Iran–Saudi Arabia relations

Iran and Saudi Arabia have no diplomatic relations following an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January 2016 after Saudi Arabia executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Shia cleric. Bilateral relations between the countries have been strained over several geo-political issues such as the interpretations of Islam, aspirations for leadership of the Islamic world, oil export policy and relations with the United States and other Western countries.

Iranian–Saudi Arabian relations

Iran
Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a conservative Sunni absolute monarchy established in 1932, with a tradition of close ties to the United States and the United Kingdom. Modern Iran is previously a Twelver Shia constitutional monarchy founded in 1925 but became a revolutionary Islamic republic in 1979, with a political system that includes elements of a presidential democracy vetted and supervised by a theocracy governed by a "Supreme Leader". Both states were aligned with the Western Bloc in the Cold War preventing Soviet influence in these countries.

Both countries are major oil and gas exporters and have clashed over energy policy. Saudi Arabia, with its large oil reserves and smaller population, has a greater interest in taking a long-term view of the global oil market and incentive to moderate prices. In contrast, Iran is compelled to focus on high prices in the short term due to its low standard of living given recent sanctions after its decade old war with Saddam's Iraq and its larger population.[1]

In the Syrian Civil War, Iran has supported the Syrian government militarily and with billions of dollars of aid, while Saudi Arabia was a major supplier of aid to rebel groups. Both countries have accused each other of support for terrorism.[2][3] Iran and Saudi Arabia are both mixed up in the strive for dominance of their region.[4]

Tensions

After the Iranian Revolution, relations deteriorated considerably after Iran accused Saudi Arabia of being an agent of the US in the Persian Gulf region, representing US interests rather than Islam. Saudi Arabia is concerned by Iran's consistent desire to export its revolution across the board to expand its influence within the Persian Gulf region—notably in post-Saddam Iraq, the Levant and within further south in addition to Iran's controversial, much debated nuclear program.[1]

Tensions between the two countries have waxed and waned. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran soured particularly after the Iranian Revolution, the nuclear program, the 2011 alleged Iran assassination plot and more recently the execution of Nimr al-Nimr. There have also been numerous attempts to improve the relationship. After the 1991 Gulf war there was a noticeable thaw in relations.[5] In March 2007 President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Riyadh and was greeted at the airport by King Abdullah, and the two countries were referred to in the press as "brotherly nations".

After March 2011, Iran's financial and military support for Syria during the Syrian Civil War, has been a severe blow to the improvement of relations.

On 3 January 2016. Saudi Arabia's embassy in Tehran, Iran was ransacked following the execution of Saudi-born Shia Islam cleric Nimr al-Nimr. The execution prompted widespread condemnation within the Arab World as well as other countries, the European Union and the United Nations, with protests being carried out in cities in Iran, Iraq, India, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey. Following the attack on its embassy in Iran, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Iran and the Saudi foreign minister said that all Iranian diplomats were to leave the country within 48 hours.[6] For a long time now, Iran has wanted to be part of the regular region, as well as sharing benefits and responsibilities.[7]

The difference of political ideologies and governance has also divided both countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, which holds that a faqīh (Islamic jurist) should have custodianship over all Muslim followers, including their governance and regardless of nationality. Iran's Supreme Leader is a Shia faqīh. The founder of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, was ideologically opposed to monarchy, which he believed to be un-Islamic. Saudi Arabia's monarchy, on the other hand, remains consistently conservative, not revolutionary, and politically married to age-old religious leaders of the tribes who support the monarchy and the king (namely the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques) is given absolute obedience as long as he does not violate Islamic sharia law.[8] Saudi Arabia has, however, a Shia minority which has recently made bitter complaints of institutional discrimination against it,[9] specifically after the 2007 change in Iraqi governance and particularly after the 2011 events that spanned the region. At some stages it has gone as far as to call for overthrowing the king and the entire system.[10] According to the New York Times, the rift between both countries looks wide and unbridgeable for now.[11] Right now, the continuing disagreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia are the U.S sanctions on Iran which have destroyed Iran's oil industry, according to the CNBC.[12]

Country comparison
Common name Iran Saudi Arabia
Official name Islamic Republic of Iran Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Coat of arms
Flag
Area 1,648,195 km2 (636,372 sq mi) 2,149,690 km2 (870,000 sq mi)
Population 83,024,745[13] 33,091,113[14]
Population density 50/km2 (130/sq mi) 16/km2 (41/sq mi)
Capital Tehran Riyadh
Largest city Tehran – 8,693,706 (15,232,564 Metro) Riyadh – 7,676,654 (9,200,000 Metro)
Government Unitary presidential Islamic republic Unitary Islamic absolute monarchy
First leader Reza Shah
Ruhollah Khomeini		 Ibn Saud
Current leader Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader)
Hassan Rouhani (President)		 Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
(King, Prime Minister and Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques)
Official languages Persian Arabic
Currency Iranian rial (IIR) Saudi riyal (SR) (SAR)
GDP (nominal) $438 billion $748 billion
GDP (nominal) per capita $5,383 $22,649
Military expenditures $6.3 billion[15] $70.0 billion[16]

History
See also: Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

1920s–1970s: during Pahlavi Dynasty
Iranian Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in Tehran, July 1975

Saudi Arabia and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1929 following the signing of a Saudi-Iranian Friendship Treaty.[17]

However, relations were not active until the 1960s mostly due to differences in religious practices and Iran's recognition of Israel.[18] In 1966 the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia visited Iran with the aim of further strengthening relationships between both neighboring countries. The Shah of Iran Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi reciprocated by paying an official visit to Saudi Arabia which eventually led to a peaceful resolution of the islands. The Shah supported King Faisal's efforts regarding Islamic solidarity and actively contributed to the establishment of multinational Islamic institutions, including the Organization of the Islamic World Congress, the Muslim World League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.[17]

In 1968, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a demarcation agreement.[19] When the United Kingdom announced it would withdraw and vacate the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s,[20] Iran and Saudi Arabia took the primary responsibility for peace and security in the region. In the late 1960s, the Shah sent a series of letters to King Faisal, urging him to modernize Saudi Arabia, saying, "Please, my brother, modernize. Open up your country. Make the schools mixed women and men. Let women wear miniskirts. Have discos. Be modern. Otherwise I cannot guarantee you will stay on your throne."[21] In response, King Faisal wrote, "Your majesty, I appreciate your advice. May I remind you, you are not the Shah of France. You are not in the Élysée. You are in Iran. Your population is 90 percent Muslim. Please don't forget that."[21]

During the 1970s, Saudi Arabia's main concerns over Iran were firstly, Iran's modernisation of its military and its military dominance all over the region; secondly, Iran's repossession of the islands of Big Tunb, Little Tunb and Abu Moussa in 1971 which challenged the United Arab Emirates claim over the islands. The dispute remains till today.[22] But the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia was never as friendly as between the years 1968 and 1979.[18][23]

The relationship between the two countries was not without its tensions in the mid-to-late 1970s. As the Shah attempted to build an Iranian security architecture in the region, the Saudis resisted these efforts. Instead, King Khalid attempted to build bilaterial security relationships with the smaller neighboring Persian Gulf states which has lasted till today. The Saudis also argued for more modest OPEC price increases in 1976 and 1977 than Iran wanted.[24]

1979: Iranian Revolution

Following the theocratic Iranian Revolution led by Khomeini in 1979, Iran started to openly attack and criticise the character and religious legitimacy of the Saudi regime.[25] However King Khalid, the then ruler of Saudi Arabia, sent Khomeini a congratulatory message, stating that "Islamic solidarity" could be the basis for closer relations of the two countries.[26] He also argued that with the foundation of the Islamic Republic in Iran there were no obstacles that inhibited the cooperation between two countries.[27]

After the 1987 Mecca incident, in a public address in 1987 Khomeini declared that "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back", and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics.”[28] Upon this statement diplomatic relations between the two countries ended until 1991.[29]

1980s: Iraqi invasion of Iran

The Shia–Sunni conflict between the two countries also played a pivotal role in the Iran–Iraq War when Saudi authorities pledged US$25 billion of aid to the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. Iraqi invasion of Iran increased Saudi concerns over stability in the region, hence their financial support to Iraq regardless of the "not-so-warm" relations between Baathist Iraq and conservative Saudi Arabia. In doing so, Saudi Arabia recognised its worries that revolutionary Iran was a far greater threat to its survival and the stability of the region. Saudi Arabia encouraged other Sunni Monarchs of Arab states of the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to do the same by giving financial support to Iraq.[30] To cover the costs of the war Saudi Arabia dramatically increased its oil production. This increase in oil production by Saudi Arabia was aimed to weaken Iran's ability to fund its campaigns. However, this measure by Saudi Arabia also cost the Saudi government billions in revenue as oil prices plunged from over $30 a barrel to less than $15 by the mid 1980s.[30]

During the Iran–Iraq War, Iran flew their aircraft in Saudi airspace and also threatened Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with severe consequences if they would not stop supporting Iraq. Unlike America, Saudi Arabia, due to its very traditional Arab-Bedouin culture, did not break diplomatic relations with Iran even during the worst periods of tension following the revolution and during the Iran–Iraq War.[31]

1984: Four Iranian F-4 warplanes Penetrate Saudi Airspace

On 7 May 1984 Iranian warplanes targeted an oil tanker in the Persian Gulf. This action resulted in Saudi Arabia undertaking air defensive measurements in the region to intercept Iranian warplanes. On 5 June 1984 two Iranian F-4 warplanes penetrated Saudi airspace to bomb oil facilities. Saudi F-15 eagles intercepted the Iranian warplanes, and shot down both F-4s.[32]

1987 Hajj Incident
Main article: 1987 Mecca incident

Until 1987, no satisfactory resolution was made to decrease the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The already strained relationship between the two countries further deteriorated when clashes occurred between Iranian-led demonstrators and Saudi security forces on 31 July 1987.[25] The clash claimed the lives of around 400 pilgrims, out of which two-thirds had Iranian nationality . This incident angered the Saudis and in retaliation, the Saudi administration instituted a ban on all Hajj (Pilgrimage) rituals and activities . Angry protesters in Tehran responded by ransacking the Saudi embassy and also detained and physically attacked a number of residing Saudi diplomats. As a result, one of the Saudi officials died from the injuries. In response, Saudi Arabia in 1988, cut its diplomatic relations with Iran and ensured that no Iranian could obtain a Saudi travel visa for performing the Hajj (pilgrimage).

Post Iran-Iraq War

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran gradually started to improve after the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988. Iran had accepted ceasefire with Iraq in July 1988 and soon afterwards, Saudi Arabia started improving relations with Iran.

In October 1988, the late King Fahd halted all media campaigns against Iran and asked Saudi administration to pressure Iraq into implementing the UNSCR 598. In 1989, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that Iran and Saudi Arabia were holding indirect talks to improve their relations.[33]

Responses to Satanic Verses

The issuance of a fatwa by Khomeini against the Indian author Salman Rushdie again soured the relations between the two countries. Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran at that time, declared a death sentence for Salman Rushdie for certain anti-Islamic remarks in his book The Satanic Verses published in 1988. The Saudi government, which took this religious decree against Rushdie as an act aimed at gaining Muslim sympathy across the world, came up with its own verdict of making Rushdie appear before an Islamic tribunal before he could be delivered a death sentence.[33]

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iran criticised and condemned the invasion. This stance from Iran, in favor of the Kuwaitis, and the anti-Iraqi coalition of the Persian Gulf states helped to improve relations between Iran and the GCC, namely Saudi Arabia. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia rejected the use of force as a solution to regional problems and opposed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Iran went further, by backing UN sanctions against Iraq. Iran viewed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait as a serious threat, considering it the first step towards its expansionist mindset. During the war, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia thawed considerably and the official ties were restored in 1991.[34]

This short resumption of political ties was followed by quick high level visits, notably, in April 1991, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited Saudi Arabia to propose an Iranian-Gulf Cooperation Council alliance with a mandate for the security of the Persian Gulf, during a meeting with the late King Fahd. He claimed the Gulf Cooperation Council was too weak and hence failed to prevent the invasion of Kuwait, and stressed the need of the inclusion of Iran to strengthen such a regional agency to ensure stability.[34]

The Hajj (Pilgrimage) issue was also resolved. In 1991, the Saudi authorities allowed 115,000 Iranian pilgrims, which was more in number compared to the 1988 quota of 45,000, that had led to Iran's abrupt boycott. The Saudis also agreed to an Iranian request of allowing 5,000 relatives and friends of the 412 "martyrs" of the 1987 incident to attend the Hajj Pilgrimage that year. In later years, Iran adopted a careful approach and undertook measures for preventing a repeat of that incident. Iranian authorities tried to discourage large demonstrations by its pilgrims and attempted to have them held within the confines of the Iranian encampment,[35] due to the fact that certain Iranian Shi'ite rituals are not accepted by other sects of Islam, and could have endangered the lives of Iranian Pilgrims if conducted openly.

Khobar Towers Bombing

On 23 June 1996, a massive truck bomb exploded near U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds. The US government held Iran responsible for the attack. The charges against Iran, however, remained unconfirmed, and therefore did not substantively affect the Iranian–Saudi relations.[35]

1997 OIC meeting

The 1997 meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Iran heralded a shift in the attitude of the Arab States towards Iran. Several Arab countries confirmed their commitment to the conference. Saudi Arabia, which was previously criticized by Iran because of its control over the main Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina and also because of its perceived reliance on the United States for security, also participated in the meeting. In the OIC summit meeting, Saudi Arabia was represented by Crown Prince Abdullah (later King) and its Minister of Foreign affairs Saud Al Faisal. Saudi participation proved helpful in the process of further reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a result, Saudi ministerial delegations visited Iran and later on, the official visit of President Mohammad Khattami to Saudi Arabia took place in February 1998.[36]

This was the first visit by an Iranian President to Saudi Arabia after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The aim was to address pressing economic issues of the time. Iran was looking for a reallocation of OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) producing quotas to which it required strong support from Saudi Arabia. It was also reported that Iran was trying to persuade Saudi Arabia to consider exporting the Iranian Infrastructure to Central Asia. Iran also expected that the issue of the regional security alliance would be raised in which the alliance for the security of the region could be made to ensure stability on both borders of the Persian Gulf.[36]

A Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and Iran in May 1998, in which both countries agreed to cooperate in the field of economics, culture and sports. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran was further improved when Khatami, the then President of Iran, on his tour to neighboring Arab countries, visited Saudi Arabia in May 1999. President Khatami stayed for five days in Saudi Arabia in which various discussions were held between the heads of both countries. Discussions included Persian Gulf security, efforts to increase global oil prices, the situation in Iraq and the development of a common geo-strategic approach to regional issues. The partial détente between Iran and the USA encouraged Saudi Arabia to apply more cooperation with President Khatami. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed an agreement known as the Saudi-Iranian security agreement in April 2001.[36]

In July 1999, the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia urged other Persian Gulf countries to improve their relations with Iran. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, speaking at the opening session of the Shura Council said that it was in the interest of all the countries of the Persian Gulf to improve relations with Iran. He further said that all the other countries should follow Saudi Arabia's lead.[37] This improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran also brought criticism from the United Arab Emirates, which criticised Saudi Arabia of abandoning UAE in its territorial disputes with Iran over three strategic Islands.[37]

Yemen

Yemeni rebels, known as Houthis, who are a politically infused religious rebel group based in the Yemen, crossed into Saudi Arabia, whereby they killed two border guards and seized Saudi territory, including the strategically important Mount al-Doud.

This triggered the largest Saudi military operation since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yemen's government, as well as the Arabs, accused Iran of arming the Houthis. Iran has heavily criticized Saudi Arabia for their intervention in the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. Iran's then president Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying: "Saudi Arabia was expected to mediate in Yemen's internal conflict as an older brother and restore peace to the Muslim state, rather than launching military strike[s] and pounding bombs on Muslim civilians in the north of Yemen," whilst Saudi foreign minister Saud Al Faisal counter-accused Iran of meddling in Yemen's internal affairs. Ahmadinejad went even further saying: "Some Western states invaded the region (Afghanistan and Iraq) in the wake of the 11 September attacks, whilst Al-Qaeda's main hub was located in another country in the region, which enjoys huge oil revenues and good relations with the United States and Western countries. There are some countries in the Middle East region that do not hold even a single election, don't allow women to drive, but the US and European governments are supporting their undemocratic governments," in reference to Saudi Arabia.[38] In 2017 Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman called the supreme leader of Iran "new Hitler".[39]

2003 Riyadh bombings

Adel al-Jubeir, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, stated in one of his articles that Al-Qaeda's chief of operations "Saif al-Adel placed a call from Iran in May 2003 giving orders for the Riyadh bombings that claimed more than 30 lives, including eight Americans. Yet he still benefits from Iranian protection"[40]

Yemeni Crisis standoff

Two Iranian officers were captured in Yemeni city of Aden during the fighting between local militia and Houthis.[41] According to local pro-Saudi militia they served as military advisors to Houthis and were connected with Iranian Quds Force.[42] Further worsening of bilateral relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is generally expected as both countries are involved intensively in Yemeni crisis.[43]

2011 Iran assassination plot

On 11 October 2011, US accused Iran of planning to assassinate the Saudi-Arabian ambassador to the US Adel Al-Jubbair.

Sanctions against Iran

In 2012, in response to the global sanctions against Iran, Saudi Arabia offered to offset the loss of Iranian oil sales and Iran warned against this.[44] The same year Turki Al Faisal, former head of Saudi General Intelligence and a Saudi royal, suggested that Saudi Arabia would support the U.S.-led sanctions against Iranian oil.[45]

Jeddah airport incident

In April 2015, media reported that two Iranian teenage pilgrims to Saudi Arabia had been sexually harassed by Saudi police at the Jeddah Airport.[46][47][48][49] After that, 80 members of Iranian parliament presented a bill for minor Haj rituals to be suspended until the Saudi officials guarantee the security of Iranian pilgrims and stop their harassment. Hundreds of Iranians protested outside Saudi Arabia's Embassy in Tehran over the alleged abuse of these two Iranian pilgrims in 11 April and clashed with police forces after trying to climb the embassy walls.[50][51] In 8 April, Saudi authorities said they had prevented a plane carrying 260 Iranian pilgrims from landing in the kingdom, saying the airline operators had not applied for a permit to enter Saudi Arabia.[51][52] In 13 April, Iran suspended minor hajj trips to Saudi Arabia until the Saudi government "applies a strong attitude" to the case.[53]

Saud al-Faisal, foreign minister of Saudi Arabia have pledged to Iran's Ambassador that his government will punish the two Saudi policemen, very soon.[54]

Mansour al-Turki, spokesman of Interior ministry of Saudi Arabia, informed that the accused airport staff members have been arrested and referred to court and Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia has been informed and the suspects have been referred for investigation.[55]

2015 "Saudileaks"

In late May 2015, Yemeni hacking group Yemen Cyber Army launched a cyber attack on Saudi Arabia's Foreign, Interior and Defense Ministries' website to gain a portion of classified information and top secret documents. The documents were related to the Saudi agenda in Iran. The documents were later listed on WikiLeaks.[56] The agenda included propaganda to stir chaotic unrest in Iran with the help of opposition forces, social media, newspapers, magazines and websites, in order to pave the way for changing the Iranian political system.[57]

Furthermore, a Saudi diplomat planned to use the Persian and Arabic-language media, also the Arab-speaking citizens of Southern and Western Iran for provoking mass protests in that region.[58]

2015 Hajj stampede
Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Tehran under Iranian police protection after Mina stampede crisis.
See also: 2015 Hajj stampede

The 2015 Hajj stampede escalated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to the deaths of Iranian pilgrims in the stampede. Iranian leaders accused Saudi authorities of being responsible for the disaster.[59][60][61] A Saudi Prince, Dr. Khalid bin Abdullah bin Fahd bin Farhan Al Saud tweeted that : "Under the threat of the enemy Zoroastrians- historically - to the Kingdom - it is time to think- seriously - to ban Iranians from coming to Mecca to preserve the safety of the pilgrims".[62]

2016 execution of Nimr al-Nimr

On 2 January 2016, 47 people were put to death in several Saudi cities, including prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Protesters of the executions responded by demonstrating in Iran's capital, Tehran. That same day a few protesters would eventually ransack the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and later set it ablaze.[63] Police donned riot gear and arrested 40 people during the incident.[64][65][66]

On 3 January 2016, Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry announced that it would cut diplomatic ties with Iran due to the violence that had occurred at their embassy.[67] and President Rouhani called the damage on embassy "by no means justifiable".[68]

After the events, Saudi Arabia refused to play in Iran during the 2016 AFC Champions League.[69]

2016 Iran embassy bombing in Yemen

On 7 January 2016, Iran's foreign ministry made the claim that Saudi warplanes had "deliberately" targeted its embassy to Yemen in the city of Sanaa. Iran's report included claims that,"a number of the building's guards" had been injured as a result of the bombing. Despite this assertion Sanaa residents and the Associated Press have reported that the embassy suffered no visible damage. Currently General Ahmad Asseri from the Saudi-led coalition is investigating Iran's allegations. Later on, Asseri announced no evidence was found for the accusation neither by the Arab Coalition Military nor by the legitimate Yemeni government.[70]

2016 Iranian ban on the Hajj

In September 2016 - following disputes, the Iranian government barred its citizens from making the hajj. Iran claimed that the 2015 incident was the result of Saudi "incompetence." The Saudi government suggested that the move was politically motivated as a means to put pressure on the kingdom.[71]

In the first week of January 2017, the Saudi Minister for Pilgrims invited more than 80 countries including Iran for Iranian participation in the forthcoming Hajj rituals. Iran has also confirmed the receipt of Saudi invitation and is willing to discuss arrangements for the 2017 hajj season. The Iranian delegation is expected to travel to Saudi Arabia on 23 February 2017 to discuss the participation of Iranian pilgrims.[72][73][74]

2020 Iranian major general assassination

The major general of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qasem Soleimani was assassinated in a targeted American drone strike on 3 January 2020 in Baghdad airport, when he was invited by Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi as a mediator to talk about Iran's response to a previous message from Saudi Arabia related to normalization of relationship between the two nations.

In May 2015, leaked top secret documents of Saudi government by Yemeni hackers called "Saudileaks" uncovered that Saudi Intelligence Agency was offering unsolicited aid to United States which would hit "an efficient and preemptive blow" to IRGC commanders.[75]

Sectarian basis for tensions
A Saudi Arabian woman in Nishapur, Iran
Main article: Shia–Sunni relations

Historically, Iran–Saudi relationships have always been uncertain, something attributed to the different sects that the majority populations in both the countries follow. Saudi Arabia which is a predominantly Sunni society has always been skeptical of Shi'ite Iran's activities in the Persian Gulf region, thus labeling Iranian ambitions to dominate the Muslim world as a form of Safawid/Safavid rule. It is in this context that Iran-Saudi hostilities are sometimes seen as being the successor to Ottoman–Safavid relations.

Leading Sunni and Shi'ite Clerics in both the countries deemed each other's religious beliefs as incorrect for decades. An attempt was made by the Sunnis to take the Tomb of Imam Hussein, one of the important religious leaders of Shi'ite theology and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad whose life is considered the main difference between Sunni and Shi'ite sects. Since then, tensions between both major sects of Islam, their followers and their affiliates, have increased and this tension is considered unlikely to be resolved any time soon.[31] According to Le Figaro, on 5 June 2010, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia told Hervé Morin, then Defense Minister of France that: "There are two countries in the world that do not deserve to exist: Iran and Israel."[76]

In 2016, Grand Mufti Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh was replaced by Sheikh Saleh bin Hamid as the giver of the hajj sermon. The Grand Mufti had given the sermon every year since 1981, but was replaced in 2016 after claiming that the Shi'ite leaders of Iran "are not Muslims."[71]

Doctrinal differences

The difference of political ideologies and governance also divided both countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, which hold that a faqīh (Islamic jurist) should have custodianship over all Muslims, including their governance. Iran's Supreme Leader is a Shia faqīh. The founder of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, was ideologically opposed to monarchy, which he believed to be contrary to Islamic principles. Saudi Arabia's monarchy, on the other hand, is conservative, not revolutionary, and its religious leaders have long supported monarchy where the king was given absolute obedience as long as he did not violate Islamic sharia law.[77] Saudi Arabia has, however, a Shia minority which has made bitter complaints about institutional discrimination against it,[9] and whom at times has been urged to overthrow the king.[78] Both countries are major oil exporters but have clashed over energy policy. Saudi Arabia, with its large oil reserves and smaller population, has a greater interest in taking a long-term view of the global oil market and incentive to moderate prices. In contrast, Iran is compelled to focus on high prices in the short term.[79]

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States

As far as the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. is concerned, both countries have been strategic allies for more than sixty years. Saudi Arabia sees itself as a firm and generous partner of the U.S. in the Cold War and in other international conflicts. From 1953 to 1979, Iran under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was also an ally of the United States in the anti-communist camp.

The visits by US President George W. Bush to the Kingdom in 2008 reaffirmed these ties. Yet Saudis have always distanced themselves from American foreign policy, particularly with regards to Iran. Even when there was growing criticism against the former Iranian President, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, for his alleged hostile foreign policy in connection to Israel,[80] Saudi Arabia recognised that Iran was a potential threat, and a regional power that was in position to create trouble within their borders. Therefore, Saudi Arabia's security over time required accommodation and good relations with its geographic neighbors notably Iran.[80] Saudi Arabia has long since looked to the United States for protection against Iran.

Prior to this visit, Saudi National Security advisor Prince Bandar bin Sultan, seen as one of the most pro-American figures in the region, had made a trip to Tehran to voice his government's interest in building harmonious relations with Iran.[81] During Iranian President Ahmadinejad's 3 March 2007 visit, he discussed with King Abdullah the need to protect the Islamic world from enemy "conspiracies."[82]

In 2007, President Ahmadinejad of Iran attended the first-ever annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was established in 1980 in part to contain the ambitions of revolutionary Iran.[83] This visit by the President of Iran was an event which signaled a possible change in relations. Yet soon after the meeting, Saudi Arabia, the most senior member of the six GCC member states invited Mr. Ahmadinejad to Saudi Arabia to take part in the annual Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca.

In 2009, Saudi Prince Faisal said in a press conference with Hillary Clinton that the "threat posed by Iran demanded a more immediate solution than sanctions." This statement was condemned by Iranian officials.[84]

On 11 October 2011 US Attorney General Eric Holder accused Iran of planning to assassinate the Saudi-Arabian ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubbair.

In 2013, Saudi Ambassador to Britain Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al Saud wrote an editorial in The New York Times criticizing Saudi Arabia's Western allies for not taking bold enough measures against Syria and Iran, thus destabilizing the Middle East and forcing Saudi Arabia to become more aggressive in international affairs.[85] The Obama administration continues to reassure the Persian Gulf states that regional security is a U.S. priority, but, as of December 2013, the Gulf states express skepticism.[86]

WikiLeaks

In November 2010, WikiLeaks disclosed various confidential documents pertaining to the US and its allies which revealed that King Abdullah urged the US to attack Iran to destroy its nuclear weapons programme, describing Iran as a snake whose head should be cut off without any procrastination.[87] The documents were dismissed by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, claiming them to be "organised to be released on a regular basis."[88]

International efforts to normalize relations

There are international efforts going on to normalize the relations between two countries after the crisis which started with the execution of Sheikh Nimr. Pakistan's prime minister Imran Khan and Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif visited Riyadh and Tehran. The Sharifs peace mission started after some high level visits from Saudi Arabia to Islamabad.[89]

Pakistan's opposition leader Imran Khan also visited the embassies of Iran and Saudi Arabia and met their head of commissions in Islamabad on 8 January 2016 to understand their stance regarding the conflict. He urged the Government of Pakistan to play a positive role to resolve the matter between both countries.[90]

See also

References
  1. Wehrey, Frederic; Karasik, Theodore W.; Nader, Alireza; Ghez, Jeremy J.; Hansell, Lydia; Guffey, Robert A. (2009). Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation and Implication for US Policy. RAND Corporation. ISBN 9780833046574. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
  2. "Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of 'deception' and supporting terrorism". Al Arabiya. 17 May 2017. Retrieved 7 June 2017.
  3. Erdbrink, Thomas (7 June 2017). "Iran Assails Saudi Arabia After Pair of Deadly Terrorist Attacks". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 7 June 2017.
  4. "Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals".
  5. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis. Palgrave. pp. 82–3.
  6. "Saudi Arabia cuts diplomatic ties with Iran". Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  7. "Saudi Arabia and Iran may finally be ready for rapprochement".
  8. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 115. "Saudi Arabia lacks a constitution that defines legislative authority and processes. Wahhabi doctrine, however, possesses a political theory, based on the views of the Philosopher Ibn Taymiyya, which requires Muslims to obey the ruler, even if he is a sinner. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the Book of God's Unity had declared that to obey the rulers in permitting something forbidden by Islamic law is tantamount to idolatry. In Ibn Taymiyya's view, the only ground for disobedience to a ruler is if he commands a believer to violate something prohibited by the shari'a.
  9. Saudi Arabia: Treat Shia Equally|hrw.org| 2009/09/02
  10. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 171. Tehran's efforts to export the revolution through leaflets, radio broadcasts and tape cassettes castigating Al Saud for corruption and hypocrisy found a receptive audience in the Eastern Province. On 28 November, Saudi Shiites summoned the courage to break the taboo on public religious expression by holding processions to celebrate the Islamic holy day of Ashura ... (both Sunni and Shia followers celebrate it but in different ways as per their individual beliefs, customs and rituals) ... on 1 February, the one-year anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, violent demonstrations again erupted. Crowds attacked banks and vehicles and hoisted placards with Khomeini's picture. The government responded to the February protests with a mix of coercion and cooptation. On the one hand, leading Shiite activists were arrested. On the other hand, a high official from the Interior Ministry met with Shiite representatives and acknowledged that Riyadh had neglected the region's development needs. ... extending electricity networks ... more schools and hospitals and improving sewage infrastructures.
  11. "Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War".
  12. "Saudi Arabia and Iran don't like each other in real life – so what happens at OPEC meetings?".
  13. "2019 Iran Military Strength". www.globalfirepower.com. Retrieved 3 September 2019.
  14. "2019 Saudi Arabia Military Strength". www.globalfirepower.com. Retrieved 3 September 2019.
  15. "2019 Iran Military Strength". www.globalfirepower.com. Retrieved 3 September 2019.
  16. "2019 Saudi Arabia Military Strength". www.globalfirepower.com. Retrieved 3 September 2019.
  17. Wrampelmeier, Brooks (1 February 1999). "Saudi-Iranian Relations 1932-1982". Middle East Policy. Retrieved 11 August 2013.
  18. Ackerman, Harrison (28 November 2011). "Symptoms of Cold Warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran: Part 1 of 3". Journalism and Political Science. 16. Retrieved 11 August 2013.
  19. Mokhtari, Fariborz (Spring 2005). "No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context" (PDF). Middle East Journal. 59 (2): 209–229. doi:10.3751/59.2.12. Retrieved 19 August 2013.
  20. Alvandi, Roham (2012). "Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf" (PDF). Diplomatic History. 36 (2): 337–372. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01025.x. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 July 2013. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
  21. Sciolino, Elaine (4 November 2001). "U.S. Pondering Saudis' Vulnerability". The New York Times. Washington. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
  22. Afrasiab, Kaven L. (6 December 2006). "Saudi-Iran Tension Fuel Wider Conflict". Asia Times.
  23. Iran and Saudi Arabia: External "Game Cocks?" Henner Furtig.
  24. F. Gregory Gause, III (19 November 2009). The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge University Press. pp. 38–39. ISBN 9781107469167. Retrieved 27 December 2013.
  25. Amiri, Reza Ekhtiari; Ku Hasnita Binti Ku Samsu; Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni (2011). "The Hajj and Iran's Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia". Journal of Asian and African Studies. 46 (678): 678–690. doi:10.1177/0021909611417546. S2CID 143799946. Retrieved 22 August 2013.
  26. Hussein, Abdulrahman A. (2012). So History doesn't Forget: Alliances Behavior in Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979–1990. Bloomington: AuthorHouse. ISBN 9781467883559.
  27. Gil Feiler (2003). Economic Relations between Egypt and the Gulf Oil States, 1967–2000: Petro Wealth and Patterns of Influence. Sussex Academic Press. p. 151. ISBN 978-1-903900-40-6.
  28. Khomeinis messengers in mecca Martin Kramer
  29. Katzman, Kenneth (17 June 2013). "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses" (CRS Report for US Congress). Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 3 August 2013.
  30. Bowen, Wayne H. "The History of Saudi Arabia", Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, 2008, p. 120.
  31. H. Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions", Greenwood Publishing Group, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 44.
  32. Smith, William E. (18 June 1984). "The Gulf: Pushing the Saudis Too Far". Time. ISSN 0040-781X. Retrieved 11 February 2019.
  33. Marschall, Christin (2003). Iran's Arabian Gulf Policy. New York: Routledge Curzon. pp. 189–190.
  34. Wilson, Peter W.; Graham, Douglas F. (1994). Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm. New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. 118. ISBN 1-56324-394-6.
  35. Kiddie, Nikki R.; Matthee, Rudolph P. (2002). Iran and Surrounding World. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 365. ISBN 0-295-98206-3.
  36. Dean, Lucy (2004). The Middle East and North Africa. Routledge, Taylor and Francis. p. 385. ISBN 1-85743-184-7.
  37. "World: Middle East Saudi King urges Rapprochement with Iran", BBC News, 6 July 1999.
  38. Press TV Iran-Saudi Arabia come to blows over Yemen Archived 18 January 2010 at the Wayback Machine, 15 January 2010
  39. Reuters Saudi Crown Prince calls Iran leader 'new Hitler': NYT, 17 December 2017
  40. ADEL, AL-JUBEIR. "Iran Can't Whitewash Its Record of Terror". wsj. wsj. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
  42. "Two Iranian Officers Advising Houthis Said Captured in Yemen". Haaretz.com. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  43. Mohammed Mukhashaf (11 April 2015). "Yemeni militiamen say captured two Iranian officers in Aden". Reuters. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  44. "Iran warns Gulf countries not to replace its oil." Reuters via Haaretz 15 January 2012.
  45. Sanati, Reza (13 March 2013). "The Saudi Oil War on Iran". The National Interest. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
  46. terrorism', KSA can help fight (11 April 2015). "PressTV-Iranians protest teens abuse in Jeddah". PressTV. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  47. "خبرگزاري مهر :: آخرين اخبار ايران و جهان :: Mehr News Agency :: Iran & World News". Mehr News Agency. 13 April 2015. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  48. AFP (12 April 2015). "Hundreds protest outside Saudi embassy in Tehran". Dawn. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  49. "Iran may stop sending pilgrims to Saudi Arabia after teenagers' sexual abuse". Pakistan Defence. 11 April 2015. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  50. Carty, Peter (11 April 2015). "Iran: Hundreds defy ban to protest outside Saudi Arabia embassy over treatment of pilgrims". International Business Times UK. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  51. "Hundreds protest in Iran outside Saudi embassy". Ahram Online. 13 April 2015. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  52. "Hundreds defy ban to protest Saudi Arabia in Iran's capital - World". The New Zealand Herald. 11 April 2015. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  53. Ago, 1 Hour (12 April 2015). "Report: Iran suspends hajj trips to Saudi Arabia amid spat". Yahoo News. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
  54. Saudi FM vows severest punishment for offenders in Jeddah airport IRNA
  55. Saudi Arabia: Airport staff prosecuted over sexual assault of Iranian boys returning from pilgrimage to Mecca International Business Times
  56. Saudileaks 1: Yemeni Group Hacks Saudi Gov't, Releases Thousands of Top Secret Documents Fars News
  57. Saudileaks 29: Docs Unveil Riyadh's Intention to Strike at Iran's National Security Fars News.
  58. Saudileaks 10: Docs Reveal Saudi Efforts to Stir Political Unrest in Iran Fars News
  59. Ian Black. "Iran blames Saudi leaders for hajj disaster as investigation begins". the Guardian. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  60. Rouhani: Transfer of experienced Saudi troops to Yemen may have caused stampede. 25 September 2015. Retrieved 4 January 2016 – via YouTube.
  61. Dayan Candappa (26 September 2015). "Iran's Rouhani: US ties better but still a long road to travel". Reuters India. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  62. "د. خــالـد آل سـعـود". Twitter. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  63. Yousuf Basil; Salma Abdelaziz; Michael Pearson (2 January 2016). "Tehran protest after Saudi Arabia executes Shiite cleric - CNN.com". CNN. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  64. Loveluck, Louisa. "Iran supreme leader says Saudi faces 'divine revenge'". Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  65. Staff writers. "Farsnews". en.farsnews.com. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  66. Ben Brumfield; Yousuf Basil; Michael Pearson (3 January 2016). "Mideast protests rage after Saudi Arabia executes Shia cleric al-Nimr, 46 others". CNN. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  67. "Agence France-Presse on Twitter". Twitter. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  68. Cassandra Vinograd. "Iran Slams Saudi Arabia's Execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr as Backlash Mounts". NBC News. Retrieved 3 January 2016.
  69. http://gulfnews.com/sport/football/more-football/afc-champions-league-football-matches-delayed-over-saudi-iran-tension-1.1659994
  70. "Iran accuses Saudis of hitting Yemen embassy". BBC News. Retrieved 19 January 2016.
  71. "Millions attend hajj in Saudi Arabia, just not the Iranians". 11 September 2016. Retrieved 11 September 2016 – via CBS News.
  72. "Official: Iran ready to discuss 2017 hajj with Saudi Arabia". The Washington Post. 10 January 2017. Retrieved 10 January 2017.
  73. "Saudi Invites Iranian Diplomats for Talks on Hajj Return". Al Manar tv. 30 December 2016. Retrieved 10 January 2017.
  74. "Iran says it has finally received Saudi hajj invite". The News. 10 January 2017. Retrieved 10 January 2017.
  75. Saudileaks 32: Saudi Intelligence Agency Offers Unsolicited Aide to US against Iran's IRGC FARS News
  76. Malbrunot, Georges (29 June 2010). "La violente charge du roi Abdallah contre l'Iran et Israël". Le Figaro.
  77. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 115. + "Saudi Arabia lacks a constitution to define legislative authority and processes. Wahhab doctrine, however, possesses a political theory, based on the views of Ibn Taymiyya, which requires Muslims to obey the ruler, even if he is a sinner. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the Book of God's Unity had declared that to obey the rulers in permitting something forbidden by Islamic law is tantamount to idolatry. In Ibn Taymiyya's view, the only ground for disobedience to a ruler is if he commands a believer to violate something prohibited by the shari'a.
  78. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 171. Tehran's efforts to export the revolution through leaflets, radio broadcasts and tape cassettes castigating Al Saud for corruption and hypocrisy found a receptive audience in the Eastern Province. On 28 November, Saudi Shiites summoned the courage to break the taboo on public religious expression by holding processions to celebrate the Shiite holy day of Ashura ...
    + " ... on 1 February, the one-year anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, violent demonstrations again erupted. Crowds attacked banks and vehicles and hoisted placards with Khomeini's picture. The government responded to the February protests with a mix of coercion and cooptation. On the one hand, leading Shiite activists were arrested. On the other, a high official from the Interior Minister met with Shiite representatives and acknowledged that Riyadh had neglected the region's development needs. ... extend the electricity network ... more schools and hospitals and improve sewage disposal.
  79. Frederic Wehrey et al, "Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation and Implication for US Policy" RAND, national Security Research Division, 2009.
  80. "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the U.S". Archived from the original on 27 November 2008. Retrieved 5 May 2009.
  81. "Mafinezam, Alidad. "Iran And Its Place Among Nations", Greenwood Press, Westport, 2008, p.70.
  82. Tarek Al-Issawi, "Saudi Arabia Warns Against Attack on Iran Over Nuclear Issue" Bloomberg. 2007.
  83. "Iran: Ahmadinejad to attend Gulf Arab summit" Associated Press. 2007.
  84. Larijani: Obama should address Clinton problem Archived 31 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  85. bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Mohammad. "Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone." New York Times. 17 December 2013. 17 December 2013.
  86. Fishman, Ben. "The Mideast’s Unlikely Allies." New York Times. 23 December 2013. 24 December 2013.
  87. "Wikileaks and Iran". Chicago Tribune. 29 November 2010. Retrieved 5 December 2010.
  88. "Iran's Ahmadinejad dismisses Wikileaks cables release". BBC News. 29 November 2010. Retrieved 9 May 2011.
  89. "PM Nawaz, COAS Raheel leaves for Tehran, after Saudi Arabia". thenewsteller.com. Retrieved 19 January 2016.
  90. "Imran wants govt to mediate in Saudi-Iran conflict". The Nation. 9 January 2016. Retrieved 9 January 2016.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.