Siege of Varaždin Barracks

In 1990, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats worsened after the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Croatian Democratic Union (Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ). The Yugoslav People's Army (Serbian: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence (Croatian: Teritorijalna obrana – TO) weapons to minimize resistance.[2] On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs,[3] centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin (approximately 60 kilometres (37 miles) north-east of Split),[4] parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia.[5] In January 1991, Serbia, supported by Montenegro and Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, unsuccessfully tried to obtain the Yugoslav Presidency's approval for a JNA operation to disarm Croatian security forces.[6] The request was denied and a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March[7] prompted the JNA itself to ask the Federal Presidency to give it wartime authority and declare a state of emergency. Even though the request was backed by Serbia and its allies, the JNA request was refused on 15 March. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, preferring a campaign to expand Serbia rather than to preserve Yugoslavia with Croatia as a federal unit, publicly threatened to replace the JNA with a Serbian army and declared that he no longer recognized the authority of the federal Presidency. The threat caused the JNA to abandon plans to preserve Yugoslavia in favour of expansion of Serbia as the JNA came under Milošević's control.[8] By the end of March, the conflict had escalated with the first fatalities.[9] In early April, leaders of the Serb revolt in Croatia declared their intention to amalgamate the areas under their control with Serbia. These were viewed by the Government of Croatia as breakaway regions.[10]

At the beginning of 1991, Croatia had no regular army. To bolster its defence, Croatia doubled its police numbers to about 20,000. The most effective part of the Croatian police force was 3,000-strong special police comprising twelve battalions organised along military lines. There were also 9,000–10,000 regionally organised reserve police in 16 battalions and 10 companies, but they lacked weapons.[11] In response to the deteriorating situation, the Croatian government established the Croatian National Guard (Croatian: Zbor narodne garde – ZNG) in May by expanding the special police battalions into four all-professional guards brigades. Under Ministry of Defence control and commanded by retired JNA General Martin Špegelj, the four guards brigades comprised approximately 8,000 troops.[12] The reserve police, also expanded to 40,000, was attached to the ZNG and reorganised into 19 brigades and 14 independent battalions. The guards brigades were the only units of the ZNG that were fully equipped with small arms; throughout the ZNG there was a lack of heavier weapons and there was poor command and control structure above the brigade level.[11] The shortage of heavy weapons was so severe that the ZNG resorted to using World War II weapons taken from museums and film studios.[13] At the time, the Croatian weapon stockpile consisted of 30,000 small arms purchased abroad and 15,000 previously owned by the police. To replace the personnel lost to the guards brigades, a new 10,000-strong special police was established.[11]

The views of the Croatian leadership on how to deal with the JNA's role in the Croatian Serb revolt gradually evolved between January and September 1991. Croatian President Franjo Tuđman's initial plan was to win European Community (EC) and United States support; so he dismissed advice to seize JNA barracks and storage facilities in the country. This course of action was first advocated by Špegelj in late 1990; he again urged Tuđman to act while the JNA fought Slovenia's TO in the Ten-Day War in June–July 1991. Špegelj's calls were echoed by Šime Đodan, who succeeded Špegelj as Defence Minister in July. Špegelj remained in command of the ZNG.[14]

Tuđman's initial stance was based on his belief that Croatia could not win a war against the JNA. The ZNG was therefore limited to defensive operations, even though the actions of the JNA appeared to be coordinated with Croatian Serb forces.[14] This impression was reinforced by buffer zones established by the JNA after fighting between Croatian Serb militia and the ZNG. The JNA often intervened after the ZNG had lost territory, leaving the Croatian Serbs in control of areas they had captured before the JNA stepped in. The JNA provided some weapons to the Croatian Serbs, although most of their weaponry was sourced from Serbia's TO and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.[15]

In July 1991, Špegelj and Đodan's advice was supported by a number of Croatian Parliament members. In response, Tuđman dismissed Đodan the same month he was appointed Defence Minister, and Špegelj resigned his command of the ZNG on 3 August. The deteriorating situation in eastern Croatia,[14] including the JNA expulsion of ZNG troops from Baranja, intermittent fighting around Osijek, Vukovar and Vinkovci,[16] increasing losses and the growing conviction that the JNA were actively supporting the Croatian Serb revolt, forced Tuđman to act. On 22 August, he issued an ultimatum to the federal Yugoslav authorities demanding the withdrawal of the JNA to its barracks by the end of the month. The ultimatum stated that if the JNA failed to comply, Croatia would consider it an army of occupation and take corresponding action.[14] On 1 September, the EC proposed a ceasefire and a peace conference was accepted by the Yugoslav Presidency and by Tuđman, despite his earlier ultimatum. The conference started on 7 September, but only four days later, the Croatian member and chair of the presidency, Stjepan Mesić, ordered the JNA to return to its barracks within 48 hours.[17] This order was motivated by Tuđman's concern that the conference would drag on while the ZNG lost territory. Even though the order was opposed by other members of the presidency, it gave Croatia justification to openly confront the JNA.[18]

Prime Minister Franjo Gregurić advised Tuđman to implement Špegelj's plan.[13] According to General Anton Tus, Tuđman ordered the ZNG to capture JNA barracks on 12 September, but rescinded the order the next day. The order was reinstated on 14 September after Tus pleaded with Tuđman to re-authorize action, arguing that the ZNG was running out of time.[19] The same day, the ZNG and the Croatian police blockaded and cut utilities to all JNA facilities it had access to, beginning the Battle of the Barracks.[20] This action comprised blockades of 33 large JNA garrisons in Croatia,[21] and numerous smaller facilities, including border posts, and weapons and ammunition storage depots.[20]

Varaždin was the garrison of the JNA 32nd Corps commanded by Major General Vladimir Trifunović. In addition to the Corps headquarters there were several other JNA facilities in and around the city. The most substantial of these were located in Varaždin itself – the Kalnički partizani barracks where Colonel Berislav Popov's 32nd Mechanised Brigade was based, and the Jalkovečke žrtve barracks of the 32nd Mixed Artillery Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Davidović. The Corps' area of responsibility extended beyond Varaždin and its immediate surroundings, where further significant combat units were based. The most significant among them were the 32nd Engineer Regiment in Čakovec, the 411th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment based in Križevci, the 73rd Motorised Brigade headquartered in Koprivnica, the 265th Mechanised Brigade based in Bjelovar,[22] and the 288th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade in Virovitica.[23] In Varaždin itself, the JNA units included approximately 1,000 troops,[24] making the JNA garrison of Varaždin the second largest in Croatia.[25] Despite this, the JNA did not have sufficient number of troops in the area to secure all its facilities.[26]

Croatian forces in and around Varaždin and nearby Čakovec consisted of 640 ZNG troops (including 60 who had been deployed from Zagreb), 100 police, 300 People's Protection (Narodna zaštita) troops and several hundred armed civilians. The ZNG troops were subordinated to the 104th Brigade and to the 5th Battalion of the 1st Guards Brigade – but were lightly armed. Besides small arms, they had only 17 mortars, two 9M14 Malyutka anti-tank guided missile systems, two 12.7-millimetre (0.50 in) anti-aircraft machine guns and four armoured personnel carriers.[27] Initially, command of Croatian forces in the city was not unified and Colonel Želimir Škarec of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia only had a coordination role.[28]

Four JNA M-77 Oganj MRLs were captured by the ZNG in Varaždin.

One JNA officer and one non-commissioned officer were killed during the fighting, and 15 JNA troops were wounded.[41] Croatian forces sustained losses of two killed and 24 wounded.[36] Two civilians were also killed.[33] Approximately 1,000 JNA officers and soldiers surrendered to the ZNG.[24] The officers and their families living in Varaždin, as well as approximately 450 soldiers who wanted to leave Croatia were transported to Serbia in a convoy comprising twelve buses and several passenger cars.[40] The convoy was provided with a police escort and two representatives of the civilian authorities in Varaždin accompanied the convoy as hostages to guarantee its safe passage. One of the hostages was Radimir Čačić,[41][33] who became Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia 20 years later.[42]

Six JNA 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers were a part of the seized JNA equipment

The ZNG captured 74 T-55 tanks, approximately ten special-purpose vehicles (such as PT-76 amphibious light tanks), armoured recovery vehicles, and armoured vehicle-launched bridges, 48 BVP M-80 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons, six 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, six M-63 Plamen and four M-77 Oganj multiple rocket launchers, eighteen 155-millimetre (6.1 in) and twelve 152-millimetre (6.0 in) guns with towing vehicles, approximately 180 artillery pieces below 100-millimetre (3.9 in) calibre, several batteries of 60-millimetre (2.4 in), 82-millimetre (3.2 in) and 120-millimetre (4.7 in) mortars, 25,000 small arms, 250 vehicles and pieces of engineering equipment, a large stock of communication equipment and several hundred thousand tonnes of ammunition.[24] Some of the weapons had been disabled on Trifunović's orders shortly before the surrender.[41] The captured weapons were distributed to units deployed in eastern Slavonia, Lika and Dalmatia, and were also used to equip new ZNG units.[43]

When the last JNA-held barracks and the 32nd Corps headquarters surrendered, only two major JNA bases remained in the area of responsibility of the Corps—Bjelovar and Koprivnica. The JNA's Bjelovar garrison was captured by the ZNG a week later, while its barracks in Koprivnica surrendered a day after that.[23] The capture of the JNA barracks in and around Varaždin, and particularly the storage facilities of the 32nd Corps was very significant for development of Croatian military.[25] The capture of the barracks is celebrated annually in Varaždin, and is locally referred to as "Varaždin's Days of War" (Varaždinski dani rata).[35]

War crimes charges were raised against Trifunović in Croatia, where he was indicted for the deaths of six individuals and the wounding of a further 37, both soldiers and civilians. In 1991, he was tried in absentia by a Croatian court, found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.[44] In 1994, Trifunović was charged with treason by the Yugoslav authorities for surrendering the entire JNA 32nd Corps to the ZNG. He was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison. In early 1996, he was pardoned and released,[33] and the government of Yugoslavia paid him €62,000 compensation for spending nearly two years in prison.[45] In 2013, Trifunović formally requested a re-trial in Croatia.[44] He died in January 2017, before proceedings could commence.[46]

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