Triangular diplomacy

In principle, the policy of triangular diplomacy seeks to link the interests of three powerful states in order to retain a balance of power within the international system. Most commonly, this involves an insecure state (or states) pursuing strategic alliances or economic deals in an attempt to both weaken the hegemony of a powerful adversary and strengthen their own position. First developed by US advisor Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War era, the policy was argued to be most effective when reliant upon “the natural incentives and propensities of the players.[1]”

Conceived in a period of American political weakness, Kissinger’s doctrine argues that foreign policy needed to rely on a combination of diplomacy and military power in order to bring benefits to all relevant players, and subsequently ensure international stability.[2] This doctrine heavily relates to a neorealist analysis of international politics, professed by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz.[3] Kissinger’s desires to seek a “coalition” with China in order to stabilise the power of the Soviet Union reflects the neorealist balance of power theory, as insecure states are seeking to bring an equilibrium to the international order in an attempt to bring peace and benefit the relevant actors.[4]

Entering into the White House during the height of the Vietnam War, one of Kissinger’s primary intentions with his policy was to gain Soviet and Chinese assistance in softening North Vietnamese troops, and withdrawing from the conflict with dignity.[5] The Sino-Soviet split offered a ripe opportunity for Kissinger and Nixon to enact such a policy, intended by offering integration into the international trade system, scientific and technological resources and a stabilization of bilateral relations.[6] The first instance of this rapprochement and the beginnings of triangular diplomacy within US policy is reflected in a 14th August 1969 National Security meeting, in which Nixon positioned his intentions to victimise China within the Sino-Soviet split and seek to offer assistance.[7][8]

Henry Kissinger, who was US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, was a central figure in the Cold War while in office (1969–1977).

The following 1972 Beijing and Moscow summits further exacerbated the existing tensions between China and the Soviet Union, allowing Nixon and Kissinger to gain Soviet co-operation on matters deemed important to US foreign policy. This can be examined in the outcome of the 1972 Spring Offensive, as the United States were able to gain diplomatic co-operation in reaching a peace with North Vietnamese forces.[9] Many scholars contend that Nixon’s rapprochement with China, as part of the triangular diplomacy framework, was an instrumental facet in the dissolution of the Vietnam War. Historian Raymond Garthoff argues that triangular diplomacy held a significant bearing on the settlement of the Vietnam War,[10] whilst Jussi Hanhimäki contends that the policy played a critical role in bringing about changes in North Vietnamese negotiation strategy.[11]  

However, triangular diplomacy did not ensure immediate stability and peaceful cooperation. The Vietnamese War continued in full force for three years after the emergence of the policy, with continued US-Soviet conflict evolving underneath. For Kissinger and Nixon, the policy was secondary to national interests and security concerns, as the nation needed to appear politically powerful against adversaries.[12]

Following the Vietnam War, Kissinger sought to reshape the US approach to international relations, seeking a balance of power which can produce stability between the three key players in the international system; the Soviet Union, the United States and China, and subsequently reduce military and political tensions. Triangular diplomacy consequently included the aim of achieving this balance of power and pursuing the policy of detente with the Soviet Union, as Nixon and Kissinger saw that correlating the interests of each power was instrumental in stabilizing the international order.[13]

In The White House Years, Kissinger argued that the opening to China and detente with the Soviets were connected policies, intended to exploit the pre-existing tensions between the states in American interest.[12][14] Stating that it was better for the United States “to be closer to either Moscow or Peking than either was to the other”, as American bargaining power would strengthen two-fold.[15]

Mao Zedong and US President Richard Nixon, during his visit in China

Key outcomes of triangular diplomacy during this period include the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué and the Camp David Accords, each of which were achieved as a result of Kissinger and Nixon's policy.

However, depicted as a sign of American political weakness, the policy of détente was ultimately overhauled. American nationalists saw the policy as a way for the Soviet Union to manipulate the US under the pretenses of diplomacy, evidenced by their refusal to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the gains received from Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.[16] In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 solidified the re-invigoration of Cold War hostilities and the conclusive end of the détente period. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger were removed from political power, to be succeeded by the administration of Gerald Ford, and triangular diplomacy was overlooked for the remainder of the Cold War.[16]

Following the Cold War, the premise of triangular diplomacy shifted from Nixon and Kissinger's definition to a “coordinated action by two states (which, in keeping with the triangle metaphor, we refer to collectively as the base) to change behaviour of another state (the “target”)[17]". As nuclear capabilities became an established facet within international relations policy, so to did continued attempts by United States administration to enforce triangular diplomacy with China and the United States.

Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao

A key example of this dynamic is the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, signed between President Vladimir Putin and President Jiang Zemin. The signing of this treaty represented a diplomatic effort to strengthen Russian and Chinese influence in dealings with the United States, and a subsequent return to the triangular diplomacy framework. Results of this treaty included; the modernization of Chinese armed forces and stable levels of fuel shipments to aid the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, and the increase of Russian sources of capital following the dissolution of the Soviet state.[18][19] The New York Times argued that while this manifestation of triangular diplomacy was "a new form…with diminished strategic significance",[20] the treaty forces the US to pay more regard to both nations and act in accordance with their wishes in order to ensure their unipolar political position, following the Cold War.

Ukraine crisis

A contemporary reflection of triangular diplomacy can be examined through political interactions in regards to the Ukrainian Crisis. In particular, the interactions between the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation. In attempts of the EU and US to balance the power of Russia, this policy can be examined through the correlation of the European Union and United States economic sanctions, the outsourcing of crisis resolution to the European Union, Ukraine’s efforts to increase transatlantic diplomacy and Russia’s efforts to undermine it.[25] In addition to marking the rise of the EU as a major international actor in foreign policy, the Ukraine crisis marks a shift in triangular diplomacy away from its neorealist inclination, to more of a liberal position regarding international cooperation, as the US and EU sought to assist the Ukraine in an attempt to ensure peace as opposed to serving national interests.[26]

President Trump talks trade with the Vice Premier of China, Liu He, May 2018

1866 political cartoon by Honoré Daumier, L’Equilibre Europea, representing the balance of power as men in differing military uniforms balancing the earth on bayonets

The triangular diplomacy framework is contingent upon the realist and neo-realist analysis of international politics, which advocates a zero sum form of geopolitical conflict, through which the overriding paradigms of statism, survival and self help define political interactions.[29] By attempting to connect the interests of competing powers in order to manifest a mutual political benefit, Kissinger's policy reflects the realist Balance of Power theory which argues that national and global stability is secured when military capability is distributed correspondingly amongst states, in order to avoid global unipolarity.

As can be examined within the Vietnam War era, in the attempt of one state to ensure their own survival in the global anarchic system through increasing economic and military strength, this in turn fuels the insecurities of less powerful states. As a result, insecure states seek to form a coalition and subsequently balance out the power of their superior, thus bringing security to the international system.[30] Hence, reflecting the formation of a coalition between the United States and China in response to the growing power of the Soviet Union within the Vietnamese sphere, in order to achieve a level of global stability through détente. As per scholar Raymond Aron, an achievement of this system will consequently manifest peace, as a “more or less lasting suspension of rivalry between political units” will ensue.[31]

However, as is evidenced from the inherent US unipolarity which has marked the 21st century, and failures of triangular diplomacy to substantiate such a peace, scholars Wohlforth, Little and Kaufman argue that these facets evidence the failures of the balance of power theory to correlate within the contemporary international environment.[32] Moreover, positioning triangular diplomacy as a point of contention within international relations theory, as whilst its tenets subscribe to realist thought, its developments within the contemporary era have positioned it against a constructivist or post-structuralist approach to international politics, advocated by scholars such as Wendt.[32]

• Linkage
• Détente

• Ngoei, W (2017). A wide anticommunist Arc": Britain, ASEAN, and Nixon's triangular diplomacy. Diplomatic History, 41(5). Within this work, Cold War historian Ngoei employs his specialised analysis of US-SE Asian foreign relations in order to confirm the successes of triangular diplomacy in cementing US hegemony over Indochina. By challenging the predominately Americentric accounts of Cold War foreign policy, Ngoei examines the methods through which ideological prejudice engendered the success of Kissinger's policies, against the repercussions of this policy under modern American administration.
• Birchfield, V., & Young, A. (2018). Triangular Diplomacy among the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine. Cham: Springer International Publishing. By examining the current Ukraine crisis through the prism of triangular diplomacy, Young and Birchfield analyse the developments of the policy during the post-Cold War era, particularly concerning the rise of the EU to international authority. The amalgamation of their methodology and reputability delegates credibility to their account, and positions it as paramount to a study of the modern developments of triangular diplomacy, through their panoramic perspective of transnational relations.
• Doyle, R. (2014). The geopolitical power shift in the Indo-Pacific region : America, Australia, China, and triangular diplomacy in the twenty-first century . Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. As a trained historian, Doyle analyses the decline in US international authority against the modern developments of triangular diplomacy, as a result of a post-Cold War power shift in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical region. His authoritative methodology manifests a highly credible account on these changes within the nature of triangular diplomacy, and the epochal international policy developing within the Indo-Pacific theatre as a result of the declining authority of the US.
• Hanhimaki, J. (2003). Selling the “Decent interval”: Kissinger, triangular diplomacy, and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971–73. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 14(1), 159–194. As a leading historian on Cold War international relations, Hanhimaki's comprehensive account of triangular diplomacy allows for a multifaceted insight into Kissinger's motivations behind the policy. His interdisciplinary methodology, in addition to the credibility gained through publication in the Diplomacy & Statecraft journal, sets Hanhimaki's work as invaluable to a study of triangular diplomacy, through his fresh insights into Kissinger's subsequent provocation of Sino-Soviet competition in Indochina.
• Daum, A., Gardner, L., & Mausbach, W. (2003). America, the Vietnam War, and the world : comparative and international perspectives . Washington, D.C: German Historical Institute. In this work, renowned theorists; Daum, Gardner and Mausbach analyse the global repercussions of triangular diplomacy during the Vietnam War, with a salient focus on its socio-political, economic, cultural and intellectual consequences. By analysing the policy against subsequent cold war conflicts, this account resides as a staple within a disciplinary analysis of Vietnam war foreign policy, and thus to a study of triangular diplomacy.