East German uprising of 1953

Eastern Bloc
Republics of the USSR Armenia Azerbaijan Byelorussia Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kirghizia Latvia Lithuania Moldavia Russia Tajikistan Turkmenia Ukraine Uzbekistan
Allied states Afghanistan Albania (until 1961) Angola Benin Bulgaria China (until 1961) Congo Cuba Czechoslovakia East Germany Ethiopia Grenada Hungary Kampuchea Laos Mongolia Mozambique North Korea Poland (until 1989) Romania Somalia (until 1977) South Yemen Vietnam (North Vietnam) Yugoslavia (until 1948)
Related organizations Warsaw Pact Comecon Cominform World Federation of Trade Unions World Federation of Democratic Youth
Dissent and opposition Anti-Soviet partisans Albania Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Serbia Ukraine Guerrilla war in the Baltic states Forest Brothers Operation Jungle Soviet occupation Protests and uprisings Plzeň 1953 East Germany 1953 Georgia 1956 Poznań 1956 Hungary 1956 Novocherkassk 1962 Prague 1968 Invasion Moscow Czechoslovakia 1976–92 Romania 1977 Poland 1980–89 Kazakhstan 1986 Brașov 1987 Tbilisi 1989 Baku 1990 Lithuania 1991 Riga 1991
Cold War events Marshall Plan Czechoslovak coup Tito–Stalin split Berlin Blockade Korean War Secret Speech Sino-Soviet split Soviet–Albanian split Berlin Wall Cuban Missile Crisis Vietnam War Cuban intervention in Angola Afghan War 1980 Moscow Olympics 1984 Los Angeles Olympics Gulf War
Decline Singing Revolution Polish Round Table Agreement Revolutions of 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall January Events in Latvia Breakup of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Wars End of the Soviet Union Post-Soviet conflicts Fall of communism in Albania Dissolution of Czechoslovakia

An article in the trade union paper, Tribune, restated the necessity of the norm increases. Evidently, the East German government would not retreat on the issue of the 10% norm increase despite its widespread unpopularity.

At 9:00am on the morning of 16 June, 300 workers from the construction sites at "Hospital Friedrichshain" and "Stalinallee Block 40" in East Berlin went on strike and marched on the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) headquarters on Wallstrasse, then to the city centre, hoisting banners and demanding a reinstatement of the old norms. Demands from the striking workers broadened out to encompass political matters outside of the work norms. Via Alexanderplatz and Unter den Linden, most of the demonstrators moved to the government seat on Leipziger Straße; others went to the SED headquarters on Wilhelm-Pieck-Straße. En route, they took over two sound trucks and used them to spread their calls for a general strike and a demonstration, set for the Strausberger Platz at 7:00am the next date. In front of the GDR House of Ministries, the quickly growing crowd demanded to speak to Ulbricht and Grotewohl. Only Heavy Industry Minister Fritz Selbmann and Professor Robert Havemann, president of the GDR Peace Council, emerged from the building. Their attempts to calm the workers were drowned out by the clamour of the crowd, which shouted the pair down.[13]

Meanwhile, the Politburo deliberated, unable to decide what to do. Despite the urgency of the situation, it was only after hours of deliberation – under the pressure of the demonstrators, and probably also from Semyonov – that the leadership decided to revoke the norm increase. They decreed that increases in productivity would now be voluntary. They blamed the strikes and demonstrations partly on how the rise had been implemented, partly on foreign provocateurs. However, by the time an SED functionary reached the House of Ministries to give the workers the news, the protestors' agenda had expanded well beyond the issue of norm increases.[14] Later that afternoon, the crowd dispersed and workers returned to their sites. Save for isolated clashes between the Volkspolizei and groups of demonstrators, there was a period of calm for the remainder of the day. The SED leadership was surprised by the depth of resentment and the extent of anti-regime actions. Indeed, the SED leadership was so out of touch they expected a massive propaganda drive would be sufficient to cope with the emerging crisis. It would not be enough, and Ulbrich probably realised this only after a few hours after that suggestion was made.[15] The Soviet authorities were likewise completely taken aback by the widespread protests that followed the demonstrations in East Berlin. Their response was improvised and uncoordinated. Later that evening, Semyonov met with the SED leadership and informed them of his decision to send Soviet troops to Berlin.[16]

Throughout the night of 16 June and early morning of 17 June, the news of events in East Berlin spread quickly throughout the GDR via word of mouth and by Western radio broadcasts, particularly Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), which had been broadcasting about the strikes being staged against the increase in work norms throughout the day. In the afternoon, there were broadcasts of the change in the demonstrator's demands from the repeal of the higher work quotas and price cuts to shouts of "We want free elections". RIAS was later approached by East Berlin workers who sought assistance from them in disseminating their call for a general strike the next day. The station's political director, Gordon Ewing, decided that the station could not directly lend itself as a mouthpiece to the workers, in his view, this had the potential to start a war. Instead, it would not actively incite rebellion and simply broadcast information about the demonstrations, factually and comprehensively. Nonetheless, at 7.30pm RIAS reported that a delegation of construction workers had submitted a resolution for publication, stating that the strikers, having proved by their actions that "they were able to force the government to accept their justified demands", would "make use of their power at any time" if their demands for lower quotas, price cuts, free elections and indemnity for all demonstrators were not fulfilled. Later that night, there was all but active encouragement to demonstrate against the regime. RIAS Programme Director Eberhard Schutz called the regime's reversal on the norm question "a victory, which our Ostberliners share with the entire working population of the Soviet Zone." Schutz attributed the government's U-turn to the workers' actions. His listeners' demands – i.e., the resignation of the government, Western-style liberties, etc. – were justified, and encouraged them to support the demonstrators. Schutz said that RIAS and the East German people expected these demands to be met: it was the East German people's task to show the SED and the Soviet Communist Party that this was true.

Following West Germany's Federal Minister for All-German Questions Jakob Kaiser's admonition in a late night broadcast to East Germans to shy away from provocations, RIAS, starting with its 11pm news broadcast, and from then on in hourly intermissions, repeated the workers' demand to continue the strike the next day, calling specifically for all East Berliners to participate in a demonstration at 7am on the 17th at Strausberger Platz.[12]

Following Semyonov's decision, Soviet troops entered the environs of East Berlin in the early morning of 17 June. Meanwhile, crowds of workers began to gather at Strausberger Platz and other public places and began towards the city centre. En route, they encountered GDR security forces – regular and Kasernierte Volkspolizei ('Barracked People's Police', KVP) units – who, apparently lacking instructions, did not initially intervene. Along with SED and FDJ functionaries, police officials tried – and mostly failed – to convince the marchers to return to their workplaces and homes. Where police attempted to halt or disperse the crowds, they rapidly ended up on the defensive. As they drew in ever-greater numbers, a feeling of solidarity permeated the demonstrators. Loudspeaker cars and bicycles provided communications between the different columns of marchers from the outer districts as, all morning, they converged on the city centre. On improvised banners and posters, the demonstrators again demanded the reinstatement of the old norms, but also price decreases, the release of fellow protestors who had been arrested the day before, even free and fair all-German elections. Slogans like "down with the government!" and "butter, not arms" were also visible. Party posters and statues – especially those depicting SED and Soviet leaders – were ransacked, burned or otherwise defaced.

By 9am, 25,000 people were gathered in front of the House of Ministries, and tens of thousands more were en route to Leipziger Strasse or across Potsdamer Platz. Between 10am and 11am, 80 to 100 demonstrators seemed to storm the government seat, visibly demonstrating that the 500 members of Volkspolizei and State Security had been overpowered.[17] Then, suddenly, Soviet military vehicles appeared, followed by tanks, and they appeared to prevent a complete takeover. Within an hour, Soviet troops had cleared and isolated the area around the government headquarters. At noon, the Soviet authorities terminated all tram and metro traffic into the Eastern sector and all but closed the sector borders to West Berlin to prevent more demonstrators from reaching the city centre. An hour later, they declared martial law in East Berlin.[17] The repression took place outside East Berlin police headquarters – where Soviet tanks opened fire on "the insurgents". Fighting between the Soviet Army (and later GDR police) and the demonstrators persisted into the afternoon and night – with, in some cases, tanks and troops firing directly into the crowds. Executions, most prominently of West Berlin worker Willi Gottling, and mass arrests followed.

Overnight, the Soviets and the Stasi started to arrest hundreds of people. Ultimately, up to 10,000 people were detained and at least 32, probably as many as 40, people were executed, including Soviet Army soldiers who refused to obey orders.[18] With the SED leadership effectively paralysed at the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst, control of East Berlin passed to the Soviets in East Berlin.[16]

Detlev-Rohwedder-Haus in Berlin, known as the House of Ministries in 1953.

All of East Germany's 24 cities with a population larger than 50,000 experienced upheavals; likewise in the case of roughly 80% of its towns with populations above 10,000 but below 50,000. Approximately 339,000 participated in 129 demonstrations outside of Berlin; more than 225,000 people launched strikes in 332 factories. The main centres of activity included the industrial region around Halle, Merseburg, and Bitterfeld, as well as middle-size towns like Jena, Gorlitz, and Brandenburg. No more than 25,000 people participated in strikes and demonstrations Leipzig, but there were 32,000 in Magdeburg, 43,000 in Dresden, 53,000 in Potsdam – and in Halle, a figure close to 100,000.

At first, such demonstrations were relatively peaceful, but as increasing numbers began to participate, the protests became more violent. Looting, particularly of SED-owned shops, became a regular occurrence; there was some arson, and many SED functionaries were beaten up later in the day. In some towns, the jails were seized by the demonstrators, who demanded the release of certain political prisoners.[19] When the Soviet Army intervened in these places outside of East Berlin, they seemed to be more restrained and more passive. Some Soviet soldiers even displayed a friendly attitude towards the demonstrators.[16]

In the countryside, meanwhile, protests took place in more than 200 villages. However, many East German farmers did not take collective action against the regime: the most common expression of protest in rural areas was for farmers to leave and/or dissolve recently formed collective farms and resume farming on one's own.[20]

Although the demands made by protesters could be political – in favour of the dissolution of the East German government and the organisation of free elections, e.g. – often they were simply of a local and economic character. They were about issues like bread shortages, unpopular night shifts, even the number of toilets in the workplace and the fact that tea was being served in rusty urns.[21] Also expressed were widely held grievances against the intelligentsia, who were perceived to enjoy 'unfair privileges', such as special deliveries of basic foodstuffs and other commodities.[22]

Others, particularly workers, demanded the re-foundation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in East Germany. Among former social democrats, there existed enormous bitterness against Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl, the ex-leader of the East German SPD, whom they believed had "betrayed the SPD" for leading the party's merger with the rival German Communist Party to form the ruling SED in 1946. The Soviet Military Administration (SVAG) had pressured Grotewohl into the merger to protect communist rule in East Germany after the surprisingly poor performance of communist parties in elections in Hungary and Austria in November 1945. Grotewohl was "rewarded" with becoming Prime Minister, but within a few years the SED had significantly reduced his powers and turned the office into a mostly figurehead role. Many East German social democrats viewed Grotewohl as a traitor who should now "have his neck wrung."[23]

There were even Nazi elements involved in the protests, though seldom as ringleaders. Walls, bridges and school blackboards were defaced with Nazi slogans and swastikas, and in some places, Nazi songs were sung at demonstrations. A significant minority of East Germans still clung to ideas of Nazism.[24]

Meanwhile, Ulbricht's position as party leader became tenuous, and his position was only saved by the leadership turmoil in Moscow following the death of Joseph Stalin. Ulbricht, after all, was tainted by his association with the disastrous Second Party Conference, the policies following which had led to the crisis East Germany was now mired in.

By the time of a Politburo meeting on 8 July, it seemed that Ulbricht was approaching the end of his time as party leader. Minister of State Security Wilhelm Zaisser conceded that the whole Politburo was responsible for the 'accelerated construction of socialism' and the disastrous fallout thereof. But he also added that to leave Ulbricht as leader "would be opposed catastrophic for the New Course." By the end of the meeting, just two Politburo members supported Ulbricht's continued leadership: Free German Youth League chief Erich Honecker and Party Control Commission Chairman Hermann Matern. Ulbricht only managed to forestall a decision then and there with a promise to make a statement at the forthcoming 15th SED CC Plenum, scheduled for later that month.[27]

The leading Soviet officials in East Berlin – Semyonov, Pavel Yudin and Vasily Sokolovsky – had reached the same conclusion in a report describing and analysing the events of 17–19 June, submitted to Moscow two weeks earlier on 24 June. In a self-serving report which sought to play down the culpability of the Soviet Commission in East Berlin and emphasise the responsibility of Ulbricht for the uprising, they concluded – inter alia – that Ulbricht's position as General Secretary of the SED should be terminated, and that the party would move towards collective leadership, in addition to other far-reaching structural political changes in East Berlin.[28] However, the situation in Moscow dramatically changed just two days later, on 26 June, when Soviet Security Chief Lavrentiy Beria was arrested. On 2 July, when a commission met to discuss proposals for reform in East Germany, the decision was made to shelve the far-reaching and political sensitive changes. The Soviet leadership, preoccupied with the Beria affair and its internal implications, became disinclined to rock the East German boat and more inclined towards the maintenance of the status quo: to maintain power in East Germany via the reinforcement of an experienced, reliable, albeit Stalinist and unpopular, ruler.

In late July, Ulbricht, ever more certain of his continued backing in Moscow, expelled his main opponents, Zaisser, Hernstadt and Ackermann, from the Politburo, and thus strengthened his position further.[29]

By late August, Moscow had committed to shoring up the current East German regime with Ulbricht in charge. Now, the situation in East Germany had stabilised thanks to new economic measures implemented by Moscow and East Berlin, and major political changes in the GDR dropped off the agenda. Substantial economic and financial aid was to flow into East Germany and reparation payments were to cease by the end of the year. Additional prisoners of war would be freed and Moscow's mission in East Berlin was elevated to the status of embassy. Ultimately, Ulbricht's position was firmly secure once more.[30]

According to historian Corey Ross, the SED party leadership derived two key lessons from 17 June.

The first was that it became more concerned about shopfloor discontent and now sought more determinedly to preclude it from escalating into a broader conflict. Factory surveillance was now raised to better monitor the mood of the workforce, the Combat Groups of the Working Class was established as an on-the-spot force to prevent or quell any signs of unrest, and the Stasi was expanded and improved to deal swiftly with any signs of organised protest in the future.

The second was that it became clear that a heavy-handed venture such as the "accelerated construction of socialism" could never again be embarked upon. Ulbricht was haunted throughout the 1950s by the thought of a repetition of the 1953 Uprising, and the government never again attempted to introduce arbitrary blanket norm increases such as it attempted in May and June 1953. The "New Course" policies – increased investment in consumer goods, housing and price and travel subventions – led to an improvement in living standards overall but failed to achieve an immediate end to the discontent that had been accumulating over the past year.

Protestors, meanwhile, learned that little could be gained from open confrontation – to act openly against the SED regime in large numbers was to be left to their own devices by the West against repression from the East German police and Soviet military.[31]