Operation Tiger (1992)

In August 1990, a revolution took place in Croatia; it was centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around the city of Knin,[1] and in parts of the Lika, Kordun, and Banovina regions, and settlements in eastern Croatia with significant Serb populations.[2] The areas were subsequently named the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). After declaring its intention to integrate with Serbia, the Government of Croatia declared the RSK a rebellion.[3] By March 1991, the conflict escalated into the Croatian War of Independence.[4] In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated.[5] A three-month moratorium followed,[6] after which the decision came into effect on 8 October.[7] The RSK then initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Croatian civilians, and most non-Serbs were expelled by early 1993. By November 1993, fewer than 400 ethnic Croats remained in the UN-protected area known as Sector South,[8] and a further 1,500 – 2,000 remained in Sector North.[9]

The Croatian National Guard (ZNG) was formed in May 1991 because the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) increasingly supported the RSK and the Croatian Police were unable to cope with the situation. The ZNG was renamed the HV in November.[10] The establishment of the military of Croatia was hampered by a UN arms embargo introduced in September.[11] The final months of 1991 saw the fiercest fighting of the war, culminating in the Battle of the barracks,[12] the Siege of Dubrovnik,[13] and the Battle of Vukovar.[14]

In January 1992, the Sarajevo Agreement was signed by representatives of Croatia, the JNA and the UN, and fighting between the two sides was paused.[15] After a series of unsuccessful ceasefires, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to Croatia to supervise and maintain the agreement.[16] The conflict largely passed on to entrenched positions and the JNA retreated from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a new conflict was anticipated.[15] Serbia continued to support the RSK after the JNA pullout.[17]

As the JNA disengaged from Croatia, its personnel prepared to set up a new Bosnian Serb army; Bosnian Serbs declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992. Between 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina—which would later be cited as a pretext for the Bosnian War—was held.[18] Bosnian Serbs set up barricades in the capital Sarajevo and elsewhere on 1 March, and the next day the first fatalities of the war were recorded in Sarajevo and Doboj. In the final days of March, the Bosnian Serb army started shelling Bosanski Brod, and the HV 108th Brigade crossed the border adjacent to the town in reply.[19] and on 4 April, Serb artillery began shelling Sarajevo.[20] The JNA and the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina were confronted by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), under the control of the Bosniak-dominated central government and the Bosnian Croat leadership respectively. The HV sometimes deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the HVO.[19]

Dubrovnik

Dubrovnik on the map of Croatia. RSK and Yugoslav Army-held area near Dubrovnik in early 1992 are highlighted red.

In April 1992, the JNA renewed its offensive operations against the HV and the HVO near Kupres and Stolac in western and southern Herzegovina. The JNA's 2nd Military District, commanded by Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, deployed elements of the 5th Banja Luka Corps and the 9th Knin Corps to the Kupres area, capturing the town from the HV and the HVO jointly defending the area in the Battle of Kupres on 7 April 1992 and threatening Livno and Tomislavgrad to the south-west. The 4th Military District of the JNA, commanded by General Pavle Strugar, employed the 13th Bileća Corps and the 2nd Titograd Corps to capture Stolac and most of the eastern bank of the Neretva River south of Mostar.[21] The JNA attacked Mostar with artillery and fighting around the city started on 6 April, and the Yugoslav Air Force attacked Široki Brijeg on 7–8 April.[22] A Croatian attack on 9 April failed to capture a JNA-controlled airfield in Mostar. On April 11, the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence Force captured two nearby hydroelectric power plants on the Neretva River and the JNA pushed the HV/HVO force from Stolac. Čapljina, 25 kilometres (16 miles) south-west of Mostar, came under intermittent JNA artillery and air attacks.[23] A ceasefire was arranged on 7 May, but the JNA and the Bosnian Serb forces resumed the attack the next day.[23] The attack captured a large part of Mostar and some territory on the western bank of the Neretva River.[21] On 12 May, JNA forces based in Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the VRS.[24]

Although the JNA planned the offensive to preempt a Croatian attack on Serb-held territory, Croatia saw the moves as a prelude to JNA attacks on southern Croatia, specifically aimed at the Port of Ploče and possibly Split.[25] To counter the perceived threat, the HV deployed additional troops to the area, now designated the "Southern Front". HV General Janko Bobetko, appointed to lead the Southern Front, reorganized the HVO command structure and assumed control of its forces in the area to stop the expected JNA/VRS offensive and regain the lost territory. In late May, Bobetko launched an attack along the Adriatic coast and in its immediate hinterland, towards besieged Dubrovnik, linking up with the HV force in the city and ending its encirclement by the JNA on 1 June. The attack coincided with the JNA's withdrawal from the area towards Dubrovnik Airport in Konavle and to positions within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[26] The border in this area is located 2 to 10 kilometres (1.2 to 6.2 miles) from the coast.[27] On 23 May, the HV/HVO captured Hum Mountain south of Mostar.[23]

Operation Jackal—also known as Operation June Dawns[28]— commenced on 7 June 1992. The attacking HV/HVO force moved east and north from Čapljina towards Stolac and Mostar, aiming to push the VRS back from the Neretva River and capture positions around Mostar. As the VRS Herzegovina Corps positions around Tasovčići collapsed on 8 June, the HV/HVO advanced quickly in both of the planned directions.[29] On 11 June, Mostar HVO forces attacked VRS positions on the western bank of the Neretva River south of Mostar in support of the main attack. The advance was immediately successful, gaining ground there,[23] and in Mostar.[28] On 12 June, no VRS forces remained on the western bank of the Neretva.[30] By 15 June, the HV/HVO completed their capture of Stolac and the surrounding area, while the linkup of the HV/HVO forces approaching Mostar from the south, and those already in the city, was completed on 17 June.[29] By 26 June, the HV/HVO advanced further eastwards along the slopes of Velež Mountain. Although the front lines did not move significantly to the east, Mostar was rendered relatively safe from future VRS attacks. On 10 June, in an operation codenamed Eagle 92 (Croatian: Orao 92), the HV tried to push VRS forces back from the high ground of Golubov Kamen, where the only road to Dubrovnik runs 700 metres (2,300 feet) from the national border, and inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, dominating over Dubrovnik.[31] The attack was not sufficiently organized and it failed.[29]

The HV initially deployed 1,475 troops to conduct Operation Tiger. Although the VRS in the area had fewer troops, it had greater artillery firepower at its disposal and the advantage of defending in rugged terrain.[32] Operation Tiger was executed by the HV's 1st Guards Brigade, reinforced with the special forces Zrinski Battalion,[32] the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade,[31] supported by the 163rd Infantry Brigade based in Dubrovnik, and additional HV troops brought in to hold positions captured by the guards brigades.[32] Because of inefficient command structures in the reserve units, the HV's Southern Front command was forced to forge tactical groups out of multiple regular units. There was also a lack of manpower in individual reserve units because of their inadequately executed mobilization.[33] To fend off any counter-attacks by the VRS Herzegovina Corps—specifically the 472th Motorized Brigade stationed in the eastern Herzegovina—the positions captured by the 1st Guards Brigade were turned over to elements of the 115th Infantry Brigade, the 145th Infantry Brigade, the 148th Infantry Brigade, a battalion of the 156th Infantry Brigade and a company of the 102nd Infantry Brigade.[32] [33][34]

Following the HV's failed attempt to push the VRS further away from Dubrovnik in early June, Bobetko planned another effort to secure the city, codenamed Operation Tiger.[29] Another effort to capture Golubov Kamen at the head of the Rijeka Dubrovačka embayment of the Adriatic Sea was made on 1 July. The initial attack, spearheaded by the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade, gained ground but the objective was not secured until 2 July, after VRS troops mounted a counter-attack.[31] On the left flank of the 4th Guards Brigade, the 1st Guards Brigade—reinforced with a special operations Zrinski Battalion—was tasked with capturing high ground on the southern rim of Popovo field. Their advance met stiff resistance and progressed slowly. By 10 July the 1st Guards Brigade reached its immediate objectives,[32] consisting of numerous significant hills.[29] By 13 July, it had covered approximately 17 kilometres (11 miles) in the Dubrovnik hinterland, from the villages of Grepci and Visova to the road running through Srnjak village at the rim of Popovo field, north of Cavtat where their advance was halted.[32]

As the guards brigades reached their objectives, the newly gained ground was gradually turned over to reserve HV units. The 163rd Infantry Brigade, defending Dubrovnik during the JNA siege, took over positions captured by the 4th Guards Brigade. The 1st Guards Brigade was relieved and its territorial gains were garrisoned by elements of the 115th Infantry Brigade, the 145th Infantry Brigade, the 148th Infantry Brigade, a battalion of the 156th Infantry Brigade and a company of the 102nd Infantry Brigade. The VRS counter-attacked the reserve infantry on 9 July, causing losses and the withdrawal of the 102nd Infantry Brigade company east of Zavala and the 115th Infantry Brigade from Zavala and Orahov Do. The retreat created a gap in the HV defences, threatening the town of Slano, but the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade closed it. Days later, the 148th Infantry Brigade conceded some of the offensive's gains to another VRS counter-attack near Bobani. On 13 July, a platoon drawn from the 2nd Guards Brigade attempted to capture the Vlaštica Peak, but the attack failed, marking the end of Operation Tiger.[32]

Croatia–Montenegro border at Prevlaka in the Bay of Kotor area

Operation Tiger captured only 40 square kilometres (15 square miles) of territory around Dubrovnik, but it created a buffer zone around the city which increased its security. It also improved the security of the Ploče–Dubrovnik section of the Adriatic Highway—especially at Golubov Kamen and Rijeka Dubrovačka—allowing the safer resupply of Dubrovnik.[32] The subsequent negotiated withdrawal of the JNA from Konavle and the HV's rapid capture of the region before the VRS could move in, and other offensive operations in the Dubrovnik hinterland secured a Croatian strategic victory. The entire region of southern Dalmatia was brought under Croatian control, the siege of Dubrovnik was lifted and the city's safety was largely improved by the end of October 1992.[36] However, that part of Croatia continued to suffer intermittent VRS artillery attacks until after Operation Storm in August 1995.[40]

In the wake of the 1995 Split Agreement and the large-scale deployment of the HV to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HV General Staff planned to attack and capture a large part of eastern Herzegovina.[41] The attack—codenamed Operation Burin—was formally ordered on 3 September 1995,[42] and the HVO and the ARBiH were scheduled to join the attack.[43] The operation was postponed on 17 September,[44] but on 7 November was again ordered to be carried out should the Dayton peace talks fail.[45] The plan was cancelled in early December 1995.[46]

The Tuđman–Ćosić agreement on the pullout of JNA troops from Konavle provoked an emotional response in Yugoslavia, where it was interpreted as a defeat and betrayal.[47] Following the agreement, the Prevlaka Peninsula was demilitarized and placed under the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), established by the UN Security Council Resolution 779 of 6 October 1992. The resolution placed the peninsula under the control of UNPROFOR.[48] The UN Security Council Resolution 981 transferred control to the newly established United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia on 31 March 1995, and then to UNMOP through the UN Security Council Resolution 1038 of 15 January 1996. The UN mission there expired two months later.[49] As of February 2013, the Prevlaka Peninsula remains demilitarized, with Croatian and Montenegrin police jointly patrolling the sea. The border in the area remains disputed between Croatia and Montenegro.[50]

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