansk, the former chief editor of Lenta.ru, Galina Timchenko, said, "This is an egregious violation of professional ethics. Not only is there no proof anywhere -- this is not even being questioned."[11] In March 2014, former economic minister Andrei Nechayev wrote, "Our propaganda on state channels is really running wild."[125] In July 2014, Andrei Malgin wrote in The Moscow Times: "I worked for Soviet newspapers during the terms of four Soviet leaders, from Leonid Brezhnev to Mikhail Gorbachev, and this is the first time the authorities have lied so brazenly and shamelessly. They have truly reached a new low."[126] Boris Nemtsov stated that Vladimir Putin and the directors of Channel One Russia and Rossiya Segodnya employed "Goebbels-style propaganda. If we are talking about the responsibility for spilling both Russian and Ukrainian blood, it lies not only with Putin, but also with such gentlemen as Konstantin Ernst or Dmitry Kiselyov. They operate in accordance with the simple principles of Joseph Goebbels: Play on the emotions; the bigger the lie, the better; lies should be repeated many times."[127] Russian hacker group Shaltay Boltay published leaked Kremlin documents telling journalists to justify the Crimean annexation, praise Vladimir Putin's development plans, and depict Ukraine as swarming with fascists.[128] Delovoi Petersburg and a journalist interviewed by Der Spiegel reported that several "Ukrainian" news sites, such as the Kharkov News Agency, were based in Russia.[129][130] The head of the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, stated, "The successful propaganda campaign we are witnessing here surrounding the Ukraine crisis is unique and highly sophisticated, even compared to Soviet standards."[131] Maksim Trudolyubov, writing in Vedomosti, said "Today's state-run media in Russia is a continuation of the KGB but much smarter than previous incarnations. They use modern tools, misinformation, confusion, and conflicting signals to prevent any collective responses and actions of citizens."[132] In 2016 Dmitry Kiselyov admitted using fake documents in his program.[133]

Writing for Sobesednik, Dmitriy Bykov said "the language of today's propaganda has become full of artificial connections. If you're against Russia's covert war in Ukraine then you must be for gluttony, against the motherland, and for soulless American fast food, only protesting against war because you want foie gras."[134] In February 2015, Irina Prokhorova, leader of the opposition party Civic Platform, commented that nationalism and "us vs. them" thinking had grown among Russian media, saying: "If I participate in some talk on television, they start accusing immediately, 'you're not patriotic, you're not a true citizen."[135] Vladislav Inozemtsev wrote, "The rhetoric of aggression and arguments justifying the use of force have become part of Russia's standard informational milieu."[136] Maria Alekhina from Pussy Riot[137] and Max Skibinsky[138] also criticized the Russian media's style of reporting.

Novaya Gazeta, Slon.ru, Grani.ru and Ekho Moskvy published some criticism of Russia's policy in Crimea and then Donbass. A number of them (such as Grani.ru) were placed on Russia's Internet blacklist as a result. Journalists who wrote commentary critical of the Russian government's actions usually experienced ostracism and were accused of being traitors or fascists by the mainstream media. Some experienced violence.[139][140] In March 2014, Vedomosti published an article by a Moscow university professor, Andrey Zubov, who was subsequently fired, in which he compared Russia's military intervention in Crimea with Nazi Germany's Anschluss.[141] Russian historians Alexandr Skobov and Andrey Piontkovski commented on the ideology of the self-declared Federal State of Novorossiya and concluded that its basic features (nationalism, imperialism) bear strong similarities with 20th century fascist movements.[142][143] On 28 July, Skobov was assaulted by unknown perpetrators and received several stab wounds in St. Petersburg.[144]

Commenting for Ekho Moskvy in July 2014, a Russian military expert, Vadim Lukashevich, ridiculed the MH17 crash theories proposed by Russian media.[145] Roskomnadzor issued a warning to the radio station after two journalists, Sergei Loiko and Timur Olevskiy, discussed the battle for Donetsk Airport.[146] Vitaliy Portnikov, writing in Grani.ru, mocked justifications of Russia's seizures of land.[147] Alexander Podrabinek wrote that Putin had a history of using wars to increase and maintain his power and was now using a war with Ukraine to deflect opposition in Russia.[148] In 2014, Boris Nemtsov wrote that the Kremlin demonstrated hypocrisy by advocating federalism for Ukraine, stating "Russia itself has not had any sort of federal state for a long time, since 2004", and said Putin sought to "punish" Ukraine in order to discourage a revolution against corruption from taking place in Russia.[149] In Profile.ru, Georgy Kunadze stated that "If a country as similar to us as Ukraine will be able to overcome the post-Soviet syndrome and becomes a successful contemporary state, its example could prove infectious for Russia."[150] In October 2014, Russian economic expert Stepan Demura criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine and 2014 Crimean crisis, saying they would harm the Russian economy.[151] Russian politician Leonid Gozman, commenting on Ekho Moskvy's blog, said that the only way to save Russia from the generals covertly sending soldiers to die in Ukraine is to "give Ukraine advanced arms".[152]

On 14 February 2015 a Russian journalist Roman Saponkov published a video of separatist artillery shelling Ukrainian positions from Debaltseve, laughing in the background about "what will RT say", "they must be using dummy ammunition, it's truce now". Russian media have widely reported that and, as result, RT and TASS agencies who worked with Saponkov previously both publicly condemned his comments.[153]

In April 2015 former Russian minister of finance Alexey Kudrin noted that the citizens are now victims of an information war started by the Russian government "against its own citizens", commenting on the process of pushing some independent media stations (TV Rain, Tomsk TV-2) out of the public sphere.[154]

In June 2015 a NTV journalist, Konstantin Goldenzweig, left his position after 12 years of work, apologizing publicly for "taking part in a collective propaganda madness".[155]

Opponents of the war in Russia frequently face discrimination and coordinated hate campaigns,[156] with the most extreme example being the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, which his daughter Zhanna Nemtsova blamed on Putin and Russian media.[157] Writing for Vedomosti, she stated that "Russian propaganda kills. It kills reason and common sense but it also kills human beings."[158] She said that Putin's "information machine" "employs criminal propaganda techniques to sow hatred, which in turn spawns violence and terror. Its modus operandi? To dehumanize the target."[158] In June 2015 Alexandr Byvshev, a poet whose anti-war works were banned as "extremist" earlier, was added to an official "list of terrorists and extremists" maintained by the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) and a "spontaneous collective condemnation" campaign, described as Soviet-style by independent media, began in his village.[159][160]

The Russian media's portrayal of the unrest in Ukraine has received wide criticism from Asian, European, Ukrainian, and North American media and governments, with the coverage often described as "propaganda", and "filled with omissions and inaccuracies".[69][76][161][162][163][164] The BBC reported on the use of misleading images, false narratives, misrepresentation and suppression.[10] The New York Times referred to Russian reporting as a "disinformation campaign" by the Russian government and the Associated Press called it a "Kremlin-led smear campaign."[29][88] Critics said the coverage aimed to discredit pro-democracy protesters and justify a Russian military intervention.[125][165] Der Spiegel wrote that Russian state TV "has no qualms about blatantly fabricating the news."[131] Writing for Reuters, Lucian Kim said "Lying – blatantly and repeatedly – is considered a legitimate weapon in the arsenal of hybrid warfare that Putin has unleashed in the struggle for Ukraine."[18]

According to Luc Maffre and Peter Pomerantsev, Russia's narrative has roots in Soviet dezinformatsiya and active measures.[45][166] Some commentators believed that Russian state-controlled media attempted to sow confusion.[14][167][168][169] Casey Michel said that they were trying "to confuse and complicate, to muddle and muddy the facts on the ground, to create multiple realities to back manifold predispositions."[170] Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo called it "information warfare" designed to "confuse, befuddle and distract", "to provoke doubt, disagreement and, ultimately, paralysis."[171] Some said that Russian state media were disseminating hatred.[172][173] Stephen Ennis of the BBC stated that Russian state TV "appears to employ techniques of psychological conditioning designed to excite extreme emotions of aggression and hatred in the viewer."[13]

In July 2014, The New Yorker reported that "nearly all Russians derive their news and their sense of what is going on in the world" from Russian state channels, whose broadcasts were described as "feverish anti-Ukrainian, anti-American, and generally xenophobic" and "full of wild exaggeration about Ukrainian "fascists"."[174] According to Sergey Golunov, such portrayals are part of a long-term trend that started in the early 2000s:

Most geopolitical textbooks that include conspiracy theories portray the United States as the primary conspirator against Russia and, accordingly, as a threat to Russia's existence, independence, and territorial integrity. Other conspirators cited include China, Germany, and Japan, as well as certain 'alliances' of states in international organisations and the Muslim world. Beyond risks to Russia's territorial integrity, some theories outline support for ethnic and/or religious separatist movements in and around Russia. Since the mid-2000s, many textbooks have also denounced a supposed 'fifth column' inside Russia.

— Sergey Golunov, Open Democracy, 13 April 2015[175]

Many western and Ukrainian media outlets have accused Russian media of fabrications and misusing images and videos.[65][67][176] Reporting for Watson.ch in Switzerland, Jürg Vollmer wrote, "For months, Russian propaganda has spread numerous false reports, fake photos and videos of Ukraine."[177] In March 2014, alumni and students at the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism started a project to identify false reports, StopFake.org.[178][179][180][181] In April 2014, Russia-1 presented a man by the name of Andrei Petkov as a pro-Russia activist who had been attacked by Ukrainians while NTV (Russia) called the same man Andrei Petkhov and said he was funding pro-Ukrainian extremists.[182][183] Maria Tsypko appeared in various roles on Russian channels during the Ukrainian crisis.[178][184] In May 2014, Russia-1 used footage from a 2012 conflict in the Russian region of Kabardino-Balkaria in a report alleging Ukrainian abuses against Russians;[131][185] the deputy chief described it as an "accidental error" after a Ukrainian website, InfoResist.org, found the 2012 news report.[186] The Kyiv Post reported that a journalist from the same channel, Yevgeni Poddubny, was involved in a plot to frame the Ukrainian army for the death of a Red Cross worker.[187] Russian media also presented images from military conflicts in Georgia, South Ossetia, and Syria as being from Ukraine.[180][188] Telekrytyka said an analysis of Russia-1's video of a gun battle in Crimea indicated it was staged.[124] The same channel falsely presented a construction site as a "concentration camp"[189] and a man critical of Euromaidan as a Ukrainian former diplomat, Andriy Veselovskyi.[190]

Multiple Russian news outlets have been criticized for producing unsubstantiated reports of atrocities. In June 2014, LifeNews aired footage which it said was evidence of Ukrainian forces using white phosphorus to attack a village named Semenyovka, near Sloviansk. Human Rights Watch analysts rejected the claim, saying that the footage was inconsistent with white phosphorus or an incendiary weapon.[191] Other Russian news organizations aired footage of white phosphorus in Iraq to support their allegations against Ukraine.[191] In July 2014, Channel One Russia stated that Ukrainian soldiers had crucified a three-year-old boy in Lenin Square in Sloviansk, although there is no such square in Sloviansk and the only witness to the alleged atrocity lied that she was a refugee from the town.[192] The same channel used a 1995 photo of a mass grave in Chechnya to depict Ukraine.[193] In August 2014, Russia's Zvezda channel was accused of editing footage of a failed rocket launch in Baikonur, Kazakhstan to use in a report claiming Ukraine attacked civilians in Makiivka.[194] In September 2014, the BBC reported that REN TV had used images of MH17 plane crash victims to support its claims of atrocities by Ukrainian soldiers in eastern Ukraine.[195] NTV (Russia)'s documentary 13 Friends of the Junta (August 2014), which described anti-war activists and critics of Russia's policies in Ukraine as "traitors" and supporters of "fascists", also received criticism. The Moscow Times reported that footage of Andrei Makarevich's concert in Sviatohirsk "was merged with images of the fighting that he supposedly endorsed. The program never mentions that the concert was for the benefit of Ukraine's internally displaced children."[196] Ukrayina aired a documentary demonstrating how the NTV movie attributed actions of Russia-backed separatists to Ukrainian armed forces and used numerous other manipulations.[197] StopFake.org reported that Rossiya Segodnya's Ukraina.ru mixed in images of the 2004 Beslan massacre, in southern Russia, into their documentary on Ukrainian children.[198]

BBC News found that Russian TV coverage of the 2 May 2014 Odessa clashes was misleading, noting that it "either completely ignored or seriously misrepresented the street clashes that preceded the fatal fire, thus giving the impression that the attack by pro-Ukraine activists on Trade Union House was completely unprovoked", made it seem that all the victims were pro-Russians, used manipulated or questionable evidence to support claims that several people had been murdered, and failed to mention that some pro-Ukrainian activists had attempted to help dying people.[199] Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group said that the Russian state media's coverage disregarded the evidence and a United Nations report[200] and she believed that "fascist" accusations were "an attempt to justify Ukraine's dismemberment."[201]

Particular controversy erupted over English-language television channel RT, which is owned by the Russian government. Referred to as the "primary hub of Russian propaganda in the West",[202] it was accused of distortions and omissions,[31][203] aligning its coverage to suit the Russian government, and fueling paranoia.[51][177][204][205] The British communications authority Ofcom reviewed four news bulletins from early March 2014 and found that RT "failed to preserve due impartiality."[206] A presenter for the channel, Liz Wahl, resigned on air after saying that she disagreed with the channel's "whitewashing" of the Russian government's actions during the 2014 Crimean crisis.[1][207] In July 2014, RT aired a controversial program, The Truthseeker: Genocide in Eastern Ukraine, which it later removed after heavy criticism. Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group said it was "full of lies" and called it "a truly sick broadcast".[208] In September 2014, Ofcom said it had launched an investigation.[209] RT also received criticism after publishing a story based on a document found on a conspiracy website, which stated that the RAND Corporation was advising the Ukrainian government to carry out "ethnic cleansing" and set up internment camps for eastern Ukrainians.[45] Der Spiegel wrote that Ivan Rodionov, the head of RT's video news agency Ruptly, "[defended] President Vladimir Putin so vehemently that one could be forgiven for confusing him with a Kremlin spokesperson."[131] Having reported Rodionov's claim that the Ukrainian government held "radical right-wing views", Der Spiegel noted that his news site "featured "right-wing radicals like Britain's Nick Griffin or German far-right extremist Olaf Rose, an ideologist with the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD), stirring up hatred towards the European Union and its Ukraine policies."[131] In 2015, RT falsely reported that Ukrainian officers had the right to shoot deserters.[203] Glenn Greenwald said that RT was no worse than the leading British media but Casey Michel stated "This trope – stating that all outlets are equally biased, and equally fallacious – exists firmly within the camp of whataboutism".[170] The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies described RT and Sputnik News as "vital elements of the Russian propaganda machine".[210]

In May 2014, Cathy Young of The Daily Beast reported that journalists were being abducted and "subjected to bizarre propaganda rituals on Russian television."[211] Irma Krat, a journalist and Euromaidan activist who was held prisoner from April to July 2014 by pro-Russian militants, said that LifeNews interrogated her after she had been injected with a drug and that NTV (Russia) had manipulated footage: "The interview was cut and spliced so that it makes me appear to have almost admitted to being a killer, a sadist, and as if I was renouncing the Maidan."[212] Interpretermag.com said that some Russian reporters were involved in serious violations of journalism ethics.[213][214] After pro-Kremlin station LifeNews approvingly filmed the abuse of Ukrainian POWs by pro-Russian forces, Dunja Mijatović of the OSCE said that the station's portrayal amounted to "unethical and inadmissible reporting" and an "abuse of journalists' rights and privileges."[215]

Some Russian media have been accused of employing whataboutism as a response to criticism of Russia's actions in Ukraine.[31][192][216] The firing of Galina Timchenko, chief editor of Russian news website Lenta.ru, after she published an interview with one of Right Sector's leaders, Andriy Tarasenko, was cited by western media as an incident of censorship.[217][218] She also faced pressure to use material from Russia's state-run media.[82] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty wrote that Russia-24's editing of RFERL's interviews was "a useful case study in how a video's context can be shifted to represent one particular point of view."[219] Rossiya Segodnya published an interview with Igor Girkin after removing his statements on working for Russia's Federal Security Service and chaos among pro-Russian militants.[220]

Following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, an article in the Indonesian version of Business Insider described the way that Russia Today was covering the incident as "ridiculous" and "in the only way it knows how: Blaming everyone except for the Russian government"[162] while Daniel Drezner noted how the Russian media narrative of the Malaysian airline shoot-down was a "grab bag of conspiracy theories" and suggested that Putin could become trapped by the nationalist rhetoric created over the incident.[221] Moreover, an RT reporter, Sara Firth, resigned in protest against the network's coverage of the crash, which she said was heavily biased.[222] She stated, "We are lying every single day at RT. There are a million different ways to lie, and I really learned that at RT."[223] The Associated Press reported that the theories presented by Russian broadcasters and newspapers "vary wildly in content" but "all point the finger at Ukraine. None admits the possibility that Russia may bear responsibility."[90] Julia Ioffe of The New Republic wrote that they were "peddling conspiracy theories" and "trying to muddy the water".[75] Writing for The Atlantic, Peter Pomerantsev said "[Russian media] were trying not so much to convince viewers of any one version of events, but rather to leave them confused, paranoid, and passive—living in a Kremlin-controlled virtual reality that can no longer be mediated or debated by any appeal to 'truth.'"[167]

In early March 2014, Shaun Walker of The Guardian reported, "Russian state television has gone out of its way to manufacture an image of the protests as a uniquely sinister phenomenon; a far-right movement backed by the west with the ultimate goal of destabilising Russia. ... On the ground in Crimea, what is particularly odd is that the most vociferous defenders of Russian bases against supposed fascists appear to hold far-right views themselves."[224] In August 2014, BBC News reported, "Russian state TV's coverage of the crisis has been consistently sensationalist, using a wide repertoire of propaganda techniques to incite revulsion and hostility towards the authorities in Kiev."[58] The Institute of Modern Russia wrote, "Inside Russia, and in areas of eastern Ukraine where Russian television is popular, the Kremlin's political technologists have managed to create a parallel reality where "fascists" have taken power in Kiev, ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine are in mortal danger and the CIA is waging a war against Moscow."[51] In March 2014, historian Timothy D. Snyder rejected the claims of a "fascist coup", stating "Although one can certainly debate the constitutional nuances, this process was not a coup. And it certainly was not fascist. Reducing the powers of the president, calling presidential elections, and restoring the principles of democracy are the opposite of what fascism would demand."[17] Some observers were critical of the Russian media's heavy focus on radical and right-wing groups during Euromaidan, finding that the protests were broad-based.[30] Commenting in the Kyiv Post on "fascist" accusations against Ukraine, Lily Hyde wrote, "Today's Russia, with its focus on a strong leader, primacy of the state, and aggressive imperial ambitions, is far more text-book "fascist" than Ukraine."[225] The Kyiv Post's Oleg Sukhov and BBC News' Stephen Ennis accused Russian media of "demonization" of Ukrainians.[226][227] Sukhov said Russian media regularly used fascist labels "without pointing out the relatively low support for far-right groups among the Ukrainian population or the presence of neo-Nazis among Russian-backed insurgents," and he criticized their presentation of the Ukrainian crisis as "orchestrated by the United States while ignoring Russia's direct involvement in support of separatists."[226] Bernard-Henri Levy said the claims of "fascism" in Ukraine were part of a "misinformation campaign."[228] Sergei Loiko, a Los Angeles Times correspondent interviewed by Novoye Vremya Ukraine, criticized Russian channels, saying "there were no reasons for [this war]. They are all fictional. They are built on lies, spread by Russian television. There was no reason for people to kill each other. It is a theatre of the absurd."[229] In an article for The Irish Times, Conor O'Clery wrote, "When leafing through Zhirinovsky's rag in Vnukovo airport it occurred to me how close his extreme outpourings are to those emanating from the mainstream Russian media."[230]

Timothy D. Snyder criticized the presentation of Russian-speakers in Ukraine as ethnic Russians who desired Russia's "protection."[17] In October 2014, Taras Kuzio wrote in the Financial Times that "the world view created by Putin's state controlled media has never corresponded to reality. Putin always mixed up "Russian speakers" with "Russians" in Ukraine, believing they were one and the same. So he was always unable to fathom the fact that a large proportion of Ukrainian armed forces and National Guard are Russian speakers."[16] The Russian media's depiction of the mainly Russophone city of Kharkiv as eager to join Russia was called "wishful thinking" by Katya Soldak of Forbes, who said that events in the city and a survey conducted by Alexei Navalny did not support the portrayal.[231] The University of Helsinki's Michael Gentile and Lucian Kim of Reuters were critical of the focus on ethnicity and language to explain the conflict in Donbas. Gentile stated that "rather than being divided between Ukrainians and Russians, the Donbas is divided between people who believe in the concept of Ukrainian sovereign statehood and those who are nostalgic of the Soviet past."[232] Kim wrote, "As strenuously as the Kremlin propaganda machine raises the hobgoblin of Ukrainian nationalism, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia isn't about ethnicity or language — it's about the kind of country that people want to live in."[233] Pierre Vaux, writing in Left Foot Forward, criticized "the efforts of Kremlin propagandists to portray the Ukrainian government as waging a war on Russian speakers", stating that "large swathes of the government are Russian speakers. So are many of the military leaders in the east, including commanders of volunteer formations, such as Semyon Semyonchenko".[234] In addition to Russophones from Ukraine, about a hundred Russian citizens joined pro-Ukrainian forces, "[discrediting] incessant Kremlin propaganda that Russian speakers are being persecuted in Ukraine", according to the Kyiv Post.[235]

Assertions that the West had broken an agreement against NATO enlargement were criticized by some commentators. Pavel Stroilov, who copied Kremlin documents, said that "if the idea of a broken promise is being used as casus belli in Ukraine, it is being used fraudulently."[236] Citing a 1995 article from The New York Times, Anne Applebaum said the suggestion that the EU and NATO had provoked Russia was "based on revisionist history promoted by the current Russian regime—and it is wrong. For the record: No treaties prohibiting NATO expansion were ever signed with Russia. No promises were broken."[237][238] In 2014 interviews with Russia Beyond the Headlines and Germany's ZDF, Mikhail Gorbachev also dismissed claims of a non-expansion pledge and said the idea that the West had deceived him was "a myth. The press had a hand in it."[239][240] According to Ben Nimmo of the Central European Policy Institute, the Russian media was "distorting Western perceptions of the conflict. Claims that NATO promised not to expand into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after German reunification, and that Russia's fear of that enlargement is justifiable, have entered the mainstream media, creating the impression that the West is to blame for Russia's direct assault on Ukraine."[33] Applebaum and French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy rejected assertions that Russia had suffered "humiliation" and "encirclement".[237][241] In an article for the Guardian, Christopher Clark and Kristina Spohr wrote that "misframing the past as a narrative of deceptions, betrayals and humiliations is a profoundly dangerous move" which undermined "the entire fabric of treaties and settlements that make up the post-cold war order."[242] Accused of trying to "encircle" Russia and deepening divisions by accepting new members, NATO said that the statement "ignores the facts of geography. Russia's land border is just over 20,000 kilometres long. Of that, 1,215 kilometres, or less than one-sixteenth, face current NATO members" and referred to the "Helsinki Final Act which says that every state has the right "to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance." And by signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia agreed to respect states' "inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.""[243]

Edward Lucas and Peter Pomerantsev noted that Russia's portrayal borrowed from Soviet narratives and terminology. "By telling Russians that, as in 1941-45, they are fighting fascists, the Kremlin aims both to galvanize its own population but also to delegitimize any dissenters: to speak against the war is to betray Russia itself."[28] Accusations of "provocation" appeared frequently in Russian discourse, turning "the dynamics of the conflict ... upside down: the attacker becomes the victim and the victim is accused of starting the conflict."[28]

On 2 December 2014, the Ukrainian government created the Ministry of Information; according to its Minister, Yuriy Stets, one of its goals is "active counteraction to the Russian information aggression".[244][245] In December 2014, Latvia's foreign minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, said that Russian news channels had become "very aggressive in what can no longer be considered normal news or normal journalism, but is more information warfare and propaganda" and said the EU was discussing whether "to invest jointly in alternative sources of information — not alternative propaganda sources, but an alternative normal European TV channel, with entertainment, with news, but with very factually accurate news."[161] Peter Pomerantsev said Russian reporting of the proposal sought to "draw equivalence," adding, "Just by saying, 'There's an information war,' it implies two sides doing equally naughty things, so it's OK for Russia to abuse information to spread disinformation."[198] Andrew Kornbluth, writing in The Moscow Times, said that "Russian messaging has worked by exploiting vulnerabilities in precisely those mechanisms of self-criticism and skepticism which are considered so essential to the functioning of a democratic society."[246] The Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society said that the Russian media "fueled" and "legitimized" the war and was "surprisingly successful in distorting the war and the way it is perceived and understood."[247] CEPI's Ben Nimmo described four Russian propaganda tactics ("dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from the main issue and dismay the audience") and reported that the campaign "relies heavily on the Kremlin-controlled media, and paid or sympathetic commentators in the West, to pass its messages."[33]

Russia-1's Crimea: The Road to the Homeland, which aired in March 2015, was criticized for distorting a March 2014 incident in which a man named Oleg Gorshkov attempted to stop a truck from breaking through a Crimean checkpoint,[248] for unsupported claims of an anti-Crimean "pogrom" in Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi,[249] and for a "sycophantic" Putin interview.[250] The same month, three Russian channels claimed that a 10-year-old girl had been killed by shelling in the Petrovsky region of Donetsk; BBC News said that the story had been "made up".[12]

Writing for Lithuania's Delfi, Viktoras Denisenko stated that "Some Russian propaganda narratives are identifiable and exposed, but quite a lot of them are stealthy and reach their audience and successfully make their way into mass perception where they become entrenched."[251] In April 2015, Lithuania's Radio and Television Commission banned RTR-Planeta for three months, stating that it had violated the law against "war propaganda, hatred and inciting discord" and ignored repeated warnings.[173][252] Some Ukrainians responded to Russian reporting with humour while others found it inappropriate.[102][253]

In September 2015 Linas Linkevičius called for more response and debunking to claims of Russian media, adding that "a lie is not an alternative point of view", which is an argument frequently used by media presenting "Russian point of view".[254] According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, "information campaigns using the stereotype of Russophobia are leading to a consolidation of political nationalism" in Russia; "attacking 'Russophobes' is a way of protecting Russian society itself from having any doubts about the Kremlin's policy", "mobilising them in the face of real or alleged threats", and "restoring psychological comfort" after a failure.[34]

In May 2016 Canal+ reviewed a number of reports by Rossiya 24 from France, verifying them with people interviewed by Russian journalists, and found out that their opinions were severely misrepresented by the Russian channel, either by manipulative editing or intentionally distorted translation. After the Canal+ program was aired, Rossiya 24 silently removed some of the most offending parts from the on-line version of their program.[255][256][257]

Russian criticism frequently involved claims that the western media ignored the influence of right-wing nationalist groups like Right Sector and the right to self-determination of those in eastern and southern Ukraine and[1][299] misrepresented Euromaidan as "peaceful".[1][280] Seumas Milne, writing for The Guardian, perceived "demonization" of Putin and Russia by the Western media: "the anti-Russian drumbeat has now reached fever pitch", "Putin has now become a cartoon villain and Russia the target of almost uniformly belligerent propaganda across the western media", and "anyone who questions the dominant narrative on Ukraine ... is dismissed as a Kremlin dupe".[300] In Left Foot Forward, Pierre Vaux described Milne's article as "the distorted apologia of a Kremlin advocate, one who performs front-of-house PR duties with the president himself" and questioned The Guardian's decision to publish it despite its own editorial criticizing moral relativism and disinformation.[234] In a piece that appeared in The Guardian, former British Ambassador to Russia Tony Brenton wrote that the western media "routinely downplayed the Russian side of the story", and that the "confrontational course" that the British government had taken on Ukraine "had been undoubtedly eased by ministers knowing they are playing a largely anti-Russian press".[301]

To counter Russian propaganda, Ukrainian journalists suggested that the European Union support the development of "a new generation of scholars focused on Eastern Europe as opposed to those seeing Eastern Europe through Russian lenses."[302] Salome Samadashvili of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies stated that the West's "view of the realities in the former captive nations of the USSR is often clouded by years of exposure to the Russian point of view."[120]

Some writers for western newspapers, including Stephen F. Cohen of The Nation and columnists for The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, were accused of apologism for Russia—justifying its actions.[202][216][303][304][305] According to Isaac Chotiner of the New Republic, Cohen's writing implied that "some sort of control over Ukraine is a requirement of Russian greatness. And then, after explaining this, [Cohen] says the whole crisis was "imposed" on Putin! This is apologetics done well: first you explain why bad behavior is actually sensible, and then you say that the bad behavior wasn't really under the control of the bad actor."[306] Pomerantsev and Weiss said that Cohen was using "willful misinterpretations" of statements by Ukrainian officials.[51] James Kirchick of The Daily Beast described The Nation as "Pravda, in English".[307] Cohen responded to criticism by stating that he sees Washington's hostility towards Russia as counterproductive and dangerous to both Russia and the US: "Before this began, Putin was the best potential partner we had anywhere in the world to pursue our national security", and "American national security still runs through Moscow".[308] Some critics said pro-Russian western media used whataboutism and focused disproportionately on the minority of Euromaidan protestors who belonged to the far-right.[216][309] The portrayal of the situation in Ukraine as primarily a conflict between the West and Russia, minimizing Ukraine, also received criticism.[310] Julia Ioffe of The New Republic wrote: "Ukraine, you see, is just "a former Soviet republic" and a catalyst for feelings between Russia and the West. It's a thing that can be "smuggled into NATO" because its desire or non-desire to be in NATO is automatically less important than how that "smuggling" would make Russia feel."[310]

Some portrayals of Ukrainians were described as "patronizing", reducing Ukrainians to "pawns" of the CIA.[281] Alexander J. Motyl of World Affairs criticized articles by Andranik Migranyan in The National Interest and Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen in The Nation, saying that "None of the texts sees Ukrainians as agents with a voice: they are marionettes, following the dictates of Washington. ... Putin and Migranyan probably can't see that this is racism. Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, who rightly rail against racism on the pages of the Nation, should know better."[291] Some commenters criticized Western media who blamed EU and NATO "expansionism" into Russia's "sphere of influence".[234][281][309] Anton Shekhovtsov, writing for Searchlight, said Ukrainians were deprived of agency and portrayed as a "mob allegedly manipulated by the West against Russia."[309] Fabio Belafatti, a lecturer at Vilnius University, was critical of Western media: "Reading many of the articles that accuse the West of "causing" the Ukrainian chaos by "provoking" Russia in its strategic interests and wounding its pride of great power, it's clear how the authors write from a distorted, hierarchical and, ultimately, orientalist (if not outright racist) perspective on the small countries of Eastern Europe."[311]

James Bloodworth of The Daily Beast criticized British newspapers, saying a perception of Russia as mistreated "extends deep into the Conservative press" and added that "the left has its own share of useful idiots."[303] He felt their writing implied "any Ukrainian desire for self-determination can go to hell: Putin is right to be concerned about the loss of his "sphere of influence.""[303] Historian Timothy D. Snyder found that both far-right and far-left publications echoed the positions of the Kremlin and Yanukovych.[312] Canadian historian Stephen Velychenko saw double standards, saying: "Latin Americans or Asians who reject US-Corporate hegemony are celebrated and supported as freedom fighters while eastern Europeans who reject Russian domination are condemned as extremists and Nazis."[313] In an interview with New Eastern Europe, Andrew Wilson said, "The way that the left talks about Russia's "legitimate interests" in Ukraine is bizarre. They would never say the same about Britain's legitimate interests in India or France's legitimate interests in Algeria."[314] John Mearsheimer's article for Foreign Affairs was criticized by Anders Åslund of the Peterson Institute,[315] Mariana Budjeryn of World Affairs,[316] Alexander J. Motyl of World Affairs,[317] and Tom Nichols of Thefederalist.com.[318] Aslund said it showed "contempt for democracy, national sovereignty, and international law. His thesis is that Russia has the right to decide the fate of the countries in its neighborhood in its own interest. ... Mearsheimer is denying countries their right to self-defense or to join NATO."[315] Budjeryn also dismissed Mearsheimer's argument that the EU and NATO had provoked the conflict: "That the Russians failed to design a model of development and a security arrangement that would be equally attractive and did not require arm-twisting to keep together is not the West's fault. Turns out, democracy and rule of law is not the West's property to peddle around the world, but a political model post-Communist societies chose to pursue when they were free to do so."[316] Motyl criticized Mearsheimer's article for "empirically preposterous claims" and "evidentiary cherry-picking, citing only those Russian claims that support realism, while ignoring the many others that do not."[317] Thefederalist.com's Tom Nichols questioned the depiction of Putin as a Russian nationalist and realist, writing that Putin had "reminded a previously slumbering NATO why it exists," "invigorated Ukrainian nationalism," "[violated] almost every rule of competent strategy" ("needless multiplication of enemies" and "letting emotion overcome policy"), and was drawing the US into the conflict, saying Barack Obama's administration "has no interest in a fight and would just as well walk away from European affairs if only given half a chance."[318]

In March 2014, Alan Yuhas wrote in The Guardian, "The occupation of Crimea by pro-Russian forces has been accompanied by a remarkable propaganda push by Moscow – an effort that has infiltrated western media and helped redefine the debate in Russia's favor."[25] In World Affairs, Arthur Milikh criticized Western journalism, saying "much of the Western media, unwittingly complicit, maintain a spirit of scepticism to avoid open accusations against [Putin]. For example, many of those labeled Ukrainian "separatists" are in fact Russian-trained and -equipped troops."[319] Some suggested false balance in Western reports on Ukraine. Paul A. Goble wrote that "Putin's lies have defined the situation rather than facts on the ground, and the Western media's focus on balance – on presenting all sides of the case even if one or more is untrue – gives thuggish leaders like him an opening."[285] Razom said that "Western media prides itself on showing all sides of any story, and so disseminates propaganda in a doe-eyed pursuit of unbiased reporting."[320] According to Chatham House, "the emphasis on 'balance' in many Western media ensures that Russian narratives, no matter how patently fraudulent, are repeated to European and American audiences by their own media."[321]

Occidental College's Agnia Grigas and the Cicero Foundation's Marcel Van Herpen wrote that Russian propaganda "has insinuated itself into and been internalized by the Western media, complementing Russia's military tactics in achieving Putin's expansionist goals."[22] Laas Leivat of Estonian Life also found that Western media were "internalizing" Russia's portrayal of Ukraine as an "irreparably dysfunctional" and "deeply divided" country.[19] Interpretermag.com's Catherine A. Fitzpatrick said mainstream media ignored allegations that Russian reporters had committed serious violations of journalism ethics.[213] In March 2015, Garry Kasparov said "Western media inexplicably continue to air, unchallenged, statements by [Putin's] cadre of propagandists."[322] According to a May 2015 report by the Atlantic Council, Moscow had succeeded in "setting the terms of the narrative for the Ukrainian conflict: international media typically refer to the separatists in Ukraine as if they are a distinct party to the conflict rather than an instrument of the Kremlin. When the Ukrainian government or even Western governments discuss the presence of Russian weapons or soldiers in the east, the media present their statements and then the Russian denial as if they were of equal value, but they are not."[71]

Newsweek was criticized for articles by Damien Sharkov and Felicity Capon.[203][323] Sharkov and the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, falsely claimed that Ukrainian lawmakers had passed a motion allowing deserters to be shot.[203] Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group found western reporting of the 2015 Ukraine bus attack lacking: "The BBC and other western media reports present the Ukrainian side, then the militant denial, leaving out any detail about the labyrinth of different versions from the latter."[324]

Casey Michel stated that many Western media "maintained a bulwark against Russian obfuscation" but others were "pushing Russia's fantasies" such as "Russia is the victim!"[170] Yuri M. Zhukov said that "ethnocentric" western and Russian portrayals of the war in Donbass, i.e. focusing on language and ethnicity, were not supported by data on the violence, which showed a stronger connection with local economic factors.[325]

In April 2014, historian Timothy D. Snyder stated that "Ukraine is now the site of the largest and most important free media in the Russian language, since all important media in Ukraine appear in Russian, and since freedom of speech prevails. Putin's idea of defending Russian speakers in Ukraine is absurd on many levels, but one of them is this: people can say what they like in Russian in Ukraine, but they cannot do so in Russia itself."[333] In August 2014, BBC News stated that Ukrainian coverage depicted Russia in a "negative light but language has been restrained in comparison to that on Russian TV."[58] They reported that Ukrainian media were increasingly airing "direct accusations" and "harsh criticism" of Russia but "alternative opinions are also aired, and presenters make no attempt to block dissent."[58] Conversely, Joseph L. Black, the Distinguished Research Professor at the Carleton University, stated that Ukrainian media used dehumanizing language towards the rebels, referring to them as "Colorado beetles" and calling for their "extermination as vermin"; in his view, the "Russian official press releases and websites were less inflammatory in their language".[4] Likewise, Mikhail A. Molchanov, professor and former chair of the Department of Political Science at St. Thomas University, said that the Ukrainian media consistently portrays Russia as an Asiatic "other" of "European" Ukraine and the West, referring to it as a "madhouse" and "Mordor", and to the Russians as "not a people, but a rabble".[334]

In December 2014, Reporters Without Borders condemned the creation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Information, which is intended to counteract "Russian propaganda", observing that "In a democratic society, the media should not be regulated by the government."[335]

In an article published in February 2014 by RFERL, Glenn Kates said some media's maps, such as one presented by Al Jazeera, oversimplified the divisions in Ukraine.[343] Andriy Portnov said, "The German, as well as British or French media, quite often publish misleading maps of 'ethnic zones'" and "automatically [ascribe] the preferred language of everyday communication to political preferences and even ethnicity."[344]

In May 2014, Der Spiegel reported that "when German talk shows invite Russian journalists to speak about the Ukraine crisis, they are almost always pundits who could have been taken directly out of the Kremlin propaganda department."[131] Munich University's Fabian Burkhardt studied the presentation of the Ukraine crisis on German talks shows, reviewing 81 guests from December 2013 to April 2014. He reported a "heavy lean towards pro-Russia guests," with many having "economic ties to Russia," and found that of the 27 guests who were journalists, none were from Ukraine, compared to eight from Russia, while most of the German journalists were experts on Russia rather than Ukraine.[51][345] In December 2014, a statement signed by over 140 German intellectuals criticised "superficial reporting and frequent appearances of Kremlin mouthpieces in television discussions on Ukraine" which had resulted in "misinformation and biased interpretations regarding Ukraine" becoming "anchored in the minds of many ordinary people".[346]

By January 2015, media coverage of events in Ukraine had decreased significantly.[347] The former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt said, "It's striking how most media just avoid the battles in eastern Ukraine. It's ongoing aggression in Europe. It must not be seen as normal."[348]

In New Eastern Europe, Sławomir Budziak stated that new pro-Russian media outlets had appeared in the Czech Republic, publishing "far-fetched claims, speculations, conspiracy-mongering, lies, defamation and propaganda" which fostered "a state of doubt" and "mistrust" in readers.[349]

Some journalists were physically assaulted or intimidated during the Ukrainian crisis. Tetiana Chornovol, a journalist who was one of the leaders of the Euromaidan protests, was severely beaten and sustained a concussion in December 2013 in Boryspil.[378] Also during Euromaidan, Ihor Lutsenko was attacked by unknown assailants and RFERL journalists were injured by riot police.[379] According to Reporters Without Borders, Vyacheslav Veremyi (Vesti) died after he was pulled from his taxi and shot by unknown assailants and 27 other journalists were injured in Kiev on 18 and 19 February in attacks mostly by Berkut and unknown assailants.[380] Oleksandr Yaroshenko (writing as Serhiy Levitanenko), an Odessa journalist who was critical of Vladimir Putin, was beaten on three occasions in the first half of 2014 and his apartment set on fire.[381]

Journalists were particularly vulnerable in eastern parts of Ukraine.[382][383] In April 2014, staff of Provintsiya, the local newspaper in Kostiantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, were threatened for reporting critically on the Donetsk People's Republic and the newsroom was burned down.[384] In May 2014, The Daily Beast reported that pro-Russian militants were conducting "systematic abductions" of journalists.[211] Irma Krat was held by insurgents from April to July 2014, accused of beheading Berkut members, and injected with a drug before being interrogated.[212] After Oleksiy Matsuka reported on links between pro-Russian separatists and Moscow, his car was set on fire and leaflets calling him a traitor were circulated in his hometown, Donetsk.[385] Pro Gorod, a pro-Ukraine newspaper in Torez, was attacked in April 2014.[386] On 21 April 2014, pro-Russian insurgents in Sloviansk abducted Simon Ostrovsky of Vice News, holding him in a basement and beating him before releasing him on 24 April.[387] Vyacheslav Ponomarev said Ostrovsky "needs to learn a lesson" and Ponomarev's spokeswoman, Stella Khorosheva, accused Ostrovsky of "not reporting in a correct way."[388][389] In May 2014, German journalist Stefan Scholl and Pavel Kanygin of Novaya Gazeta were abducted in Artemivsk by four men who accused Kanygin of "failure to make it clear that the insurgents were good guys fighting fascist oppression."[211] Scholl was soon released and Kanygin was also released after the abductors were paid.[211] Serhiy Lefter, a Ukrainian journalist for Poland's Open Dialogue Foundation, was kidnapped and held for three weeks by insurgents in Sloviansk.[390] Sergey Zakharov, an artist from Donetsk whose work satirized pro-Russian fighters, was held for six weeks and tortured.[391]

Other journalists who disappeared in militant-controlled areas included Roman Cheremsky, Valery Makeyev, Yehor Vorobyov, Yury Lelyavsky, Dmitry Potekhin, and Oleksandr Bilokobylsky.[392] Taken prisoner by LPR militants on 9 January 2015, Luhansk journalist Maria Varfolomeyeva was accused in March of spying for the Ukrainian military in late January, although she was in captivity at the time.[393] Sometimes family members of journalists were also seized. In August 2014, when militants of the Donetsk People's Republic were unable to find Donetsk journalist Viktoria Ishchenko, who had moved to Kiev, they took her parents.[394] The same month, militants from the Luhansk People's Republic seized Luhansk journalist Serhiy Sakadynsky, holding him until January 2015, and his wife, Mariya Havak, holding her for two months.[395] The Institute for Mass Information and the Independent Media Union of Ukraine – which began holding annual Enemies of the Press awards in 2007 – reported in June 2015 that the DPR and LPR were the most dangerous places in Ukraine for the media, citing 64 cases of abducted journalists, 21 cases in which journalists were beaten up, and 35 attacks on media offices which refused to cooperate with militants.[396]

Some journalists and media workers died during the war in eastern Ukraine. On 24 May 2014, an exchange of mortar fire near Sloviansk resulted in the deaths of Italian photojournalist Andrea Rocchelli and his interpreter, Andrey Mironov, and leg wounds to French photographer William Roguelon.[397] Rossiya 24 journalist Igor Kornelyuk and sound engineer Anton Voloshin died on 17 June 2014 during mortar fire near Luhansk.[65] Anatoliy Klyan of Channel One Russia died on 29 June 2014 in Donetsk Oblast when his bus came under fire while approaching a Ukrainian military unit in the middle of the night.[398] Andrei Stenin died in unclear circumstances.[213] Serhiy Nikolayev, a photojournalist for Segodnya, died on 28 February 2015 from wounds sustained during shelling in Pisky, Donetsk Oblast.[399]

The Ukrainian television journalist Ruslan Kotsaba was arrested by Ukrainian authorities on suspicion of treason for posting a video on YouTube urging people to dodge the new military draft. He faces imprisonment of up to fifteen years.[400][401] On March 18, the editor of The Working Class and former deputy of the Verkhovna Rada Alexander Bondarchuk was arrested under paragraph 1, article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, "Violation of territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine", for publishing two articles in his newspaper.

In May 2016, the Ukrainian hacker website Myrotvorets, which is curated by SBU and Ukrainian authorities, published a list of journalists who received press accreditation in Donetsk People's Republic in order to cover war on both sides; the journalists have been labeled as "collaborators with terrorists". Since the publication, a number of these journalists (including Hromadske.TV reporter Yekaterina Sergatskova and freelance journalist Roman Stepanovich) received death threats in emails and phone calls. The data publication was condemned by David Weisbrot, the chair of the Australian Press Council, as well as G7 ambassadors to Kiev and an international group of journalists, including the BBC, The New York Times, The Daily Beast, and The Economist.[402][403]

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Committee to Protect Journalists found a rise in attacks on the press.[404] Roskomnadzor required that news outlets register as Russian entities by 1 April 2015. The body granted registration to 232 out of 3,121 outlets (8%) by that date.[404] The Institute for Mass Information and the Independent Media Union of Ukraine noted 32 cases of censorship, 13 abductions or illegal detentions of journalists, and 11 attacks on editorial offices.[396] Media were threatened with denial of registration if they criticized the annexation or described the situation as an "annexation" or "occupation" of Crimea.[405] They were prevented from taking photographs or recording video of pro-Ukrainian gatherings.[405]

Some journalists were assaulted and intimidated in Russia, including Vladimir Romensky (Dozhd), Ilya Vasyunin (Russkaya Planeta), Nina Petlyanova (Novaya Gazeta), Irina Tumakova (Fontanka.ru), Sergey Kovalchenko and Sergey Zorin (Telegraph agency).[406] Alexandr Skobov was stabbed in July 2014 after writing an article for Grani.ru criticising the ideology of the self-declared Federal State of Novorossiya.[144] In August 2014, Arseniy Vesnin sustained a concussion in an attack while he was reporting for Ekho Moskvy on demonstrators supporting Ukraine in Saint Petersburg.[407] Lev Shlosberg (Pskovskaya Guberniya) was beaten unconscious in August 2014 in Pskov while investigating the alleged deaths of Russian paratroopers in eastern Ukraine.[140][406] A BBC crew was attacked in September 2014 in Astrakhan, also while investigating Russian soldiers' deaths.[408] Ksenia Batanova, a journalist and producer for Dozhd, a channel which reported extensively on the deaths, was attacked the same month in central Moscow, sustaining a fractured skull and concussion.[409] Timur Kuashev, a journalist for Dosh magazine and human rights activist, openly criticized the invasion of Eastern Ukraine as well as abuses by security services in southern Russia. On 1 August 2014 he was kidnapped in Nalchik and killed by unknown perpetrators.[139]