Burmese nationalism

Burmese nationalism (Burmese: ဗမာအမျိုးသားရေးဝါဒ) is a form of nationalism that asserts Myanmar is a nation and promotes the cultural identity of the Burmese people.

History

Union of Burma's flag from 1948 to 1974
Flag of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (3 January 1974 – 18 September 1988) and the Union of Myanmar (18 September 1988 – 21 October 2010)
Flag of modern Myanmar

Historically, Myanmar has been one of the most powerful countries in Southeast Asia. During the periods of the Pagan Empire, Taungoo dynasty and Konbaung dynasty and their respective ruling regimes, Myanmar was considered second only to China in terms of strongest nations in the region. However, despite strong historical pride, nationalism within Myanmar had little support amongst the domestic population and continued to be disorganized up until 19th century. It was only when Britain managed to takeover Burma following three bloody Anglo-Burmese wars that nationalism started to grow rapidly.[1]

Initially, Burmese nationalism aimed at overthrowing British rule. In response, the British allied with ethnic minorities against the majority Bamars and often used ethnic minorities to stampede Bamar people. Nationalism grew in British Burma and eventual British support to the minorities against the Burmese also left it extremely more ethnoreligiously concentrated around the idea of a unified Burmese state with the domination of the Bamar people and Theravada Buddhism as the dominant religion, and this made Burmese nationalism more restrictive and homogeneous.[2]

An attempt by Aung San, who was regarded as the father of modern Burma to create a unified multi-ethnic Burmese state, had led to a successfully negotiated Panglong Agreement with minorities, but he was assassinated in the aftermath of the signing.[3] The perpetrator remained unknown, but the Panglong Agreement was soon torn down by subsequent Burmese governments, as Burmese nationalism grew increasingly tenser and more ethnoreligious and chauvinist. As the British Empire started to retreat from Burma, Burmese nationalists aimed at the minorities of the country whom they found to be unfaithful to the Burmese nationhood, which became the cause for the ongoing Internal conflict in Myanmar.[4][5]

Relations with other ethnic groups

Due to the outcome of the ethnic conflicts inside the country, there is strong Bamar ethnic chauvinism inside the country, which further exploded by the reforms of Myanmar in 2011. One of the contributing factors that fostered the rise of Bamar chauvinism was the country's history, when minorities allied with Britain against Burma, the ongoing internal conflict, and the fact that the Bamar people often mingled with Buddhist nationalism since most Bamars are Theravada Buddhists.[2] That's not to say this is the current phenomenon. It was also the result of medieval Burmese persecutions, and the demographic fear, given Myanmar has over 40% of its population belonging to minorities. Racial and religious segregation in Myanmar has been historically strong and developed since the Taungoo dynasty.[6] There has been an increase of Burmese Buddhist chauvinism during the COVID-19 pandemic.[7]

Christian ethnic groups

Predominantly Christian ethnic groups such as the Karen and Chin but also individual Christians from other ethnic groups such as the Kachin have been the targets of open discrimination by Bamar nationalism since the British occupation. Up until the arrival of the British, these people did not often appear in the crosshairs of the Bamar rulers. Following the colonial occupation, however, a sense of racial segregation increased as Britain favoured the minorities like Karen, Kachin and Chin. People of these ethnicities also converted to Christianity en masse.[8][9] For instance, the Karens were favored due to their ready acceptance of British rule and open hostility toward the Buddhist Bamars since the First Anglo-Burmese War.[10][11][12]

During the World War II, the Burmese supported the Japanese persecuting its minorities, founding the Burmese Independence Army. This was not just limiting to the Rohingyas, but also Japan attacked the Karens and Kachins, in which the Burmese also participated in large-scale massacres of Christian minorities. In response, many Christians, notably Karens, joined the British and fought against the Japanese invaders.[13] The Kachins found its own Ranger group fighting under British and often clashed with both Burmese and Japanese forces.[14] These moments further segregated mainstream Christian minorities away from the majority Buddhist Bamar population, and served as the main catalyst for ethnic wars later.[15]

After the Karens were excluded from Panglong Agreement and Karen officers were dismissed from the Burmese Tatmadaw, desire for independence led the Karens into a brutal insurgency against the Burmese government. Thus, the Karen conflict began as ethnic Burmese and Karens. Burmese government in response, had begun to persecute ethnic Karens and barring the Karens from working inside Burma.[16] The situation became increasingly complicated with the growth of violent attack against ethnic Karens by the Burmese regime following the overthrown of civilian government by Ne Win, as Ne Win openly supported Buddhist Bamar nationalism to deter other ethnic nationalisms. Thus, the conflict became increasingly sectarian, with the Bamar Buddhists clash with the Karen and Kachin Christians to gain control of minorities' territories, despite various attempts to reduce sectarian and racial tensions.[17][18]

The Kachins joined anti-Burmese insurgency following the collapse of the civilian government. Thus, Kachins became equally targeted by the Burmese government.[19] Peace efforts have been mostly futile.[20]

The Chin people, a relatively close relative of the Kachin and also majority Christians, have also been recently targeted by Burmese nationalism and has been harassed for its open expression of their Chin identity, though not as large as with Karens and Kachins.[21][22]

Despite the Holy See and Myanmar established official relations in 2017 with hope to de-escalate persecution of Christians, ongoing persecution by Burmese nationalists on Christians continued as for 2018.[23] In 2019, Christians celebrating Christmas had been attacked by Buddhist mobs with Burmese nationalist rhetorics.[24]

Mon people

The Mon people are an indigenous people living in southern Burma, but share a close linguistic relationship with the Vietnamese and Khmers, both being Austroasiatic languages. The Mon experiences a fluctuated relationship with the majority Burmese, the Mons had long had an independent kingdom known as Hanthawaddy Kingdom and often fought bitterly to regain its independence from the Burmese, whom despite culturally close by Buddhist nature, are linguistically different. Siam often supported Mon resurrection against Burma as part of its buffer zone policy.[25]

However, the Mon Hanthawaddy was finally conquered following the Konbaung–Hanthawaddy War.[26] The bitterness was further exacerbated by the Burmese forcible assimilation attempt, which led to the decrease of Mon population. Thus, the Mons sided with Britain following the British conquest. The situation became increasingly complex due to the British rule, with Britain provided the Mons supports and de-Burmanization attempt, and national awareness of the Mons increased.[27] Although Mons later became more hostile to British administration, it was never large enough and the Mons soon turned against Burmese rule. Thus, since 1950s, Burmese nationalism has also aimed to permanently Burmanize the Mon minority, Mons were forced to join the Tatmadaw and in rare case, there have been casualties.[28]

Muslim ethnic groups

Burmese King Bayinnaung (1550–1581 AD) imposed restrictions upon his Muslim subjects, but not actual persecution.[29] In 1559 AD, after conquering Pegu (present-day Bago), Bayinnaung banned Islamic ritual slaughter, thereby prohibiting Muslims from consuming halal meals of goats and chicken. He also banned Eid al-Adha and Qurbani, regarding killing animals in the name of religion as a cruel custom.[30][31]

In the 17th century, Indian Muslims residing in Arakan were massacred. These Muslims had settled with Shah Shuja, who had fled India after losing the Mughal war of succession. Initially, the Arakan pirate Sandathudama (1652–1687 AD) who was the local pirate of Chittagong and Arakan, allowed Shuja and his followers to settle there. But a dispute arose between Sandatudama and Shuja, and Shuja unsuccessfully attempted to rebel. Sandathudama killed most of Shuja's followers, though Shuja himself escaped the massacre.[32][33][34][35][36][37][38]

King Alaungpaya (1752–1760) prohibited Muslims from practicing the Islamic method of slaughtering cattle.[39]

During the British rule, Myanmar was filled with influx of Indian immigrants, many were of Muslim faith. The Indian presence and widespread Muslim communities often caused tensions between Burmese and Indians, and Burmese often called Indian migrants "kala" in term of racial discrimination and economic competitiveness, with Indians had long been successful economic merchants and favored by the British government over the less-skilled Burmese counterparts.[40] Numerous anti-Indian unrests occurred across Burma and often followed with anti-Muslim unrests together. The anti-Indian riots of 1930 were sparked by a labour issue at the Yangon port which led to massacre of Indian Muslim workers. Many Burmese were killed by the British authorities aftermath.[40][41]

Amidst the World War II, many Burmese supported Japanese invasion and, with the Japanese holding an antagonistic view on Muslims, often led to massacres. The Japanese destroyed Panglong, a Chinese Muslim township, with support from Burmese.[42][43] The Japanese also helped Burmese force to crush the less-armed Rohingya resistance, forcing many Rohingyas to flee from Burma.[44][45][46][47]

The persecution once again intensified following the establishment of military junta by Ne Win at 1962. For example, Muslims were expelled from the army.[48] Muslim communities that segregated themselves from the Buddhist majority faced greater difficulties than those who integrated, potentially forfeiting observance of Islamic laws.[48] Rohingyas faced even harder repression, the community has lost the right to acquire Burmese citizenship since 1982 due to Myanmar nationality law.[49]

The destruction of Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban had further incited religious and racial conflict. In 2001, anti-Muslim pamphlets, most notably The Fear of Losing One's Race, were widely distributed by monks. Many Muslims feel that this exacerbated the anti-Muslim feelings that had been provoked by the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan.[50] On 15 May 2001, anti-Muslim riots broke out in Taungoo, Pegu division, resulting in the deaths of about 200 Muslims, in the destruction of 11 mosques and the setting ablaze of over 400 houses. On 15 May, the first day of the anti-Muslim uprisings, about 20 Muslims who were praying in the Han Tha mosque were killed and some were beaten to death by the pro-junta forces. On 17 May, Lt. General Win Myint, Secretary No. 3 of the SPDC and deputy Home and Religious minister, arrived in Taungoo and curfew was imposed there until 12 July 2001.[51] Buddhist monks demanded that the ancient Han Tha Mosque in Taungoo be destroyed in retaliation for the destruction in Bamiyan.[52] On 18 May, the Han Tha mosque and Taungoo Railway station mosque were razed to the ground by bulldozers owned by the SPDC junta.[52] The mosques in Taungoo remained closed as of May 2002. Muslims have been forced to worship in their homes. Local Muslim leaders complain that they are still harassed. After the violence, many local Muslims moved away from Taungoo to nearby towns and to as far away as Yangon. After two days of violence the military stepped in and the violence immediately ended.[52]

A number of anti-Muslim riots erupted since 2010s as a response to growing Muslim threats, often with huge casualties.[53][54][55] It was further exacerbated by the rise of 969 Movement which is strongly Islamophobic and anti-Rohingya, led by U Wirathu, who is often compared to Osama Bin Laden.[56]

Rohingya has been facing intense persecution since 2016. Ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas has been exacerbated as well, with Burmese nationalism played a potent role on discrimination to the Rohingyas.[6] Burmese nationalists have rejected the use of "Rohingya" and coined it as Bengalis, accusing them of being immigrants from Bangladesh. Violation and repression on Rohingyas have become widespread and Rohingyas became increasingly displaced.[57]

In 2017, a personal friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, lawyer Ko Ni – a Muslim himself, was assassinated by a gunman with link to Burmese nationalism. His death was thought to be traced on his sympathy to the Rohingya plight.[58]

Rakhine

Along with the Rohingya, the Rakhine people have been living in Rakhine, also known as Arakan under the Kingdom of Mrauk U. For a number of times, Mrauk U was an independent Kingdom, despite sharing common Theravada Buddhist belief with the Burmese. Mrauk U however was conquered by the Konbaung dynasty and incorporated into Burma, where the act of ethnic genocide led to the fleeing of 35,000 Arakanese away from Burma to British Raj.[59] This had eventually fostered the future enmity between Arakanese and Burmese, thus dented any hope for a peaceful relationship between two Theravada Buddhist people.

The Arakanese were openly hostile to not just Burmese, but also to the Rohingyas, whom they saw as aliens who forcibly destroyed the independence of the Arakanese nation. During the World War II, the Arakanese supported the Japanese, but also fought against Burmese force to resist Burmese nationalism from ever encroaching into the community.[60] This has contributed to the modern crisis, as Rakhines, Rohingyas and Burmese are openly hostile to each other.[61] As in accordance, one Rakhine politician has accused that "we are therefore the victims of Muslimisation and Burmese chauvinism".[62]

Burmese nationalism further led to deadly conflict toward the end of 20th century, but only intensified following 2010s, with the establishment of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army against the Burmese government.[63] This nationalist sparking of violence further escalates by Burmese revanchism of Arakan region and increasingly multifaceted between Burmese, Rohingya and Rakhine, which the later has the largest resentment.[64]

Shan State

The Shan State in Myanmar is one of the most diversified regions in the country, with the Shan people being the most numerous, as well as its strong relationship with the other Tai tribes, the Thais and Laotians. The Shan people moved to Myanmar following the Mongol invasions of Burma, and had stayed there since, forming its independence state.[65] From the rise of Burmese Empire at 16th century and its conquest, the Burmese rulers applied a pluralist approach, barring settlers from taking Shan territory and left it mostly alone, thus Burmese nationalists initially did not see Shans with a similar level of skepticism like it did with the other ethnic minorities. The Shans even contributed troops to fight for the Burmese Empire, notably against the British during the Anglo-Burmese wars, which the British force acknowledged the ability of the Shans.[65] The British conquerors acknowledged the independence of the Shan people, however, and instead, granted the region full autonomy under the Shan States and later, Federated Shan States. Thus, Shan nationalism did not develop separate immediately like those of Karen, Kachin, Rakhine and Rohingya ones, but rather a force reinforcing Burmese nationalism. The Shans even participated in the Panglong Agreement and accepted to be part of Burma. However, Aung San's assassination meant that the Panglong Agreement was never honored.[66]

Nonetheless, Shan people refrained from joining insurgency against Burmese state at first, but it changed when Ne Win's launched coup d'état in 1962 and arrest of Sao Shwe Thaik, that gave birth for tensions between Shans and Burmese.[67] The Burmese government has begun to persecute Shans, as the Shan resistance turned to be a major obstacle for Burmese nationalists to achieve a homogenous nation, mounting tensions had led to maltreatment and repression of ethnic Shans.[68]

Outside the Shans, other main ethnics in the region include the Ta'ang, Kokang Chinese and Wa, both also have been frequently targeted by the Burmese nationalists due to its differences in culture and custom.[69][70] In all ethnics there, only the Was have a nominal peace with Burma, though it is often fragile due to the involvement of the United Wa State Army on supplying other ethnic rebels and its drug trade.[71][72]

Others

Burmese Chinese and Burmese Indians have been among the participants on its conflict against Burmese government, which also led to the rise of Burmese nationalism. Burmese nationalists aimed the most hostility to the latter, partly due to British rule that encouraged Indian migration, thus anti-Indian sentiment ran between demanding of assimilation to expulsion of Indians.[73] Burmese Chinese were a much smaller migrant group, and it was not until 1960s that anti-Chinese sentiment began to rise, notably the 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Myanmar which led to the exodus of ethnic Chinese;[74] nonetheless, anti-Chinese unrest also happened during the British rule, thus the first sign of Burmese nationalism targeting on Chinese.[75]

Eventually, grievances led to the Chinese to arm itself against Burmese government, thus founding the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army to fight against Burma,[76] while the Indians had fled back to India to escape ongoing Burmese nationalist fervors.[77]

Causes

Scholars, analysts and dissidents have pointed out about the lack of unity and sympathy among Burmese to other ethnic groups may have bolstered ultranationalism in Myanmar despite its attempt to change the image.[78]

Economics

Although Myanmar has been a historic empire, the country had been largely an agrarian society and, despite bordering India and China, was not very active in international trade, with very little involvement in comparison to other Southeast Asian nations.[79] Thus, the country was not and has never been an economic power. The power and wealth Myanmar acquired was mostly the result of British colonialism, which Burma was the second richest country in Southeast Asia after the Philippines. Because of Britain, the country was on the fast track of development to become a developed country.[80] However, once the British force left Burma, subsequent mismanagement left Burma from an economic model to its verge of social and economic collapse, throughout disastrous policies like nationalisation under U Nu and Burmese Way to Socialism by Ne Win.[81][82][83] Even after the fall of Ne Win, the junta regime remained, whereas economic freedom was severely limited, and for once, the least free economy in Asia along with North Korea.[84] Economic restriction was later lifted following 2011 reforms and Myanmar has experienced the economic boom, but internal problems' explosion have hindered the country's potential, thus cut off development opportunities in many severely undeveloped parts.[85] This is considered to be harmful, given its resource-rich occupation. Thus, nationalism becomes the driving force, not just for the call demanding better economic and social development, but also often used to intimidate rival forces, often resulted in nationalist demonstration to even military and violent social activities.[86]

Politics

Given Myanmar's long unstable history and the lack of economic activities, politics of Myanmar is often being dominated by the lack of prominent democratic institutions, thus it is dependent on the leader's will throughout history. Even during the height of the Taungoo dynasty, Bayinnaung refused to assimilate the population from the colonized territories, leaving his son Nanda Bayin an impossible task to keep uniting the fragile empire, ultimately led to the downfall of Taungoo Empire.[87] Meanwhile, as Burma is mostly surrounded by a large number of difficult ethnic population who are not aligned, and sometimes antagonistic to Burmese rule, the country often has to resort on military conquest to enhance its security, as well as fostering nationalism for national interests of Burma. The Burmese–Siamese wars and its conquest to Northeast India and Laos were examples of this.[88][89] This concept is also given for the internal civil war of Myanmar as well, with Burmese nationalism often being fueled by the Burmese government to gain control of natural resources and extending control over minorities.[90][91] It is further examined by the lack of civilian control over the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's official armed forces, as the military has been independent of civilian government's circle, making Burmese nationalism more militaristic and violent; in some point, civilian leaders (as with case of Aung San Suu Kyi) often compelled to the Burmese military and nationalist desires.[92]

Ethnic antipathy

Comparing to other Southeast Asian nations, Myanmar lacks a prominent history of assimilating different ethnic groups, and the formal process of assimilation only began under the Konbaung dynasty when the Mons went under Burmanization process.[93][94] Yet, it was Burmese nationalism developed under British occupation meant that nationalism on the rise led to greater demand for Burmanization process. However, because the concept came late, and ethnic minorities have already fostered its own identities, this resulted in Burmanization mingled together with Burmese nationalist rhetorics for a united Burmese statehood, ultimately unleashing racial and religious segregation in the country.[93] The more resistance by the minorities, the more Burmese nationalists grew frustrating and fanatical for Burmanization to create for a Burmaness identity, thus the current civil conflict.[95] Lack of solidarity toward different ethnic people further strained the relationship between majority Burmese and its large minorities, as examined by the current Rakhine conflict.[64]

Religious discord

Myanmar is a country with predominant Buddhist population, and tied strongly with the Bamar people, the main ethnic group in Myanmar. With more than 20 million people that are not Bamars however, religious sectarianism is witnessed.[22] Therefore, to ensure for the desire of having Myanmar as a future homogeneous state, Burmese leaders are not hesitating on promoting cultural homogeneity with Theravada Buddhism as the center of the country, this has been used to do reprisals against Christians like Karens, Kachins and Chins; to against Muslims like Rohingyas, Kameins and Panthays; and to hurt the interests of a segment of the Shan population that practices Tai folk religion.[96][97]

The use of the term "Buddhist nationalism", however, can often be inaccurate, as is evidenced by Bamar aggression against primarily Theravāda ethnic groups such as the Arakanese (Rakhine), Indians and Mon; the mainly Mahāyāna Chinese; and the minority of Karen Buddhists;[98][99] all of whose shared religion with the Bamars is frequently ignored by causal observers in the West in favour of a narrative of Islamophobia that goes even further by singling out the Rohingya.[98] Such a narrative has begun to be undermined by reports of ethnic supremacism and, in the case of peoples whose physical features are dissimilar to the average Bamar, racial segregation.[100]

See also

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