The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company

The forerunner of A&P was founded in the 1850s as Gilman & Company by George Gilman (1826–1901) to continue his father's leather tanning business; in 1858 the firm's address was 98 Gold Street in Manhattan. Gilman's father died in 1859, leaving the son wealthy. That year, Gilman & Company entered the tea and coffee business from that storefront. One source speculates that Gilman decided to enter a more respectable business in light of his wealth. In May 1861, Gilman turned over the tanning business to his brother Winthrop; George moved his tea business to 129 Front Street. Initially, Gilman & Company was a wholesaler. In early 1863 the firm became a retailer, Great American Tea Company. Quickly, it opened five stores, moving its office and warehouse to 51 Vesey Street.[19]

Gilman proved to be a master at promotion; the business quickly expanded by advertising low prices. The firm was able to offer low prices by acting as both the wholesaler and retailer. Gilman also built a nationwide mail order business. By 1866, the firm was valued at more than $1 million. In 1869, the transcontinental railroad was completed; Gilman created a parallel company, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, to promote the then-new concept of prepackaged tea under the Thea-Nector name. The tea company continued to use the Great American name for mail-order purposes. In 1871, A&P introduced another concept when it offered premiums, such as lithographs, china, and glassware with the purchase of coffee and/or tea at its stores. These premiums are now collectibles.[20]

George Huntington Hartford, mid-1870s.

George Huntington Hartford joined Gilman & Company as a clerk perhaps in the late 1850s; Hartford later was promoted to bookkeeper, then cashier, in 1866. By 1871 Hartford was in a position of authority and was responsible for expanding A&P to Chicago after its great fire. A&P's first store outside New York City was opened just days after the disaster. The firm rapidly expanded; in 1875 A&P had stores in 16 cities.[21] In 1878, Gilman left the active management of the firm to Hartford.[22] By then, the firm operated 70 lavishly-equipped stores and a mail order business with combined annual sales of $1 million.[23]

1888 advertisement for A&P from a Norfolk, Virginia guidebook, listing the range of items carried

To raise revenue, Congress raised tariffs on tea and coffee. Profits on these products declined; around 1880 A&P started to sell sugar in its stores. The company continued aggressive growth and by 1884 operated stores as far west as Kansas City and as far south as Atlanta. The company also operated wagon routes to serve rural customers. About this time, two of Hartford's sons, George (1864–1957) and John (1872–1951), joined the firm. A&P lore holds that George convinced his father to expand the product line to include A&P-branded baking powder. Over the next decade, the company added other A&P-branded products, such as condensed milk, spices, and butter. As it expanded its offerings, the tea company was gradually creating the first grocery chain. By 1900, the firm had sales of $5 million from 198 stores as well as its mail order and wagon route operations. However, other grocery chains were expanding more rapidly and blanketing their respective areas while the tea company's stores were spread over a much larger area. A&P quickly found itself at a disadvantage.[9]

Newspaper ad from New York City, 1922

In 1901, George Gilman died without a will, starting a legal battle among his numerous heirs. The senior Hartford stepped into the battle by asserting that, in 1878, Gilman gave him half of the company in an unwritten partnership agreement. Evidence provided to the court established that Hartford received half of A&P's profits starting in 1878 and that the company's leases were in his name. The heirs realized that without Hartford, the firm would quickly become unprofitable. Therefore, in 1902 they agreed to a settlement where A&P was to be incorporated, with $2.1 million in assets. Under this agreement, the Gilman heirs received $1.25 million in preferred shares at 6% interest, while Hartford received $700,000 in common stock and the remainder of the preferred shares. This gave Hartford control of the voting stock. Over several years, Hartford was able to repurchase the preferred shares from the Gilman heirs.[10] A&P opened an average of one store every three weeks. A nine-story headquarters and warehouse was built in Jersey City; it later expanded to include a manufacturing plant and bakery.[10]

By 1908, George Hartford Sr. divided management responsibilities among his sons, with George Jr. controlling finance with John directing sales and operations. The sons ran A&P for over 40 years. The younger Hartford moved aggressively to promote the A&P brand, dramatically increasing the product line. To make space for the new items, A&P replaced in-store premiums with S&H Green Stamps. By 1912, the corporation operated 400 stores and averaged a 22% gross margin, resulting in a 2% profit.[9] A&P's peddlers were also operating 5,000 rural routes in distinctive red-and-black wagons.[24]

Food prices were a political issue in the 1912 presidential election after a 35% increase in 10 years.[24] To counter this trend, some chains experimented with a no-frills format.[9] After long debate, the Hartfords agreed to John's proposal of experimenting with an economy store designed to operate at a 12% gross margin. Capitalized at only $3,000 including its initial inventory, the prototype economy store operated with only a manager, and without fancy fixtures. Within two months, weekly sales increased to $800 and the store achieved a 30% annual return on investment. A&P quickly expanded the concept; by 1915 the chain operated 1,600 stores.

A&P's tremendous growth created problems with suppliers. Cream of Wheat, the largest breakfast food manufacturer, demanded that all retailers adhere to the cereal's pricing per box. A&P purchased the product at wholesale, 11 cents per box (3 cents less), and decided that a 1-cent markup was appropriate for its economy store format. Cream of Wheat cut off supplies and A&P sued. U.S. District Court Judge Charles Hough ruled against A&P, saying that a manufacturer can establish retail prices. As a result, A&P and other large chains expanded manufacturing of private brands.[25]

Hartford Sr. died in 1917; control of the company passed into a trust with his sons George, Edward, and John as trustees in complete control.[26]

After World War I, A&P rapidly expanded; in 1925 it operated 13,961 stores.[27] The newer combination stores included space for meats, produce, and dairy, as well as traditional grocery items. Sales reached $400 million and profit was $10 million. However, the Hartford brothers were concerned that gross margins had reached 22% to cover higher costs and that the chain veered from its low-cost discipline. In early 1926, the brothers discussed the situation with division management and launched a program to lower prices and improve cost controls. That year, sales increased 32%; A&P moved its headquarters to the new Graybar Building adjacent to Grand Central Terminal.[10] In 1927, A&P established a Canadian division; by 1929 it operated 200 stores in Ontario and Quebec.[28] In 1930, the corporation's 16,000 stores reached $2.9 billion in sales,[27] resulting in a 25% grocery-store share in its operating areas, and about 10% nationwide. No retail company had ever achieved these results. A&P was twice as large as the next largest retailer, Sears, and four times that of grocer Kroger. Unlike most of its competitors, A&P was in excellent position to weather the Great Depression. The Hartfords built their chain without borrowing; their low-price format resulted in even higher sales. From 1929 through 1932, A&P reported a record $110 million in after-tax profits with each Hartford child earning over $5 million yearly in dividends and equity.[10]

A&P's success caused a backlash that threatened to destroy it. Thousands of mom-and-pop grocery stores could not match A&P's prices. While small operators had little political clout, they were supplied by thousands of wholesale distributors which had considerable political influence. Anti-chain store movements gained traction in the 1920s, but became stronger during the Depression. In 1935, Texas Congressman Wright Patman introduced legislation that would have levied a federal tax on chain stores. If adopted, this legislation likely would have ended A&P. While this legislation did not move in Congress, in 1936 Patman sponsored the Robinson–Patman Act that outlawed charging different prices to similar customers; this law passed. Patman then reintroduced his first bill. A&P retained a lobbyist and dropped its opposition to unionizing activities of the politically powerful American Federation of Labor. George and John Hartford also took the unusual step of publishing an open letter pointing out that the legislation would increase food prices. The tide of public opinion then turned against the bill, which was defeated.[9]

A&P supermarket, in Snowdon, Quebec, 1941

An A&P store in the 1940s

In 1930, the first supermarket opened in California. On the East Coast, Michael J. Cullen, a then-former A&P employee, opened his first King Kullen supermarket in Jamaica, Queens. Two years later, Big Bear opened in Elizabeth, New Jersey, and quickly equaled the sales of 100 A&Ps. In 1933, A&P's sales dropped 19%, to $820 million, because of the competition. After considerable debate, the Hartford brothers decided to open 100 supermarkets, the first of which was in Braddock, Pennsylvania. The new stores proved to be very successful; in 1938, it operated 1,100 supermarkets. The chain continued to build supermarkets and slowly phase out its smaller stores except in highly urbanized areas; in 1950, A&P operated 4,000 supermarkets and 500 smaller stores. Sales reached $3.2 billion with an after-tax profit of $32 million.[10]

A&P's success attracted the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-trust chief, Thurman W. Arnold, who was urged to investigate A&P by Congressman Patman. In late 1941, following Pearl Harbor, the military placed many large businesses off-limits to the anti-trust division because of defense priorities, leaving grocery stores as an option. The next year, A&P and its senior executives, including the Hartford brothers, were criminally charged for restraint of trade in Dallas federal court. However, in 1944, prosecutors withdrew the complaint realizing that the Dallas federal judge thought the case was weak. The same day, charges were filed in Danville, Illinois, and were assigned to Federal Judge Walter Lindley. The prosecution complained that A&P had an unfair competitive advantage because its vertical integration including manufacturing, warehousing, and retailing allowed it to charge lower prices. Prosecutors also complained that A&P refused to buy from food retailers that insisted on selling through brokers or refused to give A&P advertising allowances. The judges contended that if unchecked, A&P would become a monopoly. A&P countered that its grocery-store share was only about 15%, much less than the leaders in other industries. Judge Lindley agreed with the government, fining each defendant $10,000.[29]

In 1949, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld Lindley's decision; A&P decided not to appeal further. In September, the anti-trust division asked the court to order the spin-off of A&P's manufacturing operations and the break-up of A&P's retail operations into seven independent companies.[30] Thousands of letters poured into the Justice Department supporting A&P; the Hartford brothers gave extensive interviews with Time which put them on the magazine's November 13, 1950 cover.[27] Time wrote that, next to General Motors, A&P sold more goods than any other retailer in the world. John was quoted as saying, "I don't know any grocer who wants to stay small ... I don't see how any businessman can limit his growth and stay healthy."[27] The case dragged on into the business-friendly Eisenhower administration. In late 1953, the government agreed to drop its demands to break up A&P if it shut down its produce brokerage that also supplied competitors.[30]

In fighting the anti-trust suits, A&P also emphasized the considerable impact of its activities on the public welfare, which had been recognized as the legacy of George Hartford Sr. and his sons. The concepts pioneered and perfected by the Hartfords and their competitors enabled the public to enjoy healthier eating at lower cost. In 1950, the average American consumed 10 percent more food than in 1930, with poorer households enjoying an especially important improvement in the quality of the food they consumed.[31] John Kenneth Galbraith supported this contention in his 1952 book, American Capitalism, by citing A&P as an example of countervailing power. To support his thesis, he discussed a 1937 A&P study of the feasibility of opening a plant to manufacture corn flakes. The mere possibility of A&P producing corn flakes forced existing corn flake manufacturers to lower their prices by 10%.[32]

A&P's new stores from 1955 to 1970 tended to be smaller than competitors. This unit, in Pluckemin, New Jersey, remained unchanged (except for A&P's "sunrise" logo) until it closed in 2013.

In 1951, John Hartford died in the Chrysler Building after returning from a meeting of the automaker's board of directors. George remained as A&P's chairman and treasurer, appointing the corporation's longtime secretary Ralph Burger as its new president.[10] While Burger started with A&P in 1910 as a clerk in Glens Falls, New York,[33] he was a staffer who lacked John Hartford's strategic marketing skills. Under Burger, A&P continued to report record sales and operated with expenses of 12.6% of sales when the industry average was 15%.

Burger was also President of the John A. Hartford Foundation started by sons John and George in 1929, assuring Burger's control of A&P when George died in 1957. George's trust was dissolved; the stock began selling on the New York Stock Exchange (under the symbol GAP) at $59 per share. For the first time, A&P elected six outside directors onto its board. In late 1961, A&P stock peaked at $70.[10]

The seeds for A&P's 35-year fall from the country's largest grocery to bankruptcy (and later liquidation) were planted in the 1950s:

• A&P was starved of capital. While A&P was publicly traded, control rested with Burger, who headed both the corporation and the Hartford trust. Most of A&P's profit was declared as dividends to satisfy the income needs of the trust and its heirs. A&P also remained opposed to debt financing; the only source of capital was the depreciation account. While competitors invested in larger, modern supermarkets, A&P was slow to update its retail capital plant. By 1970, A&P stores were considerably smaller and mostly older than those of its competitors.[10]
• A&P placed too much emphasis on private label products. In 1951, the Supreme Court ruled that manufacturers could not establish minimum prices unless the retailer agreed to the arrangement. This decision launched a revolution in discount retailing[9] fueled by the rapid increase in television advertising that raised demand for national brands. Contrary to this, A&P invested substantial amounts of its scarce capital to expand manufacturing,[10] including $25 million to construct the world's largest food plant in Horseheads, New York.[34][35][36] Because A&P stores were smaller, its shelves were dominated by private-label products, and customers found that national brands were often out of stock.[10]
• A&P's labor costs were higher than those of most competitors. Because A&P stopped growing, a rising percentage of its workers were making higher wages due to their seniority. This was not a problem for most of A&P's competitors because they were rapidly expanding and had relatively fewer workers with high seniority. To offset higher labor costs, A&P tried to operate stores with fewer employees, resulting in long lines at checkouts and empty shelves.[10]

Ralph Burger attempted to reverse downward tonnage figures by reintroducing trading stamps, creating A&P's Plaid Stamps. However, by late 1962, the initial sales gains evaporated and the six outside directors threatened to resign unless Burger retired. When Burger left in May 1963, the stock was trading in the $30s.[10] Burger was replaced with a succession of presidents who were unable to stem the downward spiral. In 1971, the board turned to William J. Kane, who joined A&P in 1934 as a full-time store clerk. Kane believed that A&P could be turned around by focusing on basic store operations, including cleanliness, product availability, customer service, and courtesy.

When his program stalled, Kane implemented a strategy to substantially cut prices by converting A&P to a warehouse store concept that became known as W.E.O. Warehouse Economy Outlet (or Where Economy Originates). The problem was that most A&Ps were not large enough to properly implement the program; losses quickly mounted. In early 1973, the stock dropped to $17, and Charles Bluhdorn of Gulf+Western made a tender offer at $20 per share. Kane rejected the offer, although some stockholders thought that the offer was attractive considering A&P's continuing difficulties.[10] A&P exited California and Washington state in 1971 and 1974, respectively, making Missouri its westernmost reach.[37] In 1974, the corporation also left its long-time headquarters in the Graybar Building, moving to Montvale, New Jersey.[10]

During the Scott/Wood era, A&P started to build modern stores. This unit was in Belleville, Ontario. Note the "sunrise" logo introduced in 1975.

In February 1975, A&P considered a plan by Booz Allen Hamilton to close 36% of its 3,468 stores. Kane agreed to resign and was replaced by Jonathan Scott, the 44-year-old president of Albertsons. Under Scott, A&P closed 1,500 stores in three years, reducing to 1,978 units. Scott hired numerous executives from outside and pushed authority down to the regional level. During his first three years, A&P built 300 supermarkets ranging from 23,000 square feet (2,100 m²) to 32,000 square feet (3,000 m²), along with its first combination grocery-drug stores with 40,000 square feet (3,700 m²) under the A&P Family Mart name. The first Family Mart opened in Greenville, South Carolina as The Family Mart in 1977. The Family Mart chain consisted of mostly 40,000–55,000 square feet (3,700–5,100 m²) stores, and were among the first A&P stores to possess a combination of a full-service supermarket and pharmacy.[7] Scott continued Kane's efforts to improve basic store operations (including cleanliness and customer service) instituting a large training program. Weekly per-store sales increased from $37,000 in 1974 to over $70,000 in 1976, with total sales increasing from $6.4 billion to $7.2 billion despite the closures. Manufacturing was also reorganized.[7] While initial results were promising, by 1978, A&P profits started to slide due to economic conditions caused by high inflation.[10]

A&P sunrise logo, 1976-2005

With the share price down to $7, the John A. Hartford Foundation finally came to the conclusion that it could no longer wait for a turnaround. Erivan Haub, owner of the German Tengelmann Group, expressed interest. Born in 1930, Haub studied retailing in the U.S. after World War II and built his family's grocery business into a 2,000-store chain with annual sales of the equivalent of $2 billion. Although still having a home in Germany, his children were born in the United States. Haub agreed to pay $7.375 per share for 42% of A&P's stock. Haub also quietly bought other shares until he owned 50.3% in February 1981. Scott did not renew his five-year contract; Haub hired James Wood to become chairman. Wood, an Englishman who was the same age as Haub, previously ran the American Grand Union supermarket chain. Many executives recruited by Scott left A&P; they were replaced by Wood's associates from Grand Union.[10] In Germany, Tengelmann had considerable success with Plus stores; they were smaller units featuring low price private-label products along with a limited assortment of meats and produce. A&P opened several divisions of Plus stores in the U.S. to take advantage of A&P's manufacturing plants and numerous small stores. However, the concept failed to win American customers who were attracted to other chains offering low prices on national brands.[10]

James Wood realized that another massive store-closing program was necessary to turn around A&P. In October 1981, it announced that it would downsize to under 1,000 stores and close the Chicago division. Under the plan, A&P also closed its large manufacturing group except the four coffee warehouses. To finance this program, A&P planned to terminate its non-union pension plan, using its $200 million surplus. The plan's obligations were covered by annuities that cost only about $130 million because of the then high interest rates. A&P's non-union employees were covered by a defined contribution 401(k). William Walsh, then a recently retired executive, filed a class action that was ultimately settled by increasing the value of the annuities. A&P still realized over $200 million and was not required to pay taxes because of tax losses carried forward from previous closing programs.[10] The Philadelphia division also was to close, unless the unions agreed to contract concessions. When the unions refused, A&P started implementing the plan. The unions offered to purchase the stores, but realized that they did not have the capital required. As an alternative, the unions agreed to a profit-sharing arrangement if A&P formed a new subsidiary, and operated under a different name. The new banner, "Super Fresh", proved profitable.[38] A&P realized that its name was not the asset it had been.[10]

A&P Fresh Midland Park, New Jersey: Built in the early 2000s, it became an ACME in 2015 due to A&P's liquidation.

A&P started to acquire stores from other chains. In 1982, Stop & Shop exited New Jersey, not returning for almost 20 years. A&P purchased most of these stores to replace obsolete ones. In 1983, A&P bought Wisconsin-based Kohl's Food Stores (which had been part of the Kohl's department store chain) from BATUS, enabling A&P to reenter Wisconsin and Illinois. In 1984, A&P purchased Pantry Pride's Richmond, Virginia division.[24] The next year, A&P reinforced its profitable Canadian division by closing stores in Quebec, and acquiring Ontario's Dominion Stores.[28] In the U.S., A&P started construction of larger 40,000-square-foot (4,000 m²) supermarkets known as A&P Future Stores.[39][40] In 1986, A&P purchased Waldbaum's (with stores in southern New York and southern New England) and The Food Emporium, the latter an upscale New York City-based chain.[41] In 1989, A&P acquired Michigan-based Farmer Jack; also, A&P attempted to expand into Europe by bidding unsuccessfully for the Gateway Corporation (then the United Kingdom's third-largest grocery chain).[24] At the end of the decade, A&P reported a profit of 1.3% (compared to an industry average of 1.04%) on sales of $11 billion.[42]

In the early 1990s, A&P started to struggle again because of the economy and new competition, especially Walmart. In 1992, A&P's sales dropped to $1.1 billion; it posted a loss of $189 million. A&P responded by strengthening its private label program and overhauling its remaining U.S. units. Most stores smaller than 40,000 square feet (4,000 m²) were expanded, closed, or replaced with units from 50,000 square feet (5,000 m²) to 80,000 square feet (7,000 m²). The new stores included pharmacies, larger bakeries, and more general merchandise. A&P continued to suffer in the South and abandoned most of the region by pulling out of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Virginia; most of these stores were sold to Kroger. As a result, A&P was reduced to four regions: the Northeast, the Midwest (Michigan and Wisconsin), New Orleans, and Ontario. To reinforce the New Orleans division, A&P purchased six Schwegmann supermarkets; however, A&P was now reduced to 600 stores.[24] Christian W.E. Haub, the youngest son of Erivan, became co-CEO in 1994 and CEO in 1997 when Wood retired from that post. In 2001, Wood also retired as Chairman, with Haub assuming that title as well.[42]

A&P modified its sunrise logo in 2005, removing the colored bands and shrinking the oval's size. A modified version of this logo is still used on Best Cellars liquor stores

Upon becoming a private company in 2012, A&P debuted a circular logo. The previous two logos were also used until the supermarkets closed.

Nationwide, Walmart gained a dominant position in the grocery industry, forcing much of the competition to downsize, though in A&P's core Northeast region, Walmart still had not become a major grocery competitor. In 2003, after declaring its largest loss, A&P closed Kohl's Food Stores and A&P's remaining stores in Vermont and New Hampshire,[43] reducing it to just over 500 stores.[24] Also in 2003, A&P spun off the Eight O'Clock Coffee division (its last manufacturing operation) to Gryphon Investors for $107 million.[11] (In 2006, Gryphon sold Eight O'Clock Coffee to Tata Global Beverages for $220 million).[44] In 2005, A&P sold its 237-store Canadian division (consisting of A&P, Dominion, Ultra Food and Drug stores, as well as the Canadian Food Basics units) to Montreal-based Metro Inc. for C$1.7 billion in cash plus shares of Metro.[45] By 2009, the A&P name disappeared from these stores.[46] In 2007, A&P closed its New Orleans division, limiting A&P's footprint to the Northeast.[9] Also in 2007, A&P acquired Pathmark, a long-time Northeastern rival, for $1.4 billion.[12] This allowed A&P to regain its position as the largest grocery retailer in the New York City area, and the second-largest in the Philadelphia area. However, the Federal Trade Commission declared that as a result of the acquisition, A&P would be a monopoly in parts of Long Island and Staten Island.[47] As part of its settlement with the FTC, the corporation was forced to divest of some Waldbaum's and Pathmarks.[48][49]

When A&P marked its 150th anniversary in 2009, it was ranked only No. 21 by Supermarket News of the top 75 North American grocery retailers based on 2008 fiscal year estimated sales of US$9.6 billion.[50] Tengelmann held approximately 38.5 percent of A&P, with Yucaipa holding a 27.5 percent share; the rest was held by individual shareholders and investor groups. Christian Haub was Chairman. Eric Claus, then President and CEO, left A&P, with Sam Martin assuming these responsibilities.[51]

The recession hit many supermarkets as customers migrated to discount markets in even greater numbers. A&P was especially hard hit because of its increased debt load to complete the Pathmark purchase. In June 2010, A&P stopped paying $150 million in rent on the closed Farmer Jack stores.[52] In August, A&P announced that it would close another 25 stores in Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania: 13 Pathmarks, 6 A&Ps, 2 Waldbaum's, and 4 Super Fresh stores. In September, A&P announced it was selling seven Connecticut stores to Big Y.[53] On December 10, 2010, bankruptcy rumors surfaced; A&P stock tumbled from over $3 per share to below $1 before trading was halted. Two days later, A&P announced it was filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. According to documents submitted to U.S. Bankruptcy Court in White Plains, New York, A&P listed over $2.5 billion in assets, and $3.2 billion in debt.[13][14]

After the filing, A&P remained in operation (with its stock symbol changed to GAPTQ) while it developed a reorganization plan. In November 2011, the corporation announced that it had entered into an agreement to receive $490 million of debt and equity financing from Yucaipa, Mount Kellett Capital Management, and investment funds managed by Goldman Sachs Asset Management. The agreement enabled A&P to complete its restructuring and emerge from Chapter 11 as a private entity in early 2012.[54] At this time, Christian Haub left A&P, and Tengelmann wrote off its books the remaining equity.[55]

A&P briefly returned to modest profitability by cutting costs in its remaining stores, although customer spending further decreased. In 2013, again a company, A&P was put up for sale but could not find a suitable buyer. In January 2014, Sam Martin resigned. In March, Paul Hertz was named CEO and President as the company broke even.[56] On January 15, 2015, the trade publication Supermarket News reported that A&P was still for sale.[57] There were rumors of several parties being interested, including Cerberus, still owning Albertsons assets; however, no suitable offers were received. In May, rumors emerged that A&P was in more financial trouble as it declared a huge loss (in April) for the previous year, losing more business to better-managed competition. As customers were staying away, A&P considered its second bankruptcy filing in less than five years. There were rumors that A&P would sell all stores more than 40 miles from its corporate offices, shrinking the company to about 100 stores; other rumors were that the company would sell all its stores. Rumors also surfaced about a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and total liquidation, selling the company in pieces, as well as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy with selling in pieces. The company remained for sale as a whole, receiving no bids for any of its stores. Other alternatives were explored, including selling other assets.[58]

On July 19, 2015, A&P filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, immediately closing 25 underperforming stores. The next day, A&P announced that 76 of its stores (including Super Fresh and Pathmark units, as well as one Food Emporium unit) had been sold to Albertsons (owner of Philadelphia-based Acme Markets). Stop & Shop purchased 25 units, mainly Pathmarks in New York City; Nassau and Suffolk counties. The Key Food co-operative acquired 23 units,[59] mainly in New York City, including all remaining Food Basics and Food Emporium stores.[60] Morton Williams acquired two Food Emporium stores in Manhattan, while Wakefern Food Corporation, the cooperative which runs ShopRite and PriceRite, acquired 12 units, including 9 Pathmark stores.[61] Local grocers also acquired units either through sales or auctions.[62] All supermarkets were closed by November 25 (Thanksgiving eve). The last remaining portion of A&P, Best Cellars at A&P, had its stores auctioned in summer 2016, with 11 stores sold (none as going concerns) and 6 leases rejected.[18]

During the Wood era, A&P developed the "Futurestore" concept; these supermarkets used black-and-white decor.[68] Family Mart would serve as the testbed for the concept design.[69]

Futurestore was one of two concepts A&P launched during the 1980s (the other being Sav-A-Center; also defunct). Futurestore's first supermarket was in the New Orleans area in 1984,[70] where A&P converted two Kroger stores it had acquired. The first conversion of an A&P to the Futurestore format was in New Jersey in 1985.[71]

The Futurestore concept spread to A&Ps in the southeastern US, plus its traditional Mid-Atlantic region (operating in the Philadelphia area under the Super Fresh name), but, in the late 1980s, all Futurestores had been re-branded, or closed.

Like its sibling supermarket, Sav-A-Center, A&P Futurestore was identified by its features and color scheme. The Futurestore interior was black and white, compared to the green and white of Sav-A-Center stores. Most Futurestores also had a glass atrium storefront. In addition, Futurestore signage featured pictograms, similar to those of European supermarkets.

Futurestores typically offered the latest in gourmet departments and electronic services in exclusive neighborhoods. Futurestore's amenities were more gourmet- and specialty-oriented than found at a traditional A&P or Sav-A-Center supermarket. Futurestores also had more modern fixtures and machinery than A&Ps had at the time.

Since the concept was never adopted for a widespread rollout, A&P phased out the Futurestore nameplate, closing some stores and converting others to A&P or Sav-A-Center. Many customers felt Futurestore did not have the same panache of other upscale food retailers, which not only offered more gourmet products, but also cooked and delivered it.[72] A&P, however, did not immediately change the interior of the Futurestores, unlike its Sav-A-Centers, after A&P began to rebrand them as A&P Food Markets in the 1990s.

In the mid-1990s, A&P began adding pharmacies, concentrating on building units of 45,000 square feet (4,200 m²) to 65,000 square feet (6,000 m²).[24]

In the early 1980s there was discussion for A&P to open a store in Saudi Arabia.[73] due to the booming oil industry at the time. A&P Preservation reported in March 2018 that A&P did open a store in Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh. Tenglemann Representative Petra Czech says that the name was licensed to Saudi operators. The store was most likely converted to the Saudi rendition of Safeway.

• Anderson, Avis H. (2002). A&P: the story of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing. ISBN 9780738510385. Retrieved 9 November 2016.
• Levinson, Marc (2019). The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America, 2nd ed. Marc Levinson. ISBN 9780578562100.
• Walsh, William (1986). The Rise & Decline of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea company. Lyle Stuart. ISBN 9780818403828.