Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic

The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR;[lower-alpha 1] 22 April — 28 May 1918)[lower-alpha 2] also known as the Transcaucasian Federation, was a short-lived South Caucasian state extending across what are now the modern-day countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, plus parts of eastern Turkey as well as Russian border areas. The state only lasted for a month before Georgia declared independence, followed shortly by Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic

Закавказская демократическая федеративная республика
1918
A 1918 map of the Caucasus by the British Army. The highlighted sections show the successor states of the TDFR, which claimed roughly the same territory.
CapitalTiflis
Common languagesArmenian
Azerbaijani
Georgian
Russian
GovernmentFederative republic
 President
Nikolay Chkheidze
 Prime Minister
Akaki Chkhenkeli
Historical eraRussian Revolution
 Federation proclaimed
22 April 1918
 Georgia declares independence
26 May 1918
 Independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan
28 May 1918
CurrencyTranscaucasian ruble (ru)[1]
Preceded by
Succeeded by
Transcaucasian Commissariat
Democratic Republic of Georgia
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
Republic of Armenia
Today part of Armenia
 Azerbaijan
 Georgia
 Russia
 Turkey

The region that formed the TDFR had been part of the Russian Empire, and the 1917 February Revolution saw the empire dissolved and a Provisional Government formed in Russia. A similar body was formed in the Caucasus, the Special Transcaucasian Committee (Ozakom), but with the October Revolution and rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia the Transcaucasian Commissariat was formed to replace the Ozakom. Peace talks were initiated with the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, but broke down quickly as the Ottoman refused to accept the authority of the Commissariat. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ended Russia's involvement in the First World War, conceded parts of the Transcaucasus to the Ottoman Empire, who continued their invasion of the region in order to take control of the territory. Faced with this imminent threat, the TDFR was proclaimed as an independent state on 22 April 1918. Further negotiations began immediately with the Ottoman, which recognized the state.

Differing goals between the three major groups (Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians) ensured that the TDFR was not sustainable, and as peace talks again broke down, and facing a renewed Ottoman offensive in May 1918, the Georgians proclaimed their independence as the Georgian Democratic Republic on 26 May, seeking aid from the German Empire. With the Georgians no longer part of the TDFR, the Armenians and Azerbaijanis each declared themselves independent on 28 May, ending the federation.

History

Background

The South Caucasus had been conquered by the Russian Empire early in the nineteenth century, with the last annexations taking place in 1828.[3] Over the next several decades the administration of the region was variously modified in order to consolidate Russian control over the region, and a Caucasian Viceroyalty was established in 1845 (similar roles had existed since 1801).[4] Tiflis (now Tbilisi) was the seat of the viceroy and the de facto capital of the region.[5] The South Caucasus was overwhelmingly rural: aside from Tiflis the only other city of significance was Baku.[6] Baku grew in the later part of the nineteenth century as oil began to be exported from the region, and became a major economic hub.[7]

With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the Caucasus became a major theatre, with the Russian and Ottoman Empires fighting in the region.[8] While the Russians managed to win some early battles, the authorities were concerned that the local population, which had a large portion of Muslims, would turn and join the Ottoman forces, as the Ottoman Sultan was also the caliph, the spiritual leader of Islam.[9] In a similar vein, both sides wanted to use the Armenian population to their advantage.[10] However military defeats led the Ottoman to turn against the Armenians, and by 1915 launched the Armenian Genocide, in which an estimate 0.8 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed.[11][12]

The 1917 February Revolution saw the demise of the Russian Empire and the establishment of a provisional government in Russia. Grand Duke Nicholas, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, initially expressed his support for the new government, but was forced to resign his post.[13] A new authority, the Special Transcaucasian Committee (known as Ozakom, from the Russian Особый Закавказский Комитет; Osobyy Zakavkazskiy Komitet), was established on 9 March 1917.[14] This was meant to function as a "collective viceroyalty," with members from the various ethnic groups of the region represented.[15] Much like in Petrograd, a dual power system was established, with the Ozakom competing with soviets (councils).[16] With little support from the government in Petrograd, the Ozakom had trouble establishing its authority over the soviets, most prominently the Tiflis Soviet.[17]

Transcaucasian Commissariat

News of the October Revolution, which brought the Bolsheviks to power in Petrograd on 25 October 1917, reached the Caucasus the following day. The Soviet met and declared their opposition to the Bolsheviks, and three days later the idea of an autonomous local government was first expressed by the Georgian Menshevik Noe Jordania.[18] A further meeting on 15 November 1917, saw the creation of the Transcaucasian Commissariat. Composed of representatives from the four major ethnic groups in the region (Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Russians) it replaced the Ozakom as the government of the South Caucasus, and was set to serve in that role until the Russian Constituent Assembly could meet in January 1918. Evgeni Gegechkori, a Georgian, was named the president of the Commissariat, and was also named the Commissar of External Affairs. The other commissariats were split between Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Russians.[19] Formed with the express purpose of being a caretaker government, the Commissariat was not able to govern strongly, and was dependent on national councils (formed along ethnic lines) for military support and was effectively powerless to enforce any laws it passed.[20]

With Russian and Ottoman forces still nominally engaged in the region, a temporary ceasefire, the Armistice of Erzincan, was signed on 5 December 1917.[21] With a halt in the fighting, on 16 January 1918 the Ottoman extended an offer to the Commissariat to join the peace talks Brest-Litovsk, where the Bolsheviks were negotiating an end to the war with the Central Powers. However as the Commissariat did not want to act independently of Russia, they did not answer the invitation, and thus did not participate in the peace talks there.[22] Two days later, on 18 January, the Constituent Assembly had its first and only meeting, being broken up by the Bolsheviks, an act that effectively consolidated their power in Russia.[23] This confirmed for the Commissariat that they would not be able to work with the Bolsheviks in any serious capacity, and so began to form a more formal government.[24]

The ceasefire between the Ottoman and the Commissariat held until 30 January 1918, when the Ottoman launched a new offensive into the Caucasus.[25] Using the pretext that they were reacting to sporadic attacks by Armenian militias on the Muslim population, the Ottoman moved quickly to occupy territory. With Russian forces having largely left the front, the Commissariat realized that they would not be able to stop a full-scale Ottoman advance, and by 23 February agreed to start a new round of peace talks.[21]

Seim

Nikolay Chkheidze, who served as the Chairman of the Seim

The idea to establish a Transcaucasian legislative body had been discussed since November 1917, though the idea had not been acted on at that time.[26] However with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January it became apparent to the leaders of the Commissariat that ties with Russia had been all but severed, and with no desire to follow the lead of the Bolsheviks it was agreed to form their own legislative body, so that they Transcaucasus could more properly negotiate with the Ottoman. Thus on 23 February they established the "Seim" in Tiflis.[27]

No election was held for the deputies, but rather those elected to represent the Caucasus at the Constituent Assembly were named, with the voting threshold lowered to one-third in order to allow more members to join.[lower-alpha 3][28] Nikolai Chkheidze, a Georgian Menshevik, was named the chairman.[29] The Bolsheviks boycotted the Seim, stating that the only legitimate government for Russia (including Transcaucasia) was the Council of People's Commissars (known by its Russian acronym, Sovnarkom[lower-alpha 4]).[27] Ultimately some ten different parties were, though it was dominated by three parties, one for each main ethnic group: the Georgian Mensheviks and Azerbaijaini Musavat party each had 30 members, while the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (known as the Dashnaktsutyun)[lower-alpha 5] had 27 members.[28]

From the outset the Seim faced challenges to its authority. With a diverse ethnic and political makeup, and no clear status to its authority, there was conflict both within its chambers and outside.[30] It was largely dependent on national councils the represented the three main ethnic groups, and was unable to proceed without their consent.[31] Thus the Ottoman offer to renew peace talks, and a willingness to meet in Tiflis where the Seim was based, was refused, as the Seim felt it would only showcase the internal disagreements taking place. Instead they agreed to travel to Trabzon, in northeast Anatolia.[32]

Trabzon peace conference

A delegation representing the Seim was scheduled to depart for Trabzon on 2 March, however on that day it was announced that the peace talks at Brest-Litovsk had concluded, and the Russians would sign a peace treaty. Contained within the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the agreement that the Russians would give up large swaths of land, including major regions in the Transcaucasus: the territories of Ardahan, Batum Oblast, and Kars Oblast, all of which had been annexed by Russia after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, were to be returned to the Ottoman Empire.[33] With this sudden development the delegation postponed leaving, as they had to reconsider their stance.[34] As the Transcaucasus had not been part of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, they sent messages to various governments across the world, stating as they were not a party there they would not honour the treaty and refused to evacuate the territories.[35] The delegation would finally depart on 7 March, and arrived the next day at Trabzon.[36] On arrival the delegation, which with ten delegates and an additional fifty guards, was held up as the guards were asked to disarm. The unusually large delegation was made up of individuals selected more to represent the diverse composition of the Seim, with its various ethnic groups and political factions;[37] on their arrival an Ottoman official to quipped that "[i]f this was the entire population of Transcaucasia, it was indeed very small; if, however, it was only a delegation, it was much too large."[35]

While the delegates waited for the conference in Trabzon to begin Vehib Pasha, the head of the Ottoman Third Army, sent a request on 10 March to Evgeny Lebedinskii, the commander of the Russian forces, to evacuate the Ardahan, Batum, and Kars, as stipulated by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Vehib also told Ilia Odishelidze, another general on the Russian and Transcaucasian side, that in light of attacks by Armenian forces on the population near Erzurum that Ottoman forces would have to advance to keep peace, warning that any hostile reply would be met with force. These requests were replied to by Chkheidze, who noted that the Transcaucasus had sent a delegation to Trabzon to negotiate peace, and that as the Seim no longer recognized Russian authority they would not acknowledge the provisions of Brest-Litovsk.[38][39] On 11 March the Ottoman began their attack on Erzurum, and with little hope for success the mostly-Armenian defenders evacuated less than twenty-four hours later.[40]

The Trabzon peace conference finally opened on 14 March. At the first session the lead Ottoman delegate, Rauf Bey, asked the Transcaucasian delegation whom they represented. Akaki Chkhenkeli, the head of the Transcaucasian delegation, was unable to give a proper response, as it was not clear to him or his associates who they represented. When the question was repeated two days later, Rauf also asked Chkhenkeli to clarify the make-up of their state, to determine if it qualified as one under international law. Chkhenkeli clarified that since the October Revolution central authority had ceased to exist in Transcaucasia, so an independent government was formed, and as it had acted at the state level when it discussed the invitation to the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, it qualified as a sovereign state, even if independence had not been explicitly proclaimed.[41] This argument was refuted by Rauf, who noted that the Sovnarkom had authority over all of Russia and even though the Ottoman had sent messages to the Commissariat to join the talks at Brest-Litovsk, that did not confer recognition. Finally, Rauf stated that the Ottoman delegation was only at Trabzon to resolve some economic and commercial issues that had not been finalized at Brest-Litovsk. Chkhenkeli and his fellow delegates had little option but to request a short recess so they could message the Seim and determine how to proceed.[42]

Formation

Renewed Ottoman invasion

During the recess at Trabzon the Ottoman forces continued their advance into Transcaucasian territory, and by the end of March had passed the 1914 border with the Russian Empire.[43] The Seim debated the best course of action, with numerous delegates favoring a political solution. To this end on 20 March the Ottoman offered that were the Seim to declare independence then they could return to negotiations, as it would then be clear the Transcaucasus was no longer part of Russia.[44] The idea of independence had come up before, with the Georgians having discussed it for themselves in depth in the preceding years. However it was decided against as the Georgian leadership felt the Russians would not allow it, and the Menshevik political ideology leaned away from nationalism.[45]

By 5 April, Chkhenkeli, accepted the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a basis for more negotiations and urged the Transcaucasian Seim to accept this position.[46] He would not back down on giving up Batum, arguing that as the major port in the region it was an economic necessity, but this was refused by the Ottoman, who made it clear that they would only accept the terms of Brest-Litovsk.[47] Acting on his own accord, Chkhenkeli agreed on 9 April to further negotiations based on the terms set out, though requested that representatives from the other Central Powers participate in the talks. Rauf replied that such a request could only be considered if the Transcaucasus were an independent state.[48]

Tired of negotiations that were not going anywhere and realizing that they could occupy the contested territories by force, the Ottoman issued an ultimatum to the defenders in Batum, ordering it evacuated by 13 April.[49] While Chkhenkeli was receptive to the loss of Batum, recognizing its importance but accepting that it was part of the terms at Brest-Litovsk, the Georgian members of the Seim were adamant about keeping the city, with Gegechkori noting that it could be defended quite easily.[48][50] Irakli Tsereteli, a Georgian Menshevik, gave an impassioned speech calling for the defence of the city, and asked the Seim to refuse to recognize Brest-Litovsk at all. Armenian delegates had long been in support of fighting the Ottoman in response to the 1915 genocide and continued attacks on Armenian civilians, while only the Azerbaijanis resisted going to war, as they were reluctant to fight fellow Muslims.[51] However they were outvoted, and on 14 April the Seim delcared war on the Ottoman Empire.[52][53] Right after the vote finished Tsereteli and Jordania left to join the defence of Batum, while the delegation in Trabzon was told to return to Tiflis immediately.[54] Some Azerbaijani delegates defied this order and remained in an attempt to negotiate.[55]

Establishment

The Ottoman military superiority was made apparent right away.[56] Batum was occupied on 14 April, with little resistance. Kars was also attacked, but a force of 3000 Armenian soldiers, plus artillery support, were able to hold the city until 25 April when it was evacuated.[57] With most of their desired territory already under their control, and not willing to lose more soldiers, the Ottoman offered another truce on 22 April, and waited for the Transcaucasians to reply.[58]

In the face of Ottoman military superiority, the Georgian National Council decided that the only option was for Transcaucasia to finally declare itself an independent state. This idea had been discussed as early as February 1918 in response to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, but the Seim had hesitated as they wanted to keep their link with Russia. With that no longer a concern, there was no real issue.[59]

The idea was debated in the Seim on 22 April, with the Georgians leading the debate, noting that the Ottoman had already agreed to resume peace talks, so long as the Transcaucasus would meet them as an independent state.[60] The choice to move forward was not initially supported by all sides: the Dashnaks felt that it was the best option at the time to stop the Ottoman advance, though they were reluctant to give up so much territory, while the Musavats were still hesitant to fight fellow Muslims, but conceded that independence was the only way to ensure the region would not be divided by foreign states. The only major opposition came from the Socialist Revolutionary Party, whose member Lev Tumanov argued that the people of Transcaucasia did not support such an action, and that the Musavat claim that "conscience not fear" was the driving force, instead argued that it was "fear and not conscience". Tumanov concluded his remarks by saying that they would all come to regret this act.[61]

The debate finished, Davit Oniashvili, a Menshevik, proposed the motion for the Seim "to proclaim Transcaucasia an independent democratic federative republic".[62] Some deputies left the chamber in order to avoid voting against the matter, so the motion passed with few dissents.[63] Immediately the new republic sent a message to Vehib announcing this development, and that it would accept the provisions of the Treat of Brest-Litovsk, and surrendered Kars to the Ottoman.[64] The Ottoman Empire confirmed its recognition of the new republic, the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) on 28 April.[65] Despite this recognition the Ottoman continued their advance into Transcaucasian territory and by 25 April had occupied both Erzerum and Kars.[66]

Independence

Akaki Chkhenkeli served both as prime minister and foreign affairs minister for the republic

The first matter for the TDFR was to form a cabinet to lead the new government. As the Commissariat had ceased to exist upon the declaration of independence, Gegechkori had lost his leading role, and while it had been agreed during the debates that Chkhenkeli would take up the role of prime minister, refused to serve in a caretaker position until a new cabinet could be formed. This was not finalized until 26 April, so for four days the TDFT effectively had no executive.[63] With pressing needs to attend to, Chkhenkeli took up his role as prime minister before this, and ordered Armenian forces to cease fighting, as well as requesting that Vehib meet him for peace negotiations in Batum. The change of location was deliberate, as Chkhenkeli needed to be able to easily travel to Tiflis if required, something that was not possible from Trabzon.[67]

Upset at Chkhenkeli's actions over the previous days, namely the evacuation of Kars, the Dashnaks initially refused to participate in the cabinet. After negotiations with the Mensheviks, who warned that they would only support having Chkhenkeli or the Dashnak Hovhannes Kajaznuni in charge, the Dashnaks relented; having Kajaznuni an Armenian, would give the perception that the TDFR intended to keep fighting, which would threaten the rest of Armenia.[68] The cabinet was confirmed by the Seim on 26 April, consisting of thirteen individuals. Chkhenkeli, aside from being prime minister, became foreign minister, with the remaining positions being split among Armenians (four), Azerbaijanis (five), and Georgians (three).[69] Azerbaijanis and Georgians took up the leading positions in the cabinet, an action that historian Firuz Kazemzadeh said revealed "the relationship of forces in Transcaucasia" at the time.[65] In his initial address to the Seim, Chkhenkeli announced that he would work ensure all citizens had equality, and to establish borders for the TDFR that were based on agreement with their neighbours.[70] He further laid out a platform with five main points: write a constitution; delineate borders; end the war; combat counter-revolution and anarchy; and land reform.[65]

A new peace conference was convened at Batum on 11 May, with both Chkhenkeli and Vehib in attendance.[71] Prior to the conference Chkhenkeli repeated his request to have the other Central Powers present, a message the Ottoman ignored.[72] Both sides thus invited observers: the TDFR brought a small German contingent, led by General Otto von Lossow, while the Ottoman had representatives from the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, an unrecognized state they were backing. Chkhenkeli expressed a desire to work on terms based on Brest-Litovsk, but this was refused by the Ottoman delegation, led by the Halil Bey, the Ottoman minister of justice. Halil noted that as conflict had begun between the two states the Ottoman would no longer accept Brest-Litovsk, and instead presented Chkhenkeli with a draft treaty previously prepared.[73]

The treaty contained twelve articles, which called for the Ottoman to be ceded not only Ardahan, Batum, and Kars, but also the Akhalkalik, Akhaltsikh, and Surmalin Uyezds, and large parts of the Aleksandropol and Echmiadzin Uyezds, mainly along the tracks of the Kars-Julfa railway. The territory named would effectively see all of Armenia brought into the Ottoman Empire.[74] The railway was desired as the Ottoman wanted t be able to quickly reach North Persia, where they were fighting British forces in the Persian Campaign, though historian Richard G. Hovannisian has suggested that the real reason was to allow the Ottoman a means to reach Baku.[75]

After giving the TDFR several days to consider their options, the Ottoman resumed their military advances into Armenia on 21 May. They engaged the Armenians at the battles of Bash Abarn (21–24 May, Sardarapat (21–29 May and Kara Killisse (24–28 May, though were forced to halt their advance as they were unable to soundly defeat the Armenians. These battles slowed the Ottoman advance and eventually forced their retreat.[76][77]

Dissolution

German intervention

By 22 May the Ottoman forces, split into two groups, were 40 kilometres (25 mi) from Erevan and 120 kilometres (75 mi) from Tiflis.[78] With this threat, the TDFR reached out to von Lossow and the Germans in hopes of securing their help and protection. Von Lossow had previously offered to mediate between the TDFR and Ottoman on 19 May, though this had not led to any progress.[79] Though the Germans and Ottoman were nominally allies, German opinion toward the Ottoman had deteriorated in the preceding months, as the German public had not approved of reports that the Ottoman were massacring Christians, nor did the German government appreciate the Ottoman's advances into territory not agreed to at Brest-Litovsk.[80] The Germans also had their own strategic interests in the Caucasus, as they wanted both a possible path to attack British India and access to raw materials in the region, both of which could be blocked by the Ottoman.[81]

With the Armenians fighting Ottoman forces, and the Azerbaijanis having their own issues with Bolsheviks controlling Baku, the Georgians concluded that they had no future in the TDFR.[82] On 14 May Jordania went to Batum to request German assistance to help secure Georgian independence. He returned to Tiflis on 21 May and expressed confidence that Georgia could become independent.[83] Representatives of the Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians met on 21 May to discuss the future of the TDFR, and agreed that it was not likely to last much longer. The next day the Georgians met alone, and resolved that independence was their only logical choice.[82] Jordania and Zurab Avalishvili drafted a Declaration of Independence on 22 May, before Jordania again left for Batum to meet von Lossow.[84] Von Lossow replied on 24 May that as he was only authorized to work with the entire TDFR, and as it was becoming apparent that it would not last long, he would have to leave Trabzon and consult with his government on how to further proceed.[85]

Break-up

Irakli Tsereteli gave the final speech of the Seim, calling for the dissolution of the TDFR and the independence of Georgia

On 26 May Tsereteli gave two speeches in the Seim. In the first he explained that the TDFR was unable to continue as there was a lack of unity among the people, and that ethnic strive led to a division of action in regards to the Ottoman invasion. Tsereteli's second speech, which blamed the Azerbaijanis for failing to support the defence of the TDFR, explained that as the federation had failed it was time for Georgia to declare itself independent.[86] At 15:00 a motion was made: "Because on the questions of war and peace there arose basic differences among the peoples who had created the Transcaucasian Republic, and because it became impossible to establish one authoritative order speaking in the name of all Transcaucasia, the Seim certifies the fact of the dissolution of Transcaucasia and lays down its powers."[87] The delegates from the Seim left the chamber and were replaced by those from the Georgian National Council. Jordania then read the Georgian declaration of independence and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Georgia.[88] This was followed two days later by both Armenia and Azerbaijan making their own declarations of independence, creating the Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, respectively.[89] All three newly independent states signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman on 4 June, effectively ending the conflict for good.[90]

Legacy

As the TDFR only lasted a month, it did not leave much of a legacy. Historians Adrian Brisku and Timothy K. Blauvelt have noted that it "seemed both to the actors at the time and to later scholars of the region to be unique, contingent, and certainly unrepeatable."[91] Stephen F. Jones stated it was "the first and last attempt at an independent Transcaucasian union,"[92] while Hovannisian noted that despite the name, the actions of the TDFR during its short existence demonstrated that it "was not independent, democratic, federative, or a republic".[63]

While the three successor states would be reunited within the Soviet Union as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, this would only exist between 1922 and 1936 before again being broken up into three union republics.[93] Within the modern states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the TDFR is largely ignored in their respective national historiography, only given consideration as the first stage towards their own independent states.[94]

Government

Cabinet

Portfolio Minister
Prime Minister Akaki Chkhenkeli
Minister of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli
Minister of the Interior Noe Ramishvili
Minister of Finance Alexander Khatisian
Minister of Transportation Khudadat bey Malik-Aslanov
Minister of Justice Fatali Khan Khoyski
Minister of War Grigol Giorgadze
Minister of Agriculture Noe Khomeriki
Minister of Education Nasib Yusifbeyli
Minister of Commerce and Industry Mammad Hasan Hajinski
Minister of Supplies Avetik Saakian
Minister of Social Welfare Hovhannes Kajaznuni
Minister of Labour Aramayis Erzinkian
Minister State Control Ibrahim Haidarov

Source:[69]

See also

References

Notes

  1. Russian: Закавказская демократическая Федеративная Республика (ЗДФР), Zakavkazskaya Demokraticheskaya Federativnaya Respublika (ZDFR)
  2. Russia and the TDFR, used the Julian calendar, which was 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar used by most of Europe at that time. Both Russia and Transcaucasia switched to the Gregorian calendar in early 1918.[2] Dates throughout the article use the Julian calendar.
  3. Each deputy to the Constituent Assemly had represented 60,000 people, while this was lowered to 20,000 for the Seim.[27]
  4. Russian: Совнарком; short for Совет народных комиссаров, Sovet narodnykh kommissarov
  5. Eastern Armenian: Դաշնակցություն, Dashnaktsutyun; Western Armenian: Դաշնակցութիւն, Tashnagtsoutioun

Citations

  1. Javakhishvili 2009, p. 159
  2. Slye 2020, p. 119, note 1
  3. Saparov 2015, p. 20
  4. Saparov 2015, pp. 21–23
  5. Marshall 2010, p. 38
  6. King 2008, p. 146
  7. King 2008, p. 150
  8. King 2008, p. 154
  9. Marshall 2010, pp. 48–49
  10. Suny 2015, p. 228
  11. de Waal 2015, p. 31
  12. King 2008, pp. 157–158
  13. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 32–33
  14. Hasanli 2016, p. 10
  15. Swietochowski 1985, pp. 84–85
  16. Suny 1994, p. 186
  17. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 35
  18. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 54–55
  19. Swietochowski 1985, p. 106
  20. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 58
  21. Mamoulia 2020, p. 23
  22. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 84
  23. Swietochowski 1985, p. 108
  24. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 85
  25. Engelstein 2018, p. 334
  26. Hovannisian 1969, p. 124
  27. Hovannisian 1969, p. 125
  28. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 87
  29. Bakradze 2020, p. 60
  30. Swietochowski 1985, p. 110
  31. Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 2
  32. Hovannisian 1969, pp. 128–129
  33. Forestier-Peyrat 2016, p. 166
  34. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 91
  35. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 93
  36. Hovannisian 1969, p. 131
  37. Swietochowski 1985, p. 121
  38. Hovannisian 1969, p. 132
  39. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 93–94
  40. Hovannisian 1969, p. 135
  41. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 94–95
  42. Hovannisian 1969, p. 140
  43. Hovannisian 1969, p. 137
  44. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 96
  45. Brisku 2020, p. 32
  46. Reynolds 2011, p. 203
  47. Hovannisian 1969, pp. 150–151
  48. Hovannisian 1969, p. 152
  49. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 98–99
  50. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 99
  51. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 99–100
  52. Swietochowski 1985, p. 124
  53. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 101
  54. Hovannisian 1969, p. 155
  55. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 100
  56. Taglia 2020, p. 50
  57. Marshall 2010, p. 89
  58. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 103
  59. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 103–104
  60. Hovannisian 1969, pp. 159–160
  61. Hovannisian 1969, pp. 160–161
  62. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 105
  63. Hovannisian 1969, p. 162
  64. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 106
  65. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 108
  66. Hovannisian 2012, pp. 292–293
  67. Hovannisian 1969, p. 163
  68. Hovannisian 1969, p. 167
  69. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 107
  70. Hovannisian 1969, p. 168
  71. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 109
  72. Hovannisan 1969, p. 172
  73. Hovannisan 1969, p. 173
  74. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 110
  75. Hovannisian 1969, p. 174
  76. Zolyan 2020, p. 17
  77. Hovannisian 2012, p. 299
  78. Hovannisian 1969, p. 176
  79. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 113–114
  80. Hovannisian 1969, p. 176–177
  81. Hovannisian 1969, pp. 177–179
  82. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 115
  83. Hovannisian 1969, p. 183
  84. Hovannisian 1969, p. 184
  85. Hovannisian 1969, p. 181
  86. Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 120
  87. Hovannisian 1969, p. 188
  88. Suny 1994, pp. 191–192
  89. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 123–124
  90. Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 125–127
  91. Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 1
  92. Jones 2005, p. 279
  93. King 2008, p. 187
  94. Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 4

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