Ulster Defence Regiment

For each battalion there was a minimum requirement of:

• 1 lieutenant colonel
• 6 majors
• 7 captains
• 25 lieutenants (including 2nd lieutenants)

To recruit company and platoon officers, Scott-Bowden and his subordinates were obliged to award instant commissions to people deemed suitable. The ideal candidates were sought in the USC, reserve forces, university Officers' Training Corps and Army Cadet Force. In various battalions officers of company and platoon rank could be found who had served in the USC, the Regular and Territorial Army, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Marines, the Indian Army and even the United States Army.[45] In addition to the problem of finding officers there had to be observant of the Protestant/Catholic ratio but by March 1971, 18 Catholic officers had been recruited and the total number of officers was just enough for battalions to function at their current strengths.[46] This rose to 23.[47] All seven battalions were led by former commandants of the USC.[38]

For each battalion there was a minimum requirement of:

• 1 Regimental Sergeant Major (Warrant Officer 1st Class (WO1))
• 7 Warrant Officers 2nd Class (WO2)
• 25 Sergeants
• 25 Corporals
• 25 Lance Corporals

The appointment of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) was carried out in a variety of ways too. In most cases, men were selected who had previously held non-commissioned rank in any of the armed forces or the USC. In at least one case (2 UDR) they were chosen by the men themselves. In some battalions, men were appointed as lance corporals (l/cpl) on a duty-by-duty basis to assess their worth. In the Newry (C) company of 3 UDR, many of the recruits had formerly been soldiers in the local territorial company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, including the company commander. It was a simple matter to appoint men who had previously been his NCOs and he supplemented these with former sergeants from the USC. The filling of senior NCO posts in this manner did have a drawback in that many men of comparatively young ages who had considerable years of service before retirement or promotion created a "promotion block".[48]

The response from the B Specials was mixed. Some felt betrayed and resigned immediately,[50] while others made application to join the UDR as soon as forms were available. Others joined the newly formed RUC Reserve instead, especially in Belfast, where during the first month of recruiting, only 36 Specials applied to join the UDR compared to an average of 29% – 2,424, one thousand of whom were rejected, mainly on the grounds of age and fitness. Around 75% of the men of the Tyrone B Specials applied, of whom 419 were accepted and, as a result, the 6th Battalion, Ulster Defence Regiment started life as the only battalion more or less up to strength, and remained so during its history. In five of the seven battalions, former Specials made up more than half of personnel; in the 4th Battalion, Ulster Defence Regiment, it reached 87%. The story was different in Belfast (10%) and the rest of Antrim (42%), where the figures were more balanced, with a correspondingly higher proportion of Catholic recruits.[51]

Some former B Specials felt so aggrieved at the loss of their force that they booed and jeered passing UDR patrols. Most anger seemed to be in County Down, where the USC District adjutant actively campaigned to persuade his men not to apply.[51]

The Belfast Telegraph stated on 18 February 1970 that the first two soldiers reported as signing up were a 19-year-old Catholic and a 47-year-old Protestant.[52] The regiment began with Catholic recruits accounting for 18% of the membership. Many were ex-regular soldiers, "eager to get back into uniform".[53] By 1987 Catholic membership was 4%.[54]

By March 1970, there had been 4,791 applications to join, of which 946 were from Catholics and 2,424 from current or former members of the B-Specials. 2,440 had been accepted, including 1,423 from current or former B-Specials.[55]

As the percentage of recruits from both communities did not reflect the religious demographics of Northern Ireland, it never became the model Lord Hunt intended.[56] Catholics continued to join the regiment, but the numbers were never representative. They were highest in 3 UDR, which had the highest percentage of Catholics throughout the Troubles, beginning with 30%, although this was a much lower percentage than that of the battalion area. Some sections were staffed entirely by Catholics, which led to protests from the B Specials Association that in 3 UDR "preference for promotion and allocation of appointments was being given to Catholics".[57] This was partially explained by the fact that in the mostly Catholic town of Newry, the Territorial Army company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers had been disbanded in 1968 and the vast majority of its soldiers had joined the UDR en masse.[58]

The company commander of C Company, (Newry), 3 UDR, was the former commander of the TA unit and was pleased to see that virtually all of his TA soldiers were on parade, in the TA Centre, in exactly the same drill hall as they had previously used, for the first night of the new regiment. He noted there were some former B Specials in the room and observed they did not initially associate with the others – not on the grounds of religion but because the former TA soldiers all knew each other socially and sat together on canteen breaks whereas the former specials kept to their group of comrades, but within a week both had melded together.[59]

By 1 April 1970, only 1,606 of the desired 4,000 men had been enlisted, and the UDR began its duties much under strength.[49] The regiment continued to grow, however. In 1973 numbers peaked at 9,100 (all part-time) and at the time of amalgamation had stabilised its numbers at 2,797 permanent cadre soldiers and 2,620 part-time.[60]

UDR stable belt colours

Unlike the USC, who were controlled by the Stormont government in Belfast, the UDR was under the direct command of the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOCNI), the commander of the British Army in Northern Ireland.[61] A six-man UDR Advisory Council (three Protestant and three Catholic) was formed and chaired by the colonel commandant. Its brief was "to advise the GOCNI on policy for the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, in particular on recruitment; and on such specific matters as the GOCNI might refer to the council."[62]

The regiment would be commanded by a regular army brigadier. Battalions were to be commanded by "local members of the force".[26]

Commanding officers were initially former County Commandants from the disbanded USC. All were men of previous military experience, such as Dublin-born Desmond Woods who had at one time been the youngest winner of the Military Cross (serving with the Royal Ulster Rifles)[63] and Michael Torrens-Spence DSO, DSC, AFC. All were appointed lieutenant colonel on a one-year contract.[64] However, some of these men were already past retirement age and after their year's contract was up they were replaced by lieutenant colonels from the regular army, the first of these being Lt Col Dion Beard of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment (1 RTR) who took over at 3 UDR on 15 February 1971.[65] The policy of appointing regular officers was not universally popular within the regiment, with the public or with some politicians,[65] but the British Army persisted in replacing former USC commanding officers and by the time of amalgamation, around 400 regular army officers had served in these posts, some of whom went on to achieve general officer rank.[65]

A newspaper for the regiment was published, called "Defence".[66] Commanders were able to communicate their views through this as well as through Part 2 Orders (routine orders) which, as with every British Army unit, were displayed on company noticeboards and were compulsory reading.[67]

UDR main gate sign denoting which companies are in barracks

The first seven battalions raised made the UDR the largest infantry regiment in the British Army at that time.[44] Two years later, four more were added, taking the total to eleven – 8th (County Tyrone); 9th (Country Antrim); 10th (City of Belfast) and 11th (Craigavon).

The regiment was described in 1972 as:

Organised into 11 Battalions (59) companies: two in Belfast and the remainder cover county or sub-county areas. Seven of the eleven are commanded by regular commanding officers. In addition the training majors, quartermaster, regimental sergeant majors, chief clerks, and signaller NCOs are also regulars. There are a number of 'conrate' (full-time UDR) posts in each unit, including adjutants, permanent staff instructors, security guards, etc. Many of the officer and senior rank conrates are ex-regulars. The remainder are part-timers. Their main tasks are guarding key points, patrolling, and surveillance, and manning vehicle checkpoints. They do not operate in the 'hard' areas of Belfast, and are not permitted to become involved in crowd confrontations anywhere. Men are armed with self-loading rifles or sub-machine guns. The current strength of the Regiment is 7910.[68]

Until 1976 the full-time cadre were "conrates" (so called because they had a "consolidated rate of pay")[69][70] whose duties consisted of guarding bases and carrying out administrative tasks. The role of the regiment was expanded by raising full-time platoons, known as "Operations Platoons", to perform duties on a 24-hour basis. The first of these was raised at 2 UDR under the command of a sergeant. By the end of the 1970s, the permanent cadre had been raised to sixteen platoons. These were then increased to company strength with the conrate role being phased out and full-time UDR soldiers undertaking their own guard duties and administration.[71]

UDR march past at Mahon Road Barracks, Portadown

The full-time element eventually increased to more than half the total personnel.

In 1990, the regiment's numbers stood at 3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time soldiers, with 140 attached regular army personnel in key command and training positions.[72] The standard of training of the permanent cadre made them suitable to be used in much the same way as regular soldiers and it was not uncommon for regular army units to then come under local command and control of a UDR Battalion Headquarters.[73]

The dispersal of UDR soldiers into their areas of responsibility was through sub-barracks of platoon or company size. Battalion headquarters would usually be located in the county town, but not always as some counties had two battalions. Guarded by conrate soldiers, these barracks would become doubly active after 6pm as part-time soldiers arrived for evening duties. After Ulsterisation began in 1976, many battalion headquarters had full-sized permanent cadre companies and these would maintain a 24-hour presence in the battalion's "tactical area of responsibility" (TAOR).

An example of this structure can be seen in the make-up of 2 UDR based at Drumadd Barracks in Armagh:

Sub-headquarter units would maintain contact with their own patrols and HQ by radio. In many cases the radios were operated by Greenfinches (female soldiers),[74] whose husbands or sons and/or daughters were on one of the active patrols, which led to tense moments when mobile units or foot patrols came under attack and submitted a "contact report" by radio.

Soldiers of 11 UDR on a patrol break in the South Armagh area. The soldier on the right is carrying a jamming device to prevent the detonation of radio-controlled improvised explosive devices.

The early image of the regiment, due to equipment and uniform shortages, was of a rag-tag bunch using World War II weaponry, old army uniforms and carrying pockets full of loose change in order to make reports from public telephone boxes. Many of the soldiers were veterans of earlier campaigns with the British Army or had been in the Special Constabulary and were middle-aged; this earned them the public nickname of "Dad's Army" - the sobriquet given to the Home Guard during World War II.

This illustration shows how the badge of the UDR (right) was created from the badge of the Ulster Rifles (left).

After equipment shortages were resolved, male soldiers dressed in a similar fashion to regular army units. Camouflage jackets were worn and headgear was a distinctive dark green beret with a gold coloured "Maid of Erin" style harp, surmounted by St Edward's Crown (in later years this was dulled down by blackening, a common practice for units of the British army when wearing cap badges on operational duties).[75] The badge was a direct copy of the Royal Ulster Rifles cap badge with the Latin motto removed from its base. Female "Greenfinch" soldiers wore combat jackets and rifle green skirts with the UDR beret and cap badge. For ceremonial occasions men wore a rifle green version of British Army (No.1 Temperate ceremonial). Female "best dress" was a rifle green jacket and skirt. The beret was retained as headgear for men and women in best dress. On the formation of operations platoons, narrow coloured slides were adopted and worn on the shoulder straps in battalion colours. These indicated to the trained eye that the wearers were full-time soldiers. They were dispensed with as the operations platoons expanded into full-time rifle companies and were replaced by battalion-specific epaulette slides. Rank badges were as for infantry NCOs and officers and worn in the same fashion.

Initially, the weapons issued were of WW2 vintage such as Lee–Enfield rifles and Sten submachine guns. In early 1972 the rifles were replaced with the standard issue L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle (SLR).[76] Other weaponry became available too: 9 mm Browning pistols (Browning 9mm), the Sterling submachine guns (SMG), the L4A4 Light Machine Guns (Bren LMG) and L7A2 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG)s. Small stocks of Federal Riot Guns (FRG) were kept and used to fire plastic bullets to knock down doors and other obstacles during search operations. A number of Carl Gustav (Charlie G) 84 mm recoilless rifles were stocked but rarely deployed as the weapon was unsuited to most operations. (see Boat Sections below). SLRs were replaced in 1988 by the SA80 and at the same time machine guns were superseded by the Light Support Weapon.[77] Metal caltrops were used at vehicle check points [78] to puncture tyres on cars trying to escape roadblocks.

For personal protection off duty, some soldiers were issued with a Walther PP. Major Ken Maginnis acquired permission for some to purchase Browning 9mm pistols at £200 each.[79] These were deemed to be more effective. In the late 1980s the Walther PP was replaced by the Walther P5, considered a more practical weapon because of its size and ballistic capabilities. Any soldier considered to be at particularly high risk would be permitted to keep his rifle at home. This policy was known as "weapons out" and was reduced by 75%, when SLRs replaced Lee–Enfields in 1972, due to the high number of rifles stolen by paramilitaries.[80]

The weapons out policy was eventually discontinued on the introduction of the SA80 rifle by that time only a small number were held at home by soldiers of 6 UDR.[77]

Firearms

• 
  No4 Rifle
• 
  L1A1 SLR (Rifle)
• 
  SA-80 L85A1 rifle
• 
  Sterling SMG
• 
  Browning 9mm

AAC Scout helicopter used to support the UDR

AAC Lynx helicopter used to support the UDR

The standard patrol vehicle was the 3/4 ton Land Rover used extensively throughout the British armed forces. Following withdrawal from police service, a number of Shorland armoured cars were allocated to the regiment.[81] Rarely used after initial service because the turret weapon was a GPMG and deemed unsuitable for urban use due to its rapid rate of fire. The Shorland was not generally popular due to its instability on the road. This was due to the heavy turret. However, some battalions continued to use them into the 1980s in high-risk area because of the increased protection plate armour gave over Makrolon polycarbonate armour fitted to Land Rovers. The tough Shorlands saved the lives of a number of people on patrol.[81]

Units were sometimes deployed by Royal Air Force and Army Air Corps helicopters for rapid insertion or for duties in areas of greatest threat where it was unwise to use "green transport" (wheeled).[82]

Several battalions were supplied with rigid Dell Quay Dory craft for patrolling waterways shared with the Republic of Ireland in an attempt to prevent gun-running across these narrow channels such as Carlingford Lough.[76] Assisted by land-based Decca Marine radar mounted on a Land Rover, deployed at Killowen Point. These boats were armed with Bren light machine guns and carried a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank weapon in addition to the rifles and sub-machine guns normally carried by soldiers. The shore-based dories proved inadequate and a paper was submitted by 3 UDR in 1972, recommending a naval vessel to be stationed in the centre of Carlingford Lough[83] to assist with the suppression of gun-running. This suggestion was adopted and to the end of the security situation a small warship was on station off the coast of the Warrenpoint/Rostrevor shoreline. This intervention was called Operation Grenada.[84] Gun-running across these coastal estuaries ceased as a result.[85] 3 UDR continued to dories and the radar stretches of the coast. The radar was withdrawn from use and later dispatched to the south Atlantic during the Falklands War on board the SS Atlantic Conveyor and lost when the ship was sunk after being hit by two Argentine Exocet missiles. The 4th Battalion also carried out waterway patrols on upper and lower Lough Erne.[86]

At first there were not enough radios to issue to each patrol and those available were of the PYE "Bantam" type used by the police, which did not have sufficient range.[87] As a result, UDR patrols were issued with pockets of small change to use in telephone boxes in order to effectively report back to base.[87] When radios were issued they were of the type used by the regular army such as Larkspur A41 manpacks, B47 and C42 vehicle mounted sets.[87] Over time these were replaced with Stornophones[88] as vehicle sets with preselected frequencies which operated on the NINET rebroadcast system, working through masts strategically placed on various high points throughout Northern Ireland such as Slieve Croob. Pyephones continued to be used for foot patrols but the range of these sets gradually improved.[87] Each battalion was able to communicate with other battalions using C42's and B47's installed in the battalion or company Operations room (Ops Room) or Communications Centre (Comcen) as well as the BID 150 system of cryptic coding and scrambler telephone system.

Search dogs were originally provided by the regular army but eventually a UDR dog section was formed to provide more immediate assistance in search operations. One of the dog handlers, Corporal Brian David Brown of 3 UDR together with his Labrador dog Oliver was killed in Kilkeel by an IRA bomb in 1986.[89] Cpl Brown was posthumously awarded the Queen's Gallantry Medal.[90]

The Yellow Card

All members of the British Armed Forces, including the UDR, carried a number of small information cards to assist in the execution of their duties in Northern Ireland. These were generally referred to by their colour. The most important of these was the Yellow Card which contained the rules for opening fire.[91]

This content of this information card was seen as vitally important and all soldiers were taught to be entirely familiar with it as it contained specific instructions to be followed when opening fire on a suspected enemy.[92] Requiring, "total understanding and instantaneous recall of the provisions...."[82] Warnings were to be issued to allow suspects to surrender. Soldiers could only shoot without warning "if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured." The card was amended in 1980 to carry the words "Firearms must only be used as a last resort".[93] The use of the card was debated in Parliament.[94]

25% of the new recruits in 1970 had no previous military or special constabulary experience. Training was done by a team of regular soldiers attached to each unit headed up by a training major, assisted by former instructors from the armed forces who were recruits themselves.[95]

The annual training commitment for each part-time soldier was twelve days and twelve, two-hour training periods. Part of which included attendance at annual training camp. As an incentive, any soldier who fulfilled his training was given an annual bounty of £25-£35, later increased to £150 for the first year, £250 for the second and £350 for the third and subsequent years.[96] This bounty in modern terms would be worth £1674 per year.[97] Pay was also given for training days but this was less than the rate for operational duty.[87]

As with all British military recruits, training started with an introduction to basic battle skills and the book of the same name, which, where possible, was issued to each individual soldier. Instruction was also given on the Army marksmanship pamphlet Shoot to Kill.[98]

Part-time (and later, permanent cadre) soldiers were required to attend an annual camp for a seven-day period. Camps were located at:

These camps not only provided intensive training but they included days out and social events where soldiers could relax and drop their guard, well away from the troubled areas they normally patrolled.[99]

From 1975 onwards specially trained search teams were created to comb the countryside and derelict buildings for illegal stashes of weapons and explosives. Some of these dumps were booby trapped and particular care and alertness was needed.[99]

Training continued to be done at each battalion's own HQ until 2 July 1979 when the UDR Training Centre opened at the old weekend training camp at Ballykinlar, Co Down.[100] The first recruit courses as the centre for permanent cadre troops were four weeks long and the subjects included physical training, foot drill, assault course, range firing, foot and mobile patrol procedures (including vehicle stops), map reading, signals, first aid and a grounding in legal responsibilities.[100] The first recruit course passed out on 28 July 1979 and the salute was taken by Brigadier David Miller, Commander UDR.[100] Courses were not just for permanent cadre and included training for:platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, potential NCOs, skill-at-arms, surveillance, intelligence, photography and search updating.[100]

In 1990 the UDR Training Centre became responsible for all military training in Northern Ireland. Under the command of a regular army lieutenant colonel seconded to the UDR. The centre then ran courses for the regular army and RAF Regiment individual reinforcements on search team training, combat medics, skill-at-arms, and NCO training; as well as the management of the extensive weapon ranges at Ballykinlar.

In some cases several members of a family would join the same unit. This led to husbands, wives, sons and daughters, even grandparents serving together.[101] Whilst this did create a good esprit de corps there were problems created. Once anyone in a family joined the Ulster Defence Regiment the entire household, even children, had to be educated on personal safety.[101] The hours were long and soldiers had to forfeit a normal family life.[101] On duty too there were issues. Family members had to be split into different patrols and vehicles so that if one unit was attacked an entire family would not run the risk of being killed or wounded at the same time.[102] In 1975 there were eighty four married couples serving and fifty three family groups of three or more.[103]

UDR soldiers lived in their own civilian homes,[104] (except for attached regular army personnel who were given "quarters").

Many lived in Protestant or Catholic enclaves which put them within easy reach of local paramilitary or community groups. The years 1972–73 saw paramilitary threats from loyalist and republican sources. Of the 288 incidents of intimidation reported, all but twelve were from Protestants who had been threatened from within their own community. Sometimes this was to gain information or to persuade soldiers to join (or remain within) loyalist organisations.[105] The intimidation included: threatening letters and phone calls, abduction, shots fired from passing cars and off-duty soldiers being assaulted.[106]

In the early days some even lived in what would later become known as "hard line areas" such as Private Sean Russell of 7 UDR who lived in the New Barnsley Estate in Belfast. This led to many UDR soldiers becoming targets for various paramilitary groups whilst off duty and indeed Sean Russell was subsequently targeted and killed whilst at home, in front of his family.[107]

The first Ulster Workers' Council strike took place between 15–28 May 1974. This is arguably the greatest test of integrity and loyalty the UDR had to endure, along with the RUC.[117] The regiment was not called out but 3 (Co Down) UDR, then at annual camp in Magilligan was deployed on Sunday 19 May by road and air to the south Tyrone and south Fermanagh areas usually patrolled by 4 (Co Fermanagh) UDR and 6 (Co Tyrone) UDR. Two days previously on 17 May loyalist paramilitaries had carried out a series of bombings in Dublin and Monaghan. The authorities believed the Provisional IRA would retaliate so had provided the 3rd Battalion as reinforcements to the local battalions.[118]

Despite there being no call out UDR soldiers flocked to their bases for duty.[119] They were frustrated in not being able to take any direct action against the strikers but the only orders they got were to "stand back and observe".[119] A patrol from 7 UDR was able to prevent loyalists from throwing stones and bottles at regular troops in the Ballybeen estate in Dundonald. Barricades preventing soldiers from the Newtownabbey company of 10 UDR who lived in Monkstown from getting to their base were lifted when the platoon commander and platoon sergeant went down and warned the people manning the barricades that they would "regret it in the future" if they continued to prevent the UDR from getting out on patrol.[119]

Some soldiers took their turn manning the barricades alongside the UDA. These were men who lived in UDA dominated housing estates and had been threatened. Those soldiers in such areas who did not take a turn on duty were not allowed to get out of the estates to report for duty and had their cars and homes damaged and in some cases they and their wives were refused service in local shops following the strike.[120]

There were two reported instances of loyalists trying to subvert the loyalty of UDR units. One was against an entire company of 3 UDR and one against a platoon from the 8th battalion. Both failed.[121]

Units from 7 UDR took up positions around key points at the shipyards, an oil refinery in Sydenham and an electricity sub station in the Castlereagh hills.[121] Forty drivers were drafted in from 1, 9 and 10 UDR battalions to assist the Royal Corps of Transport.[121] Eventually 10 UDR and regular units forcibly dismantled the barricades in Monkstown.[121]

Prior to the strike some army commanders and the Brigadier UDR had expressed doubts about who the UDR was loyal to and who they would support in the event of such an action by loyalists. The regiment's integrity was never called into question again. Brigadier Baxter said of that time: "During the strike the UDR came of age".[121]

Ulsterisation was the British Government's policy to reduce regular Army troop numbers in Northern Ireland and bring local forces into the front line. This was as a result of international opinion about British soldiers being used in what many viewed as a "colonial occupation". It was also called "normalisation", or "police primacy".[122] The term "Ulsterisation" was coined by the media. The then Assistant Chief Constable of the RUC, Jack Hermon, summed it up when he said, "Ulstermen need to learn to live together and be policed by Ulstermen. If they have to kill, let them kill each other, not English soldiers."[123]

A report commissioned in 1976 recommended:

• An increase in the establishment of the RUC and RUC Reserve
• Creation of RUC "mobile support units"
• An increase in the conrate establishment of the UDR so it could take over from the regular Army
• A 24-hour military presence by the UDR

The scheme was hampered by the shortfall of conrate officers in the UDR who could take on the role of operations officers. It also placed heavier demands upon senior NCO "watchkeepers" in the operations rooms, or and communication centres (comcens).

The main outcome of Ulsterisation was the creation of the "Province Reserve UDR" (PRUDR) whereby each of the 56 available companies would take it in turns to operate anywhere in the province, although in practice this normally meant in South Armagh.[124]

Greenfinches were used to deny terrorists the use of women and children in paramilitary activities.[136] On patrol they were used to search for explosives, weapons, ammunition and documents, as well as driving patrol vehicles, operating radios and acting as interviewers.[136]

The use of females in barracks included clerical, catering and store-keeping duties in addition to staffing "Operations Rooms" and "Intelligence Cells", released male soldiers for operational duties.[136]

Women soldiers were required to pass annual skills tests to qualify for grades and pay increments.[137] If these tests were failed the Greenfinch concerned would be downgraded and suffer a drop in wages.[138] They received regular "role specific" training which included: person and vehicle searching, map reading, first aid, signals, personal security and terrorist recognition; as well as regimental history, military etiquette, rank structure and dress regulations, and also fitness training.[137] They were advised to maintain a high degree of fitness.[137]

Although not armed on duty Greenfinches were trained to fire a full range of weapons and taught how to make a weapon "safe" as part of the training on dealing with casualties.[127] HQUDR ran a .22 shooting competition.[127]

Some Greenfinches were issued with (or purchased) personal protection weapons (PPW's) if considered to be at high risk.[127]

Issues which affected other servicewomen also applied to Greenfinches. Rules regarding pregnancy, marriage, and pay. To join, married women were required to submit written permission from their husbands and those with children were obliged to sign a declaration confirming childcare arrangements.[136]

Ministry of Defence regulations concerning women soldiers meant that Greenfinches would be discharged in the fourth month of pregnancy.[139] If they returned to their unit after maternity leave they were required to retake the basic recruits course.[139] Their previous service did not count towards medal entitlement or promotion.[139] Some sympathetic battalion commanders avoided putting female soldiers through this by sending them on extended, long term leave but keeping them "on strength".[127]

The European Court ruled against the Ministry of Defence in 1990 and awarded compensation to 78 former Greenfinches totaling £370,000.[139] Regulations then changed and all British servicewomen were subsequently allowed 48 weeks unpaid maternity leave, following which they could return to duty without preconditions.[127]

A study in 1988 showed that half the women serving were married and 42% were mothers, with two thirds of their children being infants or of school age.[140]

Four Greenfinches were killed as active servicewomen between 1974 and 1992.[141] The first was Private Eva Martin, age 28, fatally wounded by rocket fragments on 3 May 1974 during a PIRA attack on 6 UDR's outlying base at the Deanery, Clogher. She was also the first female from the security forces to die in the Troubles.[134][142]

When the regiment was formed, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) did not yet exist;[41] it would not be established until September 1971.[173] Dual membership was initially acceptable to the military authorities as the UDA was not seen as a threat to the state.[174][175] This changed when on 29 November 1972, the GOCNI, on instructions from Westminster,[176] announced that dual membership of UDR and paramilitary organisations would not be tolerated and began a purge which saw 171 soldiers with links to the UDA discharged by the end of 1975.[177] Lt Col Dion Beard (1RTR) commander of 3 UDR issued a battalion order:

I will not tolerate any active participation by members of this battalion in any organisation which encourages violence... you cannot play in both teams. Either you believe in law and order applied equally to all men, or you believe in violence as a means of achieving political ends. In this respect the UDA is no better than IRA. Not only should you take no part in UDA activities but you should discourage your fellow citizens [from doing so].[178]

A similar statement was issued by the commanding officer of 11 UDR when Ian Paisley's Third Force was established in 1981. The media reported that he had issued a battalion order to the effect that any soldier who became involved in the Third Force would be dismissed.[179]

During the regiment's 22-year history, loyalist raids were mounted against 3 UDR, 5 UDR, 7 UDR, 10 UDR, and 11 UDR. Subsequent to a raid against 11 UDR's C company, Lurgan on 20 October 1972, the guard commander, Sgt. Billy Hanna MM, was convicted of supplying arms and information to loyalist paramilitaries.[180] Most were recovered in follow up operations, but some were later proven to have been used by loyalist organisations to carry out crimes, including murders.[181] Most stolen weapons were taken by loyalist organisations, but a number of soldiers were killed by members of the IRA who attacked their homes to steal rifles.[182]

Two soldiers from the 11 UDR's C Company (also UVF members) were convicted of the 1975 killing of three musicians from The Miami Showband. This attack was led by Robin Jackson, a former UDR soldier who had been discharged for "undisclosed reasons".[183][184][185] Two soldiers from 11 UDR's E Company, Portadown (also UVF members), died in the premature explosion of their own bomb.[186]

In 1977, the Army investigated D and G companies of 10 UDR based at Girdwood Barracks, Belfast. The investigation concluded that 70 soldiers had "links" to the UVF. Following this two were dismissed on security grounds.[187] 30 NCOs from D Company were suspected of fraudulently "siphoning off" between £30,000 - £47,000. A large percentage of this was suspected of going to the UVF. It was also alleged that UVF members socialized with soldiers in their mess.[187] The investigation was halted after a senior UDR officer claimed it was harming morale.[187] Details of the investigation were discovered in 2011.[187]

In 1989, twenty-eight UDR soldiers were arrested as part of the Stevens Inquiries into alleged collusion with loyalist paramilitaries.[188] Twenty-six belonged to the same company of 7/10 UDR.[189] Six were later awarded damages.[190] One was charged with activities linked to loyalist paramilitaries. The Stephens team caused "intense anger" as three hundred police had been used to surround the homes of suspects. This had identified them as UDR soldiers to their neighbours, potentially putting their lives at risk. Eleven moved house as a result, while the homes of eighteen others were provided with "additional security measures" at a cost of £25,000.[189]

In 1999, David Jordan, a former UDR soldier, allegedly broke down in a bar and admitted to being part of a patrol that killed nationalist Councillor Patsy Kelly in 1974.[191]

At the start of June 1987 three attacks were made against soldiers of the same company of 7/10 UDR including Private Joe Tracey who was shot dead as he started a new job on apartments off the Lisburn Road, Belfast. The Belfast Newsletter reported that 7/10 UDR had been infiltrated by the IRA. The commanding officer accepted that someone must have informed on him but denied that the IRA had been able to penetrate the battalion calling the allegation a "wild rumour".[192]

Another incident involved William Bogle of 6 UDR who was ambushed and killed on 5 December 1972 at Killeter near the Tyrone/Donegal border. He was killed by a former member of his own company "possessed of strong republican views" who moved across the border after the killing and is not known to have returned to Northern Ireland.[76]

• The Bray reforms

Brigadier Michael Bray adopted a zero-tolerance policy for any activity related to loyalism from the beginning of his tenure as Commander UDR. He instituted a number of safeguards including monitoring of entire battalions and six-month security reviews of all UDR personnel. An out of bounds list was compiled which included pubs and clubs known to be frequented by loyalist paramilitaries.[193] Soldiers were cautioned as to whom they should socialise with.[193] This was a concerted effort to remove anyone with dual membership from the regiment and to prevent peer pressure being applied.[194]

• The Stevens Enquiry

The Stevens Report resulted in a tightening of control on even the most low-rated intelligence documents and heightened accountability. For the first time the RUC were given access to UDR vetting procedures and many soldiers found themselves under police observation for extended periods of time, in some cases resulting in their discharge. Stevens agreed there had been collusion between a small number of UDR soldiers who had "gravely abused their positions of trust" but that the issue was not "widespread or institutionalised".[195]

A draft document, entitled Subversion in the UDR, was amongst many released in 2005 and discovered in the Public Record Office. Some content appeared in The Irish News on 2 and 3 May 2006. Believed to have been prepared by British military intelligence in August 1973, it examines the issue of overlapping membership between the UDR and subversive organisations in the first three years of recruiting.[172]

Subversion was considered to be a "strong support for, or membership of, organisations whose aims are incompatible with those of the UDR" and attempts by soldiers to use their "knowledge, skills, or equipment to further the aims of such organisations." It speculated that "perhaps" 5–15% of UDR soldiers were, or had been, directly linked to "Protestant extremist groups". That the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for these groups was the UDR" and that the British Government knew UDR weapons were being used by loyalist paramilitaries, including the killing of a Roman Catholic civilian and other attacks.[196]

The report illustrated how over 200 UDR weapons were lost or stolen by the end of 1972, although the rate of loss had decreased to 56 by 1973 when the report was written. This was suggested to be partially due to increased security and also that "the reduced credibility of Protestant extremist groups in the eyes of the majority community, has made the subversion of UDR members more difficult."[171] During 1973 the most successful loyalist extremist arms raids took place at the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science, and at firearms dealers in Belfast, Newtownards and Armagh, rather than on UDR locations.[171]

The report suggested there was no substantial threat of subversion from republican extremists in the regiment as the number of Catholics had decreased to under 4%.[172] There were isolated incidents where Catholic UDR soldiers 'lost' weapons in suspicious circumstances, but "neither the number of weapons nor the threat is thought to be great".[171]

The report concluded that except in limited circumstances subversion in the UDR has not compromised its ability to carry out its duties.[171]

18 UDR soldiers were convicted of murder and 11 for manslaughter.[197] Between 1970 and 1985, 99 were convicted of assault, whilst others were convicted of armed robbery, weapons offences, bombing, intimidation and attacks on Catholics, kidnapping, and membership of the UVF.[198] Only a small fraction of the 40,000 men and women who served with the regiment[199] were involved in such criminal activities, but the proportion was higher than for the regular British Army or RUC.[198]

The political groups which supported violence were referred to as "non-constitutional". Chief amongst them was Provisional Sinn Féin (now referred to as "Sinn Féin") – the political arm of the Provisional IRA. The weekly republican newspaper An Phoblacht carried reports highlighting what it saw as naked state oppression. In its editorials An Phoblacht referred to the UDR as, "not Dad's Army but a sectarian militia".[208] To help emphasise their message they produced posters which supporters pasted over walls in Republican areas such as "The Loyalist Murderers"[208] and "Blood Money,"[209] referring to the redundancy payments received by former UDR soldiers still serving with the Royal Irish Regiment at the end of Operation Banner [210] (The official army title for operations in Northern Ireland).

An Phoblacht claimed that the UDR had secret "death squads" (See: Glenanne gang) sponsored by United Kingdom Special Forces[211] and that members of the UDR (in collusion with British Intelligence) were behind the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.[212]

When Gerry Adams (the Sinn Féin president) was wounded in an assassination attempt by three members of the UFF it was an off-duty full-time Non-commissioned officer of 10 UDR[213] who gave chase to their car and arrested them, assisted by an off-duty policeman.[214] This is not noted in Adams' Sinn Féin biography[215] and the BBC still insists the assailants were arrested by "plain clothes policemen".[216] The UDR NCO received the Queen's Gallantry Medal for arresting the gunmen. In the long term however the soldier was intimidated out of his home and the UDR as a direct result of these arrests.[217]

This action by an off-duty soldier did not soften the opinion of Sinn Féin. Their newspaper continued to criticise the UDR and after amalgamation, the Royal Irish Regiment (Home Service), referring to it as "The Murder Regiment".[218]

The City of Belfast and a number of boroughs throughout Northern Ireland paid their own tribute to the regiment by granting freedoms including: North Down, Larne, and Newtownards.[242]

The community relations work of 7th/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion was recognised by the award of the Wilkinson Sword of Peace for 1990.[44]

A memorial to the UDR was erected in Lisburn, to "recognise the self sacrifice of the soldiers, both men and women, from all traditions of the UK".[243] The Memorial is "a 19-foot 'heroic scale' bronze sculpture" featuring "bronze figures of a male UDR soldier and a female 'Greenfinch' on operational duty...set upon an equally impressive Mourne granite plinth.".[244]

Lisburn City Council leased the site to the UDR Memorial Trust at Market Square, Lisburn. Under the terms of the lease, the UDR Memorial Trust are permitted to use this for the erection of a memorial. The planning, erection and maintenance of the memorial is the responsibility of the UDR Memorial Trust.[245]

The UDR Memorial is in addition to the UDR Roll of Honour situated beside Lisburn War Memorial, Castle Street, Lisburn that commemorates UDR personnel from the Lisburn area who died in the conflict.

The memorial group of statues was unveiled on 12 June 2011 by Viscount Brookeborough, one of the trustees of the UDR Memorial Trust. At the ceremony, Trust chairman Wesley Duncan said, "It was unfortunate that there were members who did bad things and we're not trying to hide that. But what we would say is that there's almost 50,000 people who didn't do bad things – who did good things, who were ordinary decent people who wanted to do the best they could for their country."[246]

On Saturday, 28 April 2012 a memorial to the UDR was unveiled at the National Memorial Arboretum by Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE (Patron of the Regimental Association) along with Memorial Trees in memory of those UDR Soldiers who were murdered after having left the Regiment. Memorial Trees in memory of all those who were killed while serving had already been planted some years ago. The memorial takes the form of a 6-foot Mourne granite monument. The event was attended by around 100 UDR families, joined by the Northern Ireland Minister of State, Hugo Swire, DUP Junior Minister Jonathan Bell and UUP deputy leader John McCallister. A parade to the monument was led by the band of the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment.[247]

• A selection of the memorials to the fallen of the UDR found in churches, High Streets and memorial gardens in Northern Ireland and England. mode=packed-hover heights=150px align=center
• 
  UDR Memorial Statue, Lisburn, June 2011
• 
  Roll of Honour Memorial, War Memorial, Lisburn.
• 
  UDR Memorial at the National Arboretum.
• 
  Memorial seat at the National Arboretum.
• 
  Poppy crosses for the fallen, Belfast Cenotaph.

General Sir Charles Huxtable KCB CBE DL

• General Sir John Anderson GCB, KCB DSO (1969–1977) (5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards) (1st Colonel Commandant).[34][249]
• Brigadier Harry Baxter CBE GM (1977–1986).[250]
• General Sir David Young (1986–1991) Royal Scots.[251]
• General Sir Charles Huxtable (1991–1992) Duke of Wellington's Regiment. Huxtable continued as Colonel Commandant of the Royal Irish Regiment until 1996.[252][253][254]

Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE VRD UD Royal Naval Reserve/3rd Battalion, Ulster Defence Regiment (1982–1992)

• Category:Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers
• Category:Ulster Defence Regiment officers