History of foreign relations of China

History of foreign relations of China covers diplomatic, military, political and economic relations in History of China from 1800 to the modern era. For the earlier period see Foreign relations of imperial China, and for the current foreign relations of China see Foreign relations of China.

This article is about the foreign relations of China. For the foreign relations of the Republic of China after 1949, see Foreign relations of Taiwan.

Qing Dynasty

By the mid 19th century, Chinese stability had come under increasing threat from both domestic and international sources. Social unrest and serious revolts became more common while the regular army had Was too weak to deal with foreign military forces. Chinese leaders increasingly feared the impact of Western ideas. John Fairbank argues that in 1840 to 1895 China's response to the worsening relations with Western nations came in four phases. China's military weakness was interpreted in the 1840s and 1850s as a need for Western arms. Very little was achieved in this regard until much later. In the 1860s there was a focus on acquiring Western technology—as Japan was doing very successfully at the same time, but China lagged far behind. The 1870s to 1890s were characterized with efforts to reform and revitalize the Chinese political system more broadly. There was steady moderate progress, but efforts to leap forward such as the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898 roused the conservatives who stamped out the effort and executed its leaders. There was a rise in Chinese nationalism, as a sort of echo of Western nationalism, but that led to a quick defeat in war with Japan in 1895. An intense reaction against modernization set in at the grassroots level in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.[1]

Opium Wars
See also: First Opium War and Second Opium War

European commercial interests sought to end the trading barriers, but China fended off repeated efforts by Britain to reform the trading system. Increasing sales of Indian opium to China by British traders led to the First Opium War (1839–1842). The superiority of Western militaries and military technology like steamboats and Congreve rockets forced China to open trade with the West on Western terms.[2]

The Second Opium War also known as the Arrow War, in 1856-60 saw a joint Anglo-French military mission including Great Britain and the French Empire win an easy victory. The agreements of the Convention of Peking led to the ceding of Kowloon Peninsula as part of Hong Kong.[3]

French political cartoon from 1898 depicts helpless China being carved up and divided among the powers, (from left) Britain, Germany, Russia, France and Japan.

Unequal treaties
Main article: Unequal treaty

A series of "unequal treaties", including the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the treaties of Tianjin (1858), and the Beijing Conventions (1860), forced China to open new treaty ports, including Canton (Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), and Shanghai. The treaties also allowed the British to set up Hong Kong as a colony and established international settlements in the treaty ports under the control of foreign diplomats. China was required to accept diplomats at the capital in Peking, provided for the free movement for foreign ships in Chinese rivers, kept its tariffs low, and opened the interior to Christian missionaries. Manchu leaders of the Qing government found the treaties useful, because they forced the foreigners into a few limited areas, so that the vast majority of Chinese had no contact whatsoever with them or their dangerous ideas. The missionaries, however, ventured more widely but they were widely distrusted and made very few converts. Their main impact was setting up schools and hospitals.[4] Since the 1920s, the "unequal treaties" have been a centerpiece of angry Chinese grievances against the West in general.[5]

Suzerain and tributaries

For centuries China had claimed suzerain authority over numerous adjacent areas. The areas had internal autonomy but were forced to give tribute to China while being theoretically under the protection of China in terms of foreign affairs. By the 19th century the relationships were nominal, and China exerted little or no actual control.[6] The great powers did not recognize China's fiefdom and one by one seized the supposed suzerain areas. Japan moved to dominate Korea (and annexed it in 1910)[7] and seized the Ryukyus;[8] France took Vietnam;[9] Britain took Burma[10] and Nepal; Russia took parts of Siberia. Only Tibet was left, and that was highly problematic since the Tibetans, as most of the supposed suzerainty, had never accepted Chinese claims of lordship and tribute.[11] The losses humiliated China and marked it as a repeated failure.

Christian missionaries
Further information: Christianity in China and Jesuit China missions

Catholic missions began with the Jesuit China missions from France and Italy in the 16th century. For a while were highly successful in placing intellectuals and scientists in the royal court. The Pope, however, prohibited the priests from making accommodations to Confucianism or paganism. The Jesuits left, but returned in 1842. Converts were from the lower social strata, and numbered about 240,000 in 1840 and 720,000 in 1901. The Jesuits opened Aurora University in Shanghai in 1903 to reach an elite audience.[12] German missionaries arrived in the late 19th century, and Americans arrived in force in the 1920s, largely to replace the French.[13]

Beginning in Protestant missionaries started to come, to include thousands of men, their wives and children, and unmarried female missionaries. These were not individual operations, they were sponsored and financed by organized churches in their home country. The 19th century is one of steady geographical expansion, which was reluctantly allowed by the Chinese government every time it lost a war. At first they were limited to the Canton area. In the 1842 treaty ending the First Opium War missionaries were granted the right to live and work in five coastal cities. In 1860, the treaties ending the Second Opium War opened up the entire country to missionary activity. Protestant missionary activity exploded during the next few decades. From 50 missionaries in China in 1860, the number grew to 2,500 (counting wives and children) in 1900. 1,400 of the missionaries were British, 1,000 were Americans, and 100 were from continental Europe, mostly Scandinavia.[14] Protestant missionary activity peaked in the 1920s and thereafter declined due to war and unrest in China, As well as a sense of frustration among the missionaries themselves. By 1953, all Protestant missionaries had been expelled by the communist government of China.[15]

In long-term perspective, the major impact of the missions was not the thousands of converts out of million of people, but introducing modern medical standards, and especially building schools for the few families eager to learn about the outside world.[16] The hospitals not only cured sick people, they taught hygiene and care of children.[17] They lessened the hostility of Chinese officials.[18][19] The key leader of the 1911 revolution, Sun Yat-sen spent four-year in exile in Hawaii, where he studied in Christian schools and eventually converted.[20]

When missionaries returned home they typically preached a highly favorable view toward China, and a negative view toward Japan, helping promote public opinion in the West that increasingly supported China. At the local level across China, for the vast majority of the population, missionaries were the only foreigners they ever saw. Outside the protected international centers, they came under frequent verbal attack, and sometimes violent episodes. This led the international community to threaten military action to protect missionaries, as their diplomats demanded the government provide more and more protection. Attacks reached a crescendo during the Boxer Rebellion, which had a major anti-missionary component. The Boxers killed over 200 foreign missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians. Dr. Eleanor Chesnut was killed by a mob in 1905.[21] Likewise nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s also had an anti-missionary component.[22]

Sino-French War (1884-1885)

First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)
Main article: First Sino-Japanese War

A weakened China lost wars with Japan and gave up nominal control over the Ryukyu Islands in 1870 to Japan. After the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 it lost Formosa to Japan. After the Sino-French War of 1884–1885, France took control of Vietnam, another supposed "tributary state." After Britain took over Burma, as a show of good faith they maintained the sending of tribute to China, putting themselves in a lower status than in their previous relations.[23] To affirm this, Britain agreed in the Burma convention in 1886 to continue the Burmese payments to China every 10 years, in return for which China would recognise Britain's occupation of Upper Burma.[24]

Chinese generals in Pyongyang surrender to the Japanese, October 1894.

Japan after 1860 modernized its military after Western models and was far stronger than China. The war, fought in 1894 and 1895, was fought to resolve the issue of control over Korea, which was yet another suzerain claimed by China and under the rule of the Joseon Dynasty. A peasant rebellion led to a request by the Korean government for China to send in troops to stabilize the country. The Empire of Japan responded by sending its own force to Korea and installing a puppet government in Seoul. China objected and war ensued. It was a brief affair, with Japanese ground troops routing Chinese forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and nearly destroying the Chinese navy in the Battle of the Yalu River.[25]

Treaty of Shimonoseki

China, badly defeated, sued for peace and was forced to accept the harsh Treaty of Shimonoseki Signed on April 17, 1895.[26] China became responsible for a financial indemnity of £30 million. It had to surrender To Japan the island of Taiwan and the Pescatore Islands. Japan received most favored nation status, like all the other powers/ Korea became nominally independent, although Japan and Russia were vying for control. The most controversial provision ceded the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. However this was not acceptable. Russia, taking the self-appointed mantle of protector of China, worked with Germany and France to intervene and forced Japan to withdraw from Liaodong Peninsula.[27] To pay the indemnities, British French and Russian banks loaned China the money, but they also gained other advantages. Russia in 1896 was given permission to extend its Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria to reach Vladivostok, a 350-mile shortcut. The new Chinese Eastern Railway, was controlled by the Russians, and became a major military factor for them In controlling key parts of Manchuria. Later in 1896 Russia and China made a secret alliance, whereby Russia would work to prevent further Japanese expansion at China's expense. In 1898 Rush obtained a 25-year lease over the Liadong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, including the ice free harbor of Port Arthur, their only such facility in the East. An extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur greatly expanded Russian military capabilities in the Far East.[28]

British cartoon shows the victory of "little" Japan over "large" China. in 1894.

Reforms in 1890s

One of the government's main source of income was a five percent tariff on imports. The government hired Robert Hart (1835-1911), a British diplomat to run it from 1863. He set up an efficient system based in Canton that was largely free of corruption, and expanded it to other ports. The top echelon of the service was recruited from all the nations trading with China. Hart promoted numerous modernising programs.[29] His agency established a modern postal service and supervision of internal taxes on trade. Hart helped establish its own embassies in foreign countries. He helped set up the Tongwen Guan (School of Combined Learning) in Peking, with a branch in Canton, to teach foreign languages, culture and science. In 1902 the Tongwen Guan was absorbed into the Imperial University, now Peking University.[30][31]

Hundred Days Reform fails in 1898

The Hundred Days Reform was a failed 103-day national, cultural, political, and educational reform movement from 11 June to 22 September 1898. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters. Following the issuing of over 100 reformative edicts, a coup d'état ("The Coup of 1898", Wuxu Coup) was perpetrated by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Cixi. The Emperor was locked up until his death and key reformers were exiled or fled.[32][33]

Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908) was in control of imperial policy after 1861; she had remarkable political skills but historians blame her for major policy failures and the growing weakness of China. Her reversal of reforms in 1898 and especially support for the Boxers caused all the powers to join against her. Late Qing China remains a symbol of national humiliation and weakness in Chinese and international historiography. Scholars attribute Cixi's "rule behind the curtains" responsible for the ultimate decline of the Qing dynasty and its capitulatory peace with foreign powers. Her failures hastened the revolution to overthrow the dynasty.[34]

Boxer rebellion
Main article: Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion (1897–1901) was an anti-foreigner movement by the Righteous Harmony Society in China between 1897 and 1901. They attacked and often killed missionaries, Christian converts, and foreigners. They held the international diplomats in Peking under siege. The ruler of China, the Dowager Empress Cixi, supported the Boxers and the Chinese government paid the penalty. The uprising was crushed by the ad hoc Eight Nation Alliance of major powers.[35][36] On top of all the damage and pillage, China was forced to pay annual installments of an indemnity of $333 million American dollars to all the victors—actual total payments amounted to about $250 million.[37] Robert Hart, the inspector general of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, was the chief negotiator for the peace terms. The indemnity, despite some beneficial programs, was "nothing but bad" for China, as Hart had predicted at the beginning of the negotiations.[38]

Manchuria
See also: Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchuria Railway

Manchuria was a contested zone with Russia and Japan taking control away from China and in the process going to war themselves in 1904–1905.[39]

Republican China

The Republican Revolution of 1911 overthrew the imperial court and brought an era of confused politics. Yuan Shikai became president in 1912 and, with support from regional war lords, tried to be a dictator. He showed little interest in foreign affairs apart from obtaining loans from Europe. When he suddenly died in 1916 the national government was left in chaos.[40]

When World War I broke out in 1914, China officially entered the war and played a small role. Japan seized the German possessions in China. In January 1915 Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands. The goal was to greatly extend Japanese control of Manchuria and of the Chinese economy.[41][42] The Chinese public responded with a spontaneous nationwide boycott of Japanese goods; Japan's exports to China fell by 40%. Britain was officially a military ally of Japan but was affronted and no longer trusted Japan. With the British tied down on the Western Front against Germany, Japan's position was strong. Nevertheless, Britain and the United States forced Japan to drop the fifth set of demands that would have given Japan a large measure of control over the entire Chinese economy and ended the Open Door Policy. Japan and China reached a series of agreements which ratified the first four sets of goals on 25 May 1915. Japan gained a little at the expense of China, but Britain refused to renew the alliance and American opinion turned hostile. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 resulted in the Versailles Treaty that allowed Japan to retain territories in Shandong that had been surrendered by Germany in 1914. Chinese students launched the May Fourth Movement in 1919, inspiring a nationwide nationalistic hostility against Japan and the other foreign powers.[43]

After 1916 almost all of China was in the hands of regional warlords. Until 1929 the national government was a small rump establishment based in Beijing, with little or no control over most of China. However it did control foreign affairs, and was recognized by foreign countries. It receive the customs revenue; the money was largely used to pay off old debts, such as the indemnities for the Boxer Rebellion. It managed to negotiate an increase in the customs revenue, and represented China in international affairs such as the Paris peace conference. It tried with limited success to renegotiate the unequal treaties. Britain and the other powers continue to control Shanghai and the other port cities until the late 1920s.[44][45]

In 1931, Japan seized control of Manchuria over the objections of the League of Nations. Japan quit the League, which was helpless.[46] The most active Chinese diplomat was Wellington Koo.[47]

German role
Main articles: China–Germany relations and Sino-German cooperation (1911-1941)

The German military had a major role in Republican China.[48]The Navy was in charge of Germany's concessions at Qingdao, and spent heavily to set up modern facilities that would be a showcase for Asia. Japan seized the German operations in 1914 after sharp battles. After World War I, the German republic provided extensive advisory services to the Republic of China, especially training for the Chinese army. Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, the former commander the German army, organized the training of China's elite army units and the fight against communists in 1933-1835.[49] All military academies had German officers, as did most army units. In addition, German engineers provided expertise and bankers provided loans for China's railroad system. Traded with Germany flourished in the 1920s, with Germany as China's largest supplier of government credit. The last major advisor left in 1938, after Nazi Germany had only allied itself with Japan, the great enemy of the republic of China. Nevertheless Chiang Kai-shek continued to hope for using Germany as a model for his nation, as his mentor Sun Yat-sen had recommended.[50][51]

War with Japan: 1937–1945
Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War

Japan invaded in 1937, launching the Second Sino-Japanese War. By 1938, the United States was a strong supporter of China. Michael Schaller says that during 1938:

China emerged as something of a symbol of American-sponsored resistance to Japanese aggression.... A new policy appeared, one predicated on the maintenance of a pro-American China which might be a bulwark against Japan. The United States hoped to use China as the weapon with which to contain Tokyo's larger imperialism. Economic assistance, Washington hoped, could achieve this result.[52]
Chiang Kai-shek with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Cairo Conference in 1943

Even the isolationists who opposed war in Europe supported a hard-line against Japan. American public sympathy for the Chinese, and hatred of Japan, was aroused by reports from missionaries, novelists such as Pearl Buck, and Time Magazine of Japanese brutality in China, including reports surrounding the Nanjing Massacre, called the 'Rape of Nanking'. By early 1941, the U.S. was preparing to send American planes flown by American pilots under American command, but wearing Chinese uniforms, to fight the Japanese invaders and even to bomb Japanese cities. There were delays and the "Flying Tigers" under Claire Lee Chennault finally became operational days after Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) brought the U.S. into the war officially. The Flying Tigers were soon incorporated into the United States Air Force, which made operations in China a high priority, and generated enormous favorable publicity for the China in the U.S.[53]

After Japan took Southeast Asia, American aid had to be routed through India and over the Himalayan Mountains at enormous expense and frustrating delay. Chiang's beleaguered government was now headquartered in remote Chongqing. Roosevelt sent Joseph Stilwell to train Chinese troops and coordinate military strategy. He became the Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, served as U.S. commander in the China Burma India Theater, was responsible for all Lend-Lease supplies going to China, and was later Deputy Commander of South East Asia Command. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers, over the distribution of Lend-Lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and U.S. forces in the 11th Army Group (which was under British command).[54] Madame Chiang Kaishek, who had been educated in the U.S., addressed the U.S. Congress and toured the country to rally support for China.[55] Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act and Roosevelt moved to end the unequal treaties. Chiang and Mme. Chiang met with Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference of late 1943, but promises of major increases in aid did not materialize.[56]

The perception grew that Chiang's government, with poorly equipped and ill-fed troops was unable to effectively fight the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Communists. China Hands advising Stilwell argued that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counteroffensive invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, which began in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Other Americans, led by Chennault, argued for air power. In 1944, Generalissimo Chiang acceded to Roosevelt's request that an American general take charge of all forces in the area, but demanded that Stilwell be recalled. General Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell, Patrick J. Hurley became ambassador, and Chinese-American relations became much smoother. The U.S. had included China in top-level diplomacy in the hope that large masses of Chinese troops would defeat Japan with minimal American casualties. When that hope was seen as illusory, and it was clear that B-29 bombers could not operate effectively from China, China became much less important to Washington, but it was promised a seat in the new UN Security Council, with a veto.[57]

Civil War

When civil war threatened, President Harry Truman sent General George Marshall to China at the end of 1945 to broker a compromise between the Nationalist government and the Communists, who had established control in much of northern China. Marshall hoped for a coalition government, and brought the two distrustful sides together. At home, many Americans saw China as a bulwark against the spread of communism, but some Americans hoped that the Communists would remain on friendly terms with the U.S.[58] Mao had long admired the U.S.—George Washington was a hero to him—and saw it as an ally in the Second World War. He was bitterly disappointed when the U.S. would not abandon the Nationalists, writing that "the imperialists who had always been hostile to the Chinese people will not change overnight to treat us on an equal level." His official policy was "wiping out the control of the imperialists in China completely."[59] Truman and Marshall, while supplying military aid and advice, determined that American intervention could not save the Nationalist cause. One recent scholar argues that the Communists won the Civil War because Mao Zedong made fewer military mistakes and Chiang Kai-shek antagonized key interest groups. Furthermore, his armies had been weakened in the war against Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists promised to improve the ways of life for groups such as farmers.[60]

Stalin's policy was opportunistic and utilitarian. He offered official Soviet support only when the People's Liberation Army had virtually won the Civil War. Sergey Radchenko argues that "all the talk of proletarian internationalism in the Sino-Soviet alliance was but a cloak for Soviet expansionist ambitions in East Asia".[61]

People's Republic of China
See also: List of wars involving the People's Republic of China
Countries of the world indicating decade diplomatic relations commenced with the People's Republic of China: 1949/1950s (dark red), 1960s (red), 1970s (orange), 1980s (beige) and 1990s/2000s (yellow). Countries not recognized by or not recognizing the PRC are in grey.

International recognition of the People's Republic of China
See also: Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China

Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has worked vigorously to win international recognition and support for its position that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Tibet (History of Tibet (1950–present)), Hong Kong (Foreign relations of Hong Kong), Macau (Foreign relations of Macau), Taiwan (Foreign relations of Taiwan), the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and islands in the South China Sea.

Upon its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China was recognized by Eastern Bloc countries. Among the first Western countries to recognize China were the United Kingdom (on 6 January 1950), Switzerland (on 17 January 1950[62]) and Sweden (on 14 February 1950[63]). The first Western country to establish diplomatic ties with China was Sweden (on 9 May 1950).[64][65] Until the early 1970s, the Republic of China government in Taipei was recognized diplomatically by most world powers and held China's permanent seat in the UN Security Council, including its associated veto power. After the Beijing government assumed the China seat in 1971 (and the ROC government was expelled), the great majority of nations have switched diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, following the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the U.S. did so in 1979. In 2011, the number of countries that had established diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 171, while 23 maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).[66] (See also: Political status of Taiwan)

Both the PRC and ROC make it a prerequisite for diplomatic relations that a country does not recognize and conduct any official relations with the other party.

Mao's foreign policies

In the 1947-1962 era, Mao emphasized the desire for international partnerships, on the one hand to more rapidly develop the economy, and on the other to protect against attacks, especially by the U.S. His numerous alliances, however, all fell apart, including the Soviet Union, Vietnam, North Korea, and Albania. He was unable to organize an anti-American coalition. Mao was only interested in what alliances could do for China, and ignored the needs of the partners. From their point of view China appeared unreliable because of its unstable internal situation, typified by the Great Leap Forward. Furthermore, Mao was insensitive to the fears of alliance partners that China was so big, and so inwardly directed, that their needs would be ignored.[67]

With Mao in overall control and making final decisions, Zhou Enlai handled foreign-policy and developed a strong reputation for his diplomatic and negotiating skills.[68] Regardless of those skills, Zhou's bargaining position was undercut by the domestic turmoil initiated by Mao. The Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 was a failed effort to industrialize overnight; it devastated food production and led to millions of deaths from famine. Even more disruptive was the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, which decimated a generation of leadership. When China broke with Russia around 1960, the main cause was Mao's insistence that Moscow had deviated from the true principles of communism. The result was that both Moscow and Beijing sponsored rival Communist parties around the world, which expended much of their energy fighting each other. China's focus especially was on the Third World as China portrayed itself as the legitimate leader of the global battle against imperialism and capitalism.[69][70]

Soviet Union and Korean War

After its founding, the PRC's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the U.S. The 1950–53 Korean War waged by China and its North Korea ally against the U.S., South Korea, and United Nations (UN) forces has long been a reason for bitter feelings. After the conclusion of the Korean War, China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.[71]

China's entry into the Korean War was the first of many "preemptive counterattacks". Chinese leaders decided to intervene when they saw their North Korean ally being overwhelmed and no guarantee American forces would stop at the Yalu.[72]

Break with Moscow
Main article: Sino-Soviet split

By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become so divisive that in 1960, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the developing world, for China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and its numerous bilateral and bi-party ties. In the 1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among communist parties and in the developing world generally. In 1962, China had a brief war with India over a border dispute. By 1969, relations with Moscow were so tense that fighting erupted along their common border. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position. China then lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West European nations.[73]<

1980s

Chinese anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Sharp differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over Soviet support for Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia—the so-called "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.[74][75]

In the 1970s and 1980s, China sought to create a secure regional and global environment for itself and foster good relations with countries that could aid its economic development. During the time of Mao, China was a closed country. After his death, authorities led by Deng Xiaoping began instigating reforms. In 1983, 74-year-old Li Xiannian became President of China, nominal head of state of China and one of the longest serving politicians in the leadership of China. He visited many countries and thus began opening China to the world. In 1985, Li Xiannian was the first president of China to visit the U.S. President Li also visited North Korea. 1986 saw the arrival of Queen Elizabeth II in an official visit.[76] To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.

China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower hegemonism", focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba, but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, although China was not a formal member.

Tiananmen Square Incident

In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, many countries reduced their diplomatic contacts with China as well as their economic assistance programs. In response, China worked vigorously to expand its relations with foreign countries, and by late 1990, had reestablished normal relations with almost all nations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.[77]

21st century

During the first five years of Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership the budget for diplomacy doubled.[78]

The aggressive style of Chinese diplomacy which emerged in the 21st century has been termed “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy."[79][80] The phrase is derived from the patriotic Chinese movie Wolf Warrior and its sequel Wolf Warrior 2, the film's tagline was "Even though a thousand miles away, anyone who affronts China will pay."[81] Efforts aimed at incorporating Chinese diaspora into China's foreign policy have also intensified with an emphasis placed on ethnic loyalty over national loyalty.[82]

China has been criticized for its aggressive diplomatic response to the COVID-19 outbreak[83][84] which included spreading misinformation about how other countries were handling the outbreak.[85]

Social media

Engagement on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter has become an integral component of Chinese diplomacy.[86] From April 2019 to April 2020 the output of Chinese diplomat's Twitter accounts increased fourfold.[87]

See also

Notes
  1. John King Fairbank, "China's Response to the West: Problems and Suggestions." Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale. Journal of World History. Cuadernos de Historia Mundial 3.2 (1956): 381.
  2. Brian Catchpole, A map history of modern China (1976), pp 21-23.
  3. John Yue-wo Wong, Deadly dreams: Opium and the Arrow war (1856-1860) in China (Cambridge UP, 2002).
  4. Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, China's response to the West: a documentary survey, 1839-1923(1979) pp 35-37, 134-35.
  5. Dong Wang, "The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China," Pacific Affairs (2003) 76#3 pp 399-425.
  6. Amanda J. Cheney, "Tibet Lost in Translation: Sovereignty, Suzerainty and International Order Transformation, 1904–1906." Journal of Contemporary China 26.107 (2017): 769-783.
  7. Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article." Journal of Asian Studies 59.4 (2000): 951-976. online
  8. Ying-Kit Chan, "Diplomacy and the Appointment of officials in Late Qing China: He Ruzhang and Japan’s Annexation Of Ryukyu." Chinese Historical Review 26.1 (2019): 20-36.
  9. Robert Lee, France and the exploitation of China, 1885-1901 (1989).
  10. Anthony Webster, "Business and empire: A reassessment of the British conquest of Burma in 1885." Historical Journal 43.4 (2000): 1003-1025.
  11. Wendy Palace (2012). British Empire and Tibet 1900-1922. Routledge. p. 257. ISBN 9781134278633.
  12. Jean-Paul Wiest, "Bringing Christ to the nations: shifting models of mission among Jesuits in China." The Catholic historical review 83.4 (1997): 654-681.
  13. John Harney, "Enshrining the Mission: The Bishop Sheehan Memorial Museum and Vincentian Visions of China." American Catholic Studies (2015): 45-69. Online Archived 2019-08-28 at the Wayback Machine
  14. Larry Clinton Thompson, William Scott Ament and the Boxer Rebellion: Heroism, Hubris, and the Ideal Missionary (2009), p. 14; Jane Hunter, 'The Gospel of Gentility (1984), p. 6
  15. Nicolas Standaert, "New trends in the historiography of Christianity in China." Catholic Historical Review 83.4 (1997): 573-613.
  16. Miwa Hirono, Civilizing missions: International religious agencies in China (Springer, 2008).
  17. Michelle Renshaw, "'Family-Centred Care' in American Hospitals in Late-Qing China." Clio Medica 86.1 (2010).
  18. Xu Guangqiu, "The Impact of Medical Missionaries on Chinese Officials: Dr. Peter Parker and the Canton Hospital, 1835-1855" Journal of Presbyterian History (2019) 97#1 pp 16-28.
  19. Hu Cheng, "The Modernization of Japanese and Chinese Medicine (1914-1931)." Chinese Studies in History 47.4 (2014): 78-94.
  20. Irma Tam Soong, "Christianity and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's schooling in Hawai'i, 1879-83." Chinese America: History and Perspectives (2010) pp. 75-86.
  21. Guangqiu Xu (2017). American Doctors in Canton: Modernization in China, 1835-1935. Taylor & Francis. p. 32. ISBN 9781351532778.
  22. Lin Su (2017). China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy. p. 49. ISBN 9781351952095.
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Further reading

Surveys
  • Berkshire Encyclopedia of China (5 vol. 2009) online
  • Clyde, Paul H., and Burton F. Beers. The Far East: A History of Western Impacts and Eastern Responses, 1830-1975 (Prentice Hall, 1975), university textbook. online
  • Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (2010) excerpt and text search
  • Dudden, Arthur Power. The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present (1992)
  • Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (2001) 363 pp.
  • Fenby, Jonathan. The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850 to the Present (3rd ed. 2019) popular history.
  • Fogel, Joshua. Articulating the Sino-sphere: Sino-Japanese relations in space and time (2009)
  • Grasso, June Grasso, Jay P. Corrin, Michael Kort. Modernization and Revolution in China: From the Opium Wars to the Olympics (4th ed. 2009) excerpt
  • Gregory, John S. The West and China since 1500 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
  • Hsü, Immanuel C.Y. the rise of modern China (6th ed 1999) University textbook with emphasis on foreign policy
  • Jansen, Marius B. Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 (1975).
  • Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947 (WW Norton. 2018).
  • Li, Xiaobing. A history of the modern Chinese army (UP of Kentucky, 2007).
  • Liu, Ta-jen, and Daren Liu. US-China relations, 1784-1992 (Univ Pr of Amer, 1997).
  • Liu, Lydia H. The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (2006) theoretical study of UK & China excerpt
  • Macnair, Harley F. and Donald F. Lach. Modern Far Eastern International Relations (1955) online free
  • Mancall, Mark. China at the center: 300 years of foreign policy (1984), Scholarly survey; 540pp
  • Perkins, Dorothy. Encyclopedia of China (1999) online
  • Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino-Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014) online
  • Song, Yuwu, ed. Encyclopedia of Chinese-American Relations (McFarland, 2006) excerpt.
  • Sutter, Robert G. Historical Dictionary of Chinese Foreign Policy (2011) excerpt
  • Vogel, Ezra F. China and Japan: Facing History (2019) excerpt
  • Wang, Dong. The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (2013)
  • Westad, Odd Arne. Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (Basic Books; 2012) 515 pages; comprehensive scholarly history
  • Wills, John E. ed. Past and Present in China's Foreign Policy: From "Tribute System" to "Peaceful Rise". (Portland, ME: MerwinAsia, 2010). ISBN 9781878282873.

Pre-1945
  • Bickers, Robert. The scramble for China: Foreign devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914 (2011)
  • Chi, Hsi-sheng. Nationalist China at war : military defeats and political collapse, 1937-45 (1982) online
  • Chi, Madeleine. China Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1970)
  • Chien, Frederick Foo. The opening of Korea: a study of Chinese diplomacy, 1876-1885 (Shoe String Press, 1967).
  • Dallin, David J. The rise of Russia in Asia (Yale UP, 1949) online free to borrow
  • Dean, Britten. "British informal empire: The case of China." Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 14.1 (1976): 64-81.
  • Fairbank, John King, E.O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. East Asia: the modern transformation (Houghton Mifflin, 1965) online
  • Fairbank, John K. ed.The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (1968) online
  • Fairbank, John King. "Chinese diplomacy and the treaty of Nanking, 1842." Journal of Modern History 12.1 (1940): 1-30. Online
  • Feis, Herbert. China Tangle: American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (1960) Online free to borrow
  • Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford UP, 1988).
  • Hara, Takemichi. "Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea." Modern Asian Studies 32.2 (1998): 389-430.
  • Hibbert, Christopher. The dragon wakes: China and the West, 1793-1911 (1970) online free to borrow; popular history
  • Hsü, Immanuel C.Y. China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (1960),
  • Lasek, Elizabeth. "Imperialism in China: A methodological critique." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 15.1 (1983): 50-64. online
  • Luo, Zhitian. "National humiliation and national assertion: The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands." Modern Asian Studies 27.2 (1993): 297-319 online.
  • Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire Vol. 1 (1910) to 1859; online;
    • Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire vol 2 1861-1893 (1918) online;
    • Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire vol 3 1894-1916. (1918) online
  • Nathan, Andrew J. "Imperialism’s effects on China." Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars 4.4 (1972): 3-8. Online
  • Nish, Ian. (1990) "An Overview of Relations between China and Japan, 1895–1945." China Quarterly (1990) 124 (1990): 601-623. online
  • Perdue, Peter. China marches West: The Qing conquest of Central Eurasia (2005)
  • Pollard, Robert T. China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (1933; reprint 1970).
  • Rowe, William T. China's last Empire: The great Qing (2009)
  • Standaert, Nicolas. "New trends in the historiography of Christianity in China." Catholic Historical Review 83.4 (1997): 573-613. online
  • Sun, Youli, and You-Li Sun. China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-1941 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)
  • Suzuki, Shogo. Civilization and empire: China and Japan's encounter with European international society (2009).
  • Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the struggle for modern China (2nd ed. 2011)
  • Wade, Geoff. "Engaging the south: Ming China and Southeast Asia in the fifteenth century." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 51.4 (2008): 578–638.
  • Wright, Mary C. "The Adaptability of Ch'ing Diplomacy." Journal of Asian Studies 17.3 (1958): 363–381.
  • Zhang, Yongjin. China in the International System, 1918-20: the Middle Kingdom at the periphery (Macmillan, 1991)
  • Zhang, Feng. "How hierarchic was the historical East Asian system?." International Politics 51.1 (2014): 1-22. Online

After 1945
  • Alden, Christopher. China Returns to Africa: A Superpower and a Continent Embrace (2008)
  • Barnouin, Barbara, and Changgen Yu. Zhou Enlai: A political life (Chinese University Press, 2006).
  • Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union 1948-1972 (1990)
  • Economy, Elizabeth C. Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (2018) excerpt
  • Foot, Rosemary. The practice of power: US relations with China since 1949 (Oxford UP, 1995).
  • Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) (2019). online reviews
  • Garson, Robert A. The United States and China since 1949: a troubled affair (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994).
  • Garver, John W. China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic (2nd ed. 2018) comprehensive scholarly history. excerpt
  • Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'. (Cambridge UP, 2004). online
  • Gosset, David. China's subtle diplomacy, (2011) online
  • Gurtov, Melvin, and Byong-Moo Hwang. China under threat: The politics of strategy and diplomacy (Johns Hopkins UP, 1980) an explicitly Maoist interpretation.
  • Hunt, Michael H. The Genesis of Chinese Communist foreign-policy (1996)
  • Jian, Chen. China's road to the Korean War (1994)
  • Keith, Ronald C. Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (Springer, 1989).
  • Li, Mingjiang. Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma (Routledge, 2013).
  • Luthi, Lorenz. The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War and the Communist world (2008)
  • MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The week that changed the world. Random House Incorporated, 2008.
  • Poole, Peter Andrews. "Communist China's aid diplomacy." Asian Survey (1966): 622–629. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642285
  • Qiang, Zhai. "China and the Geneva Conference of 1954." China Quarterly 129 (1992): 103–122.
  • Sutter, Robert G. Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China's International Politics Since 1949 (Rowman & Littlefield; 2013) 355 pages excerpt and text search
  • Tudda, Chris. A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972. LSU Press, 2012.
  • Yahuda, Michael. End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2016)
  • Zhai, Qiang. The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chinese-British-American relations, 1949-1958 (Kent State UP, 1994).
  • Zhang, Shu Guang. Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. Stanford University Press, 2001.

Primary sources
  • Teng, Ssu-yü, and John King Fairbank, eds. China's response to the West: a documentary survey, 1839-1923 (Harvard UP, 1979).
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