Xinjiang conflict

The Xinjiang conflict (Chinese: 新疆冲突), also known as the Uyghur–Chinese conflict, is an ongoing ethnic conflict in China's far-northwest autonomous region of Xinjiang. It is centred around the Uyghurs, a Turkic minority ethnic group who constitute the majority of the region's population.[12][13]

This article is about recent unrest and fighting in Xinjiang. For the uprisings and battles in Xinjiang during the 1930s and 1940s, see Xinjiang Wars.

Xinjiang conflict
Part of Ethnic issues in China
Xinjiang, highlighted red, shown within China
Date1931[1]–present
Location
Xinjiang, China (mainly)
Parties to the civil conflict
Lead figures
Xi Jinping (General Secretary: 2012–present)
Chen Quanguo (Party Secretary: 2016–present)
 Abdul Haq
Abdullah Mansour[8]
Units involved
Xinjiang Military Region
People's Armed Police Xinjiang UAR Corps, mobile corps, and special police units
Xinjiang UAR Public Security Department, and SWAT/police tactical units from other provinces
Xinjiang re-education camps (2014–present)
Xinjiang civil servants (Civil Servant-Family Pair Up)
Casualties
Death(s)1,000 c. (2007-2014)[9][10]
Injuries>1,700[11]

Though the conflict's origins trace back to 1931, factors such as the mass state-sponsored migration of Han Chinese from the 1950s to the 1970s, government policies promoting Chinese cultural unity and punishing certain expressions of Uyghur identity,[14][15] and harsh responses to separatism[16][17] have contributed to tension between the Uyghurs, and state police and Han Chinese.[18] This has taken the form of both frequent terrorist attacks and wider public unrest such as the Baren Township riot, 1997 Ürümqi bus bombings, protests in Ghuljia, June 2009 Shaoguan Incident and the resulting July 2009 Ürümqi riots, 2011 Hotan attack, April 2014 Ürümqi attack, May 2014 Ürümqi attack, 2014 Kunming attack as well as the 2015 Aksu colliery attack. Other Uyghur organizations such as the World Uyghur Congress denounce totalitarianism, religious intolerance, and terrorism as an instrument of policy.[19]

In recent years, Chinese government policy has been marked by mass surveillance and the incarceration without trial of over one million Uyghurs and other Muslim minority ethnic groups in "re-education camps".[20][21][lower-alpha 1][lower-alpha 2] Numerous reports have stated that many of these minorities have been used for prison labour in a seeming return to the "re-education through labour" program, which was supposedly abolished in 2013.[22] International observers have labelled the Sinicization campaign to be an instance of cultural genocide.[23][24][25][26][27][28]

These claims have been denied by the Chinese government, and were the subject of dispute at the 44th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC); 39 countries condemned China's treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in June 2020.[29] In July, a group of 45 nations issued a competing letter to the UNHRC, defending China's treatment of both Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.[30]

Background
Further information: History of Xinjiang, Islamization and Turkification of Xinjiang, and East Turkestan independence movement
Part of a series on the
History of Xinjiang
Ancient period
Medieval and early modern period
Modern period

Xinjiang is a large central-Asian region within the People's Republic of China comprising numerous minority groups: 45% of its population are Uyghurs, and 40% are Han.[31] Its heavily industrialised capital, Ürümqi, has a population of more than 2.3 million, about 75% of whom are Han, 12.8% are Uyghur, and 10% are from other ethnic groups.[31]

In general, Uyghurs and the mostly Han government disagree on which group has greater historical claim to the Xinjiang region: Uyghurs believe their ancestors were indigenous to the area, whereas government policy considers present-day Xinjiang to have belonged to China since around 200 BC during Han Dynasty.[32] According to Chinese policy, Uyghurs are classified as a National Minority; they are considered to be no more indigenous to Xinjiang than the Han, and have no special rights to the land under the law.[32] During the Mao era the People's Republic oversaw the migration into Xinjiang of millions of Han, who have been accused of economically dominating the region,[33][34][35][36] although a 2008 survey on both ethnic groups has contradicted the allegation.[37]

Current Chinese minority policy is based on affirmative action, and has reinforced a Uyghur ethnic identity that is distinct from the Han population.[38][39] However, Human Rights Watch describes a "multi-tiered system of surveillance, control, and suppression of religious activity" perpetrated by state authorities.[15] It is estimated that over 100,000 Uyghurs are currently held in political "re-education camps",[16] and far-reaching surveillance operations using drones produced by DJI are being undertaken.[40] China justifies such measures as a response to the terrorist threat posed by extremist separatist groups.[17] These policies, in addition to some long-standing prejudices between the Han and Uyghurs,[41][42][43][44][45] have sometimes resulted in tension between the two ethnic groups.[46] As a result of the policies, the Uyghurs' freedoms of religion and of movement have been curtailed,[47][48] and most of them believe the government downplays their history and traditional culture.[32]

On the other hand, some Han citizens view Uyghurs as benefiting from special treatment, such as preferential admission to universities and exemption from the (now abandoned) one-child policy,[49] and as "harbouring separatist aspirations".[50] Nonetheless, it was observed in 2013 that at least in the workplace, Uyghur-Han relations seemed relatively friendly,[51] and a survey from 2009 suggested that 70% of Uyghur respondents had Han friends while 82% of Han had Uyghur friends.[52]

Recently there have been attempts to restrict the Uyghur birth rate and increase the Han fertility rate in portions of Xinjiang to counteract Uyghur separatism.[53]

Restrictions

Although religious education for children is officially forbidden by law in China, the Communist Party allows Hui Muslims to have their children educated in Islam and attend mosques; the law is enforced for Uyghurs. After secondary education, China allows Hui students to study with an imam.[54] China does not enforce the law against children attending mosques on non-Uyghurs outside Xinjiang.[55][56] Since the 1980s Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿学校)) have been permitted by the Chinese government in Muslim areas, excluding Xinjiang because of its separatist sentiment.[lower-alpha 3][58][59][60]

Hui Muslims employed by the state, unlike Uyghurs, are allowed to fast during Ramadan. The number of Hui going on Hajj is expanding and Hui women are allowed to wear veils, but Uyghur women are discouraged from wearing them.[61] Muslim ethnic groups in different regions are treated differently by the Chinese government with regard to religious freedom. Religious freedom exists for Hui Muslims, who can practice their religion, build mosques and have their children attend them; more controls are placed on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[62] Hui religious schools are allowed, and an autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader was formed with the approval of the Chinese government.[63][64] According to The Diplomat, Uyghur religious activities are curtailed but Hui Muslims are granted widespread religious freedom; therefore, Chinese government policy is directed against Uyghur separatism.[65]

In the last two decades of the 20th century, Uyghurs in Turpan were treated favourably by China with regard to religion; while Kashgar and Hotan were subject to more stringent government control.[66][67][68] Uyghur and Han Communist officials in Turpan turned a blind eye to the law, allowing Islamic education of Uyghur children.[69][70] Religious celebrations and the Hajj were encouraged by the Chinese government for Uyghur Communist Party members, and 350 mosques were built in Turpan between 1979 and 1989.[71] As a result, Han, Hui and the Chinese government were then viewed more positively by Uyghurs in Turpan.[72] In 1989, there were 20,000 mosques in Xinjiang.[73] Until separatist disturbances began in 1996, China allowed people to ignore the rule prohibiting religious observance by government officials.[74] Large mosques were built with Chinese government assistance in Ürümqi.[75] While rules proscribing religious activities were enforced in southern Xinjiang, conditions were comparatively lax in Ürümqi.[76]

Armed police and metal detector at the Kargilik bazaar

According to The Economist, in 2016 Uyghurs faced difficulties travelling within Xinjiang and live in fenced-off neighbourhoods with checkpoint entrances. In southern Ürümqi, each apartment door has a QR code so police can easily see photos of the dwelling's authorized residents.[77]

In 2017, overseas Uyghur activists claimed that new restrictions were being imposed, including people being fined heavily or subjected to programmes of "re-education" for refusing to eat during fasting in Ramadan, the detention of hundreds of Uyghurs as they returned from Mecca pilgrimages, and many standard Muslim names, such as Muhammad, being banned for newborn children.[78][79] It was claimed that Han officials had been assigned to reside in the homes of those with interned Uyghur family members as part of the government's "Pair Up and Become Family" program.[80][81] There were also reportedly separate queues for Uyghurs and outsiders, where the former needed to get their identity cards checked at numerous points.[82]

Re-education camps
Main article: Xinjiang re-education camps

Since 2017, reports have emerged of people being detained in extrajudicial "re-education camps", subject to political indoctrination and alleged instances of forced abortion, compulsory sterilization,[83] rape,[84] and torture.[21][lower-alpha 1] 2018 estimates allege the number of detainees in the hundreds of thousands.[lower-alpha 2]

This has led to criticism by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination[85][86] the United States[87] and 22 other countries,[88] and human rights groups.[89][90]

However, China and more than 50 other countries[88][91] have rejected these criticisms, asserting that the camps are a humane counterterrorism measure intended for vocational training rather than political re-education, and criticizing the practice of "politicizing human rights issues".[91][92][93][94] In September 2020, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping said “practice has proved that the party's strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct and must be adhered to for a long time." Xi Jinping required the whole CCP to take the implementation of the party's strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era as a political task, and make efforts to implement it completely and accurately.[95]

Timeline

Pre-20th century
Main articles: History of Xinjiang and Islamization and Turkification of Xinjiang

The history of the region has become highly politicised, with both Chinese and nationalist Uyghur historians frequently overstating the extent of their groups' respective ties to the region.[96][97] In reality, it has been home to many groups throughout history, with the Uyghurs arriving from Central Asia in the 10th century.[98] Although various Chinese dynasties have at times exerted control over parts of what is now Xinjiang,[99] the region as it exists today came under Chinese rule as a result of the westward expansion of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, which also saw the annexation of Mongolia and Tibet.[100]

Qing rule was marked by a "culturally pluralist" approach, with a prohibition on Chinese settlement in the region, and indirect rule through supervised local officials.[100][101] An increased tax burden placed on the local population due to rebellions elsewhere in China later led to a number of Hui-led Muslim rebellions.[97][102] The region was subsequently recaptured, and was established as an official province in 1884.

20th century
Further information: First East Turkestan Republic and Second East Turkestan Republic

After the 1928 assassination of Yang Zengxin, governor of the semi-autonomous Kumul Khanate in east Xinjiang under the Republic of China, he was succeeded by Jin Shuren. On the death of the Kamul Khan Maqsud Shah in 1930, Jin abolished the Khanate entirely and took control of the region as warlord.[103] Corruption, appropriation of land, and the commandeering of grain and livestock by Chinese military forces were all factors which led to the eventual Kumul Rebellion that established the First East Turkestan Republic in 1933.[104][105][106] In 1934, it was conquered by warlord Sheng Shicai with the aid of the Soviet Union. Sheng's leadership was marked by heavy Soviet influence, with him openly offering Xinjiang's valuable natural resources in exchange for Soviet help in crushing revolts, such as in 1937.[107] Although already in use,[lower-alpha 4] it was in this period that the term "Uyghur" was first used officially over the generic "Turkic", as part of an effort to "undermine potential broader bases of identity" such as Turkic or Muslim. In 1942, Sheng sought reconciliation with the Republic of China, abandoning the Soviets.

In 1944, the Ili Rebellion led to the Second East Turkestan Republic. Though direct evidence of Soviet involvement remains circumstantial, and rebel forces were primarily made up of Turkic Muslims with the support of the local population, the new state was dependent on the Soviet Union for trade, arms, and "tacit consent" for its continued existence.[109] When the Communists defeated the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War, the Soviets helped the Communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) recapture it, and it was absorbed into the People's Republic in 1949.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955.[110]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, between 60,000 and 200,000 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities fled China to the USSR, largely as a result of the Great Leap Forward.[111][112] As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, the Soviets initiated an extensive propaganda campaign criticising China, encouraging minority groups to migrate – and later revolt – and attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty by appealing to separatist tendencies. In 1962, China stopped issuing exit permits for Soviet citizens, as the Soviet consulate had been distributing passports to enable the exodus.[113] A resulting demonstration in Yining was met with open fire by the PLA, sparking further protests and mass defections. China responded to these developments by relocating non-Han populations away from the border, creating a "buffer zone" which would later be filled with Han farmers and Bingtuan militia.[111][112][113] Tensions continued to escalate throughout the decade, with ethnic guerrilla groups based in Kazakhstan frequently raiding Chinese border posts,[114][115] and Chinese and Soviet forces clashing on the border in 1969.[114][116][117]

From the 1950s to the 1970s, a state-orchestrated mass migration into Xinjiang has raised the number of Han from 7% to 40% of the population, exacerbating ethnic tensions.[118] On the other hand, a declining infant-mortality rate, improved medical care and a laxity in China's one-child policy have helped the Uyghur population in Xinjiang grow from four million in the 1960s to eight million in 2001.[119]

In 1968, the East Turkestan People's Party was the largest militant Uyghur separatist organization, and may have received support from the Soviet Union.[120][121][122] During the 1970s, the Soviets supported the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET) to fight the Chinese.[7]

Xinjiang's importance to China increased after the 1979 Soviet assistance to Afghanistan, which led to China's perception of being encircled by the Soviets.[123] China supported the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and broadcast reports of Soviet atrocities committed on Afghan Muslims to Uyghurs to counter Soviet broadcasts to Xinjiang that Soviet Muslim minorities had a better life.[124] Anti-Soviet Chinese radio broadcasts targeted Central Asian ethnic minorities, such as the Kazakhs.[125] The Soviets feared disloyalty by the non-Russian Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz in the event of a Chinese invasion of Soviet Central Asia, and Russians were taunted by Central Asians: "Just wait till the Chinese get here, they'll show you what's what!"[126] Chinese authorities viewed Han migrants in Xinjiang as vital to defence against the Soviet Union.[127] China established camps to train the Afghan mujahideen near Kashgar and Hotan, investing hundreds of millions of dollars in small arms, rockets, mines, and anti-tank weapons.[128] During the 1980s, student demonstrations and riots against police action assumed an ethnic aspect, and the April 1990 Baren Township riot has been acknowledged as a turning point.[129]

The Soviet Union supported Uyghur nationalist propaganda and Uyghur separatist movements against China. Soviet historians claimed that the Uyghur native land was Xinjiang; and Uyghur nationalism was promoted by Soviet versions of history on turcology.[130] This included support of Uyghur historians such as Tursun Rakhimov, who wrote more historical works supporting Uyghur independence, claiming that Xinjiang was an entity created by China made out of the different parts of East Turkestan and Zungharia.[131] Bellér-Hann describes these Soviet Uyghur historians were waging an "ideological war" against China, emphasizing the "national liberation movement" of Uyghurs throughout history.[132] The CPSU supported the publication of works which glorified the Second East Turkestan Republic and the Ili Rebellion against China in its anti-China propaganda war.[133]

1990s to 2007

China's "Strike Hard" campaign against crime, beginning in 1996, saw thousands of arrests, as well as executions, and "constant human rights violations", and also marked reduction in religious freedom.[134] These policies, and a feeling of political marginalisation, contributed to the fermentation of groups who carried out numerous guerrilla operations, including sabotage and attacks on police barracks, and occasionally even acts of terrorism including bomb attacks and assassinations of government officials.

A February 1992 Ürümqi bus bombing, attributed to the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, resulted in three deaths.[134]

A police roundup and execution of 30 suspected separatists[135] during Ramadan resulted in large demonstrations in February 1997, characterised as riots by Chinese media[136] and peaceful by Western media.[137] The demonstrations culminated in the 5 February Ghulja incident, in which a People's Liberation Army (PLA) crackdown led to at least nine deaths[138] and possibly more than 100.[135] 25 February Ürümqi bus bombings killed nine people and injured 68. Responsibility for the attacks was acknowledged by Uyghur exile groups.[139][140]

In Beijing's Xidan district, a bus bomb killed two people on 7 March 1997; Uyghur separatists claimed responsibility for the attack.[141] Uyghur participation in the bombing was dismissed by the Chinese government, and the Turkish-based Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom admitted responsibility for the attack.[134][140] The bus bombings triggered a change in policy, with China acknowledging separatist violence.[142] The situation in Xinjiang quieted until mid-2006, although ethnic tensions remained.[143]

2007 to 2017
See also: 2008 Uyghur unrest

According to Vaughan Winterbottom, although the Turkistan Islamic Party distributes propaganda videos and its Arabic Islamic Turkistan magazine (documented by Jihadology.net and the Jamestown Foundation) the Chinese government apparently denied the party's existence; China claimed that there was no terrorist connection to its 2008 bus bombings as the TIP claimed responsibility for the attacks.[144] In 2007, police raided a suspected TIP terrorist training camp.[145] The following year, an attempted suicide bombing on a China Southern Airlines flight was thwarted[146] and the Kashgar attack resulted in the death of sixteen police officers four days before the beginning of the Beijing Olympics.[147]

During the night of 25–26 June 2009, in the Shaoguan incident in Guangdong, two people were killed and 118 injured.[148] The incident reportedly triggered the July 2009 Ürümqi riots; others were the September 2009 Xinjiang unrest and the 2010 Aksu bombing, after which 376 people were tried.[149] The July 2011 Hotan attack led to the deaths of 18 people, 14 of whom were attackers. Although the attackers were Uyghurs,[150] Han and Uyghurs were victims.[151] That year, six ethnic Uyghur men unsuccessfully attempted to hijack an aircraft heading to Ürümqi, a series of knife and bomb attacks occurred in July and the Pishan hostage crisis occurred in December.[152] Credit for the attacks was professed by the Turkistan Islamic Party.[153]

On 28 February 2012, an attack in Yecheng killed 20 and injured 18. A group of knife-wielding Uyghur men attacked a market there in Xinjiang region of northwest China, home to the mainly Muslim Uyghur minority, leaving at least 20 people dead. Thirteen people were killed by attackers before police shot seven of them dead.[154] On 24 April 2013, clashes in Bachu occurred between a group of armed men and social workers and police near Kashgar. The violence left at least 21 people dead, including 15 police and officials.[155][156][157] According to a local government official, the clashes broke out after three other officials reported that suspicious men armed with knives were hiding in a house outside Kashgar.[158] Two months later, on 26 June 27 people were killed in riots in Shanshan; seventeen were killed by rioters, and the other ten were alleged assailants who were shot dead by police in the township of Lukqun.[159]

On 28 October 2013, a four-wheel drive vehicle ploughed through a group of pedestrians near the iconic Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, crashed into a stone bridge and caught fire, killing five people and injuring dozens. Chinese authorities quickly identified the driver as Uyghur.[160][144]

In 2014, the conflict intensified. In January, eleven members of an organisation said to be an anti-China Uyghur group were killed by Kyrgyz security.[161][162] They were identified as Uyghurs by their appearance, and their personal effects indicated that they were separatists.[163]

On 1 March, a group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked the Kunming Railway Station, killing 31 and injuring 141.[164] China blamed Xinjiang militants for the attack,[165] and over 380 people were arrested in the following crackdown. A captured attacker and three others were charged on 30 June.[166] Three of the suspects were accused of "leading and organising a terror group and intentional homicide", although they did not directly take part since they had been arrested two days earlier.[167] On 12 September, a Chinese court sentenced three people to death and one to life in prison for the attack.[168] Social media had initially been the main portal for covering the attack, due to lack of coverage on Chinese TV.[169][170][41] The attack was praised by ETIM.[171]

On 18 April, a group of 16 Chinese citizens identified as ethnic Uyghurs engaged in a shootout with Vietnamese border guards after seizing their guns when they were being detained to be returned to China. Five Uyghurs and two Vietnamese guards died in the incident. Ten of the Uyghurs were men, and the rest were women and children.[172][173][174][175]

Twelve days later, two attackers stabbed people before detonating their suicide vests at an Ürümqi train station. Three people, including the attackers, were killed.[176][177][178]

On 22 May, two suicide car bombings occurred after the occupants threw explosives from their vehicles at an Ürümqi street market. The attacks killed 43 people and injured more than 90, the deadliest attack to date in the Xinjiang conflict.[178][179][180] On 5 June, China sentenced nine people to death for terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.[181]

According to the Xinhua News Agency, on 28 July, 37 civilians were killed by a gang armed with knives and axes in the towns of Elixku and Huangdi in Shache County and 59 attackers were killed by security forces. Two hundred fifteen attackers were arrested after they stormed a police station and government offices. The agency also reported that 30 police cars were damaged or destroyed and dozens of Uyghur and Han Chinese civilians were killed or injured. The Uyghur American Association claimed that local Uyghurs had been protesting at the time of the attack. Two days later, the moderate imam of China's largest mosque was assassinated in Kashgar after morning prayers.[182]

On 21 September, Xinhua reported that a series of bomb blasts killed 50 people in Luntai County, southwest of the regional capital Ürümqi. The dead consisted of six civilians, four police officers and 44 rioters.[183]

On 12 October, four Uyghurs armed with knives and explosives attacked a farmers' market in Xinjiang. According to police, 22 people died (including police officers and the attackers).[184]

On 29 November 15, people were killed and 14 injured in a Shache County attack. Eleven of the killed were Uyghur militants.[185]

On 18 September 2015, in Aksu, an unidentified group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked sleeping workers at a coal mine and killed 50 people.[10] The Turkistan Islamic Party has claimed responsibility for the attack.[186] On 18 November, a 56-day manhunt for the attackers reportedly concluded with Chinese security forces cornering them in a mountain hideout. Twenty-eight assailants were killed, and a sole survivor surrendered to authorities.[10][187]

The Bangkok bombing is suspected to have been carried out by the Turkish ultranationalist organisation known as the Grey Wolves in response to Thailand's deportation of 100 Uyghur asylum-seekers back to China. A Turkish man was arrested by Thai police in connection with the bombing and bomb-making materials were found in his apartment.[188][189][190] Due to the terrorist risk and counterfeiting of passports, Uyghur foreigners in Thailand were placed under surveillance by Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon[191][192][193][194] and Thai police were placed on alert after the arrival of two Turkish Uyghurs.[195]

On 30 August 2016, Kyrgyzstan's Chinese embassy was struck by a suicide bombing by an Uyghur, according to Kyrgyz news.[196] The suicide bomber was the only fatality from the attack. The casualties included wounds suffered by Kyrgyz staff members and did not include Chinese.[162][197] A Kyrgyzstan government agency pointed the finger at Nusra allied Syrian based Uyghurs.[198]

Police killed 4 militants who carried out a bombing on 28 December 2016 in Karakax.[199]

On 14 February 2017, three knife wielding attackers killed five people before being killed by police.[200][201]

2017 to Present
Main articles: Uyghur genocide and Xinjiang re-education camps

Since 2017, the Chinese government has pursued a policy which has led to more than one million Muslims (the majority of them Uyghurs) being held in secretive detention camps without any legal process[202][203] in what has become the largest-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities since the Holocaust.[204] Critics of the policy have described it as the sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide,[202][205][206][207][208][209] with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide.[210][211][212][213][214][215][216][217]

Critics of the programme have highlighted the concentration of Uyghurs in state-sponsored re-education camps,[218][219] suppression of Uyghur religious practices,[220][221] political indoctrination,[222][223] severe ill-treatment,[222][224] and testimonials of alleged human rights abuses including forced sterilization and contraception.[225][218][226] Chinese government statistics show that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar plunged by more than 60%.[227] In the same period, the birth rate of the whole country decreased by 9.69%, from 12.07 to 10.9 per 1,000 people.[228] Chinese authorities acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in 2018 in Xinjiang, but denied reports of forced sterilization and genocide.[229] Birth rates have continued to plummet in Xinjiang, falling nearly 24% in 2019 alone when compared to just 4.2% nationwide.[227]

Terrorist groups
Further information: Turkistan Islamic Party

The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) is an Islamic extremist terrorist organisation seeking the expulsion of China from "East Turkestan".[230] Since its emergence in 2007 it has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks,[160][144] and the Chinese government accuses it of over 200, resulting in 162 deaths and over 440 injuries.[231] Hundreds of Uyghurs are thought to reside in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to have fought alongside extremist groups in conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War.[232] However, the exact size of the Turkistan Islamic Party remains unknown and some experts dispute its ability to orchestrate attacks in China, or that is exists at all as a cohesive group.[160][233][234]

The TIP is often assumed to be the same as the earlier East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which has been effectively defunct since the death of its leader Hasan Mahsum in 2003.[144] Although the names are often used synonymously, and China exclusively uses ETIM, the link between the two is still unproven.[235]

The TIP are believed to have links to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,[235] and the Pakistani Taliban.[236] Philip B. K. Potter writes that despite the fact that "throughout the 1990s, Chinese authorities went to great lengths to publicly link organizations active in Xinjiang—particularly the ETIM—to al-Qaeda [...] the best information indicates that prior to 2001, the relationship included some training and funding but relatively little operational cooperation."[3][237] Meanwhile, specific incidents were downplayed by Chinese authorities as isolated criminal acts.[2][15] However, in 1998 the group's headquarters were moved to Kabul, in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, while "China’s ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighboring countries, such as Pakistan," Potter writes, "where they are forging strategic alliances with, and even leading, jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban." The East Turkestan Islamic Movement dropped "East" from its name as it increased its domain.[2] The U.S. State Department have listed them as a terrorist organisation since 2002,[238] and as having received "training and financial assistance" from al-Qaeda.[237] In October 2020, this designation was lifted.[239]

A number of members of al-Qaeda have expressed support for the TIP, Xinjiang independence, and/or jihad against China. They include Mustafa Setmariam Nasar,[240] Abu Yahya al-Libi,[241][242] and current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri who has on multiple occasions issued statements naming Xinjiang (calling it "East Turkestan") as one of the "battlegrounds" of "jihad to liberate every span of land of the Muslims that has been usurped and violated."[243][244][245][246][247] Additionally, the al-Qaeda aligned al-Fajr Media Center distributes TIP promotional material.[248]

Andrew McGregor, writing for the Jamestown Foundation, opines that "though there is no question a small group of Uyghur militants fought alongside their Taliban hosts against the Northern Alliance [...] the scores of terrorists Beijing claimed that Bin Laden was sending to China in 2002 never materialized" and that "the TIP’s “strategy” of making loud and alarming threats (attacks on the Olympics, use of biological and chemical weapons, etc.) without any operational follow-up has been enormously effective in promoting China's efforts to characterise Uyghur separatists as terrorists."[249]

Reactions
Protesters in Prague, Czech Republic carrying Tibetan and East Turkestan flags, 29 March 2016

In October 2018 and December 2019, Chinese state media aired two documentaries on the conflict and the purported necessity of the re-education camps, which reportedly drew mixed reactions on Chinese social media.[250][251]

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement has been recognised as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations,[252] the United States,[253] the European Union,[254] Russia,[255] the United Kingdom,[256][257] Kyrgyzstan,[lower-alpha 5][260][261] Kazakhstan,[262] Malaysia,[263] Pakistan,[264] Turkey,[265][266] and the United Arab Emirates.[267] It is also subject to UN sanctions by the Security Council.[268]

United Nations

In July 2019, 22 countries issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), condemning China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities, calling upon China to "refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang".[88][269][270]

In the same UNHRC session, 50 countries issued a joint letter supporting China's Xinjiang policies,[88][91][271] criticising the practice of "politicizing human rights issues". The letter stated, "China has invited a number of diplomats, international organizations officials and journalist to Xinjiang" and that "what they saw and heard in Xinjiang completely contradicted what was reported in the media."[91]

In October 2019, 23 countries issued a joint statement at the UN urging China to "uphold its national and international obligations and commitments to respect human rights".[272]

In response, 54 countries issued a joint statement supporting China's Xinjiang policies. The statement "spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safeguarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups."[272][273]

Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act

The United States Senate and House of Representatives passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in September 2019 and December 2019 respectively in reaction to the conflict.[274][275][276][277] The bill requires United States President Donald Trump to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act on Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, which would be the first time such sanctions would be imposed on a member of CCP politburo.[278][279] The bill was signed by President Trump into law on 17 June 2020.[280]

Deportation of Uyghurs

Hundreds of Uyghurs fleeing China through Southeast Asia have been deported back by the governments of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and others, drawing condemnation from the U.S., the UNHCR, and human rights groups.[281][282] The U.S. State Department said deported Uyghurs "could face harsh treatment and a lack of due process" while the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch have called the deportations a violation of international law.[283][284]

Involvement of Foreign Enterprises

The role of commercial entities has become increasingly scrutinized, due to the presence of Western enterprises such as Coca-Cola, Volkswagen and Siemens in the region. A major concern is here the fact that the presence of these entities could finance human rights violations and enable the supervision of ethnic minorities by technological cooperation. Moreover, reports have claimed that forced labor prevails in Xinjiang's textile industry.[285]

Based on these allegations, international organizations such as the World Bank have begun to reconsider their involvement in Xinjiang, while textile manufacturers including Adidas or Badger Sportswear have withdrawn from Xinjiang Divestment also concerns collaboration in the realm of AI and digital technologies, and some enterprises have decided to discontinue the handover of technologies and knowledge to Chinese entities involved in the human rights violations in Xinjiang.[286]

Outside China

Due to the increasing tensions between Uyghurs and China, the conflict is also stemmed beyond the Chinese border.[287]

During the Syrian Civil War, a Chinese hostage was murdered by the Islamic State, which claimed its desire to fight against China over Xinjiang.[288] These militants are also very active in Syria, mostly Idlib, where it formed to be one of the most radical fighting groups in the conflict, which prompted China to take cautious reactions.[289][290]

A number of Uyghur militants have been recruited by ISIS[291][292] and have had a presence in Southeast Asia, with some joining Mujahidin Indonesia Timor.[293]

See also

Notes
  1. Further independent reports:
  2. Human Rights Watch gives the following compilation of estimates of the detained population:
  3. The People's Republic, founded in 1949, banned private confessional teaching from the early 1950s to the 1980s, until a more liberal stance allowed religious mosque education to resume and private Muslim schools to open. Moreover, except in Xinjiang for fear of secessionist feelings, the government allowed and sometimes encouraged the founding of private Muslim schools in order to provide education for people who could not attend increasingly expensive state schools or who left them early, for lack of money or lack of satisfactory achievements.[57]
  4. The First East Turkestan Republic had considered the name "Uyghuristan", with some early coins bearing that name, but settled on the "East Turkestan Republic" on the basis that there were other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang and the new government.[108]
  5. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Organization for Freeing Eastern Turkistan and the Islamic Party of Turkistan were outlawed by Kyrgyzstan's Lenin District Court and its Supreme Court in November 2003.[258][259]

References

Citations
  1. Millward (2004), p. 6.
  2. "China: The Evolution of ETIM". Stratfor. 13 May 2008. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  3. Potter, Philip B. K. (Winter 2013). "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications" (PDF). Strategic Studies Quarterly. 7 (4): 71–74. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 9 June 2018.
  4. Zenn, Jacob (7 September 2018). "The Turkistan Islamic Party in Double-Exile: Geographic and Organizational Divisions in Uighur Jihadism". Terrorism Monitor. Jamestown Foundation. 16 (17).
  5. Shohret Hoshur; Joshua Lipes (2 November 2012). "Exile Group Denies Terror Link". Radio Free Asia.
  6. "We Strongly Dismiss the Slanderous Article Against Our Association; It Is an Example of Irresponsibility". East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association. 12 September 2018.
  7. Reed & Raschke (2010), p. 37.
  8. MacLean, William (23 November 2013). "Islamist group calls Tiananmen attack 'jihadi operation': SITE". Reuters.
  9. Collins, Gabe (23 January 2015). "Beijing's Xinjiang Policy: Striking Too Hard?". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 5 February 2016. Retrieved 1 January 2016. China's long-running Uighur insurgency has flared up dramatically of late, with more than 900 recorded deaths in the past seven years.
  10. Martina, Michael; Blanchard, Ben (20 November 2015). "China says 28 foreign-led 'terrorists' killed after attack on mine". Reuters. Archived from the original on 24 April 2017. Retrieved 3 July 2017. China's government says it faces a serious threat from Islamist militants and separatists in energy-rich Xinjiang, on the border of central Asia, where hundreds have died in violence in recent years.
  11. Wong, Edward (25 August 2009). "Chinese President Visits Volatile Xinjiang". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 17 October 2017. Retrieved 4 September 2009.
  12. Ismail, Mohammed Sa'id; Ismail, Mohammed Aziz (1960) [Hejira 1380], Muslims in the Soviet Union and China (privately printed pamphlet), 1, translated by U.S. Government, Joint Publications Service, Tehran, Iran, p. 52 translation printed in Washington: JPRS 3936, 19 September 1960.
  13. Dwyer (2005), p. .
  14. "Borders | Uyghurs and The Xinjiang Conflict: East Turkestan Independence Movement". apps.cndls.georgetown.edu. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 May 2018.
  15. "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang" (PDF). Human Rights Watch. Vol. 17 no. 2. April 2005. Post 9/11: labeling Uighurs terrorists, p. 16. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 April 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2018.
  16. Phillips, Tom (25 January 2018). "China 'holding at least 120,000 Uighurs in re-education camps'". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 19 August 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  17. Huang, Echo. "China is confiscating the passports of citizens in its Muslim-heavy region". Quartz. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  18. Kennedy, Lindsey; Paul, Nathan. "China created a new terrorist threat by repressing this ethnic minority". Quartz. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  19. "About". World Uyghur Congress. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
  20. Ramzy, Austin; Buckley, Chris (16 November 2019). "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 16 November 2019.
  21. "'Eradicating Ideological Viruses': China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims". Human Rights Watch. 9 September 2018. Archived from the original on 3 January 2019. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
  22. "What happens when China's Uighurs are released from re-education camps". Retrieved 24 July 2020 – via The Economist.
  23. ""'Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education'" - The Independent, 5 July 2019". Archived from the original on 22 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  24. ""'Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs" - The Times 17 December 2019". Archived from the original on 25 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  25. ""China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide'" - 28 November 2019". Archived from the original on 21 January 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  26. ""Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture" - Financial Times 12 September 2019". Archived from the original on 14 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  27. ""The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction" November 2019". MDPI. Archived from the original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  28. ""China's crime against Uyghurs is a form of genocide" - Summer 2019". Archived from the original on 1 February 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  29. Amt, Auswärtiges. "Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020". Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
  30. "Joint Statement delivered by Permanent Mission of Belarus at the 44th session of Human Rights Council". www.china-un.ch. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
  31. 国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司 [Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics]; 国家民族事务委员会经济发展司 [Department of Economic Development of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission] (September 2003). 2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料 [2000 Census Chinese National Population Information] (in Chinese). Beijing: 民族出版社 [Nationalities Publishing House]. ISBN 978-7-105-05425-1.
  32. Gladney (2004), pp. 112–114.
  33. Rudelson, Justin Ben-Adam (16 February 2000). "Uyghur "separatism": China's policies in Xinjiang fuel dissent". Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Archived from the original on 29 February 2012. Retrieved 29 January 2010.
  34. Jiang, Wenran (6 July 2009). "New Frontier, same problems". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 10 July 2009. Retrieved 18 January 2010. But just as in Tibet, the local population has viewed the increasing unequal distribution of wealth and income between China's coastal and inland regions, and between urban and rural areas, with an additional ethnic dimension. Most are not separatists, but they perceive that most of the economic opportunities in their homeland are taken by the Han Chinese, who are often better educated, better connected, and more resourceful. The Uyghurs also resent discrimination against their people by the Han, both in Xinjiang and elsewhere.
  35. Ramzy, Austin (14 July 2009). "Why the Uighurs feel left out of China's boom". Time. Archived from the original on 5 November 2012. Retrieved 5 September 2009.
  36. Larson, Christina (9 July 2009). "How China Wins and Loses Xinjiang". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 8 June 2011. Retrieved 5 September 2009.
  37. Anthony Howell; Cindy Fan (2011). "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi" (PDF). Eurasian Geography and Economics. University of California, Los Angeles.
  38. Bovingdon (2005), pp. 4, 19.
  39. Dillon (2004), p. 51.
  40. Venable, John; Ries, Lora (19 August 2020). "Chinese-Made Drones: A Direct Threat Whose Use Should Be Curtailed" (PDF). The Heritage Foundation.
  41. Holdstock, Nick (13 June 2019). China's Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror and the Chinese State. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78831-982-9.
  42. Svanberg, Ingvar; Westerlund, David (1999). Islam Outside the Arab World. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-11330-7.
  43. Fallows, James (13 July 2009). "On Uighurs, Han, and general racial attitudes in China". The Atlantic. Retrieved 24 December 2019.
  44. "China's model village of ethnic unity shows cracks in facade". AP NEWS. 22 November 2018. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  45. "China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law". Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1 October 2005. Archived from the original on 7 April 2010. Retrieved 6 May 2010. [Uyghurs] live in cohesive communities largely separated from Han Chinese, practice major world religions, have their own written scripts, and have supporters outside of China. Relations between these minorities and Han Chinese have been strained for centuries.
  46. Sautman (1997), p. 35.
  47. Moore, Malcolm (7 July 2009). "Urumqi riots signal dark days ahead". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 4 October 2012. Retrieved 7 July 2009.
  48. Bovingdon (2005), pp. 34–35.
  49. Sautman (1997), pp. 29–31.
  50. Pei, Minxin (9 July 2009). "Uighur riots show need for rethink by Beijing". Financial Times. Retrieved 18 January 2010. Han Chinese view the Uighurs as harbouring separatist aspirations and being disloyal and ungrateful, in spite of preferential policies for ethnic minority groups.
  51. Finley (2013), p. .
  52. The Urumqi Riots and China's Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang (PDF). National University of Singapore. 2009. p. 21.
  53. "The government in Xinjiang is trying to limit Muslim births". The Economist. 7 November 2015. Archived from the original on 10 November 2015. Retrieved 10 November 2015.
  54. Alles, Elisabeth; Cherif-Chebbi, Leila; Halfon, Constance-Helene (2003). "Chinese Islam: Unity and Fragmentation" (PDF). Religion, State & Society. 31 (1): 14. doi:10.1080/0963749032000045837. S2CID 144070358. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2016. Retrieved 28 June 2015.
  55. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2005), p. 160.
  56. Szadziewski, Henryk (19 March 2013). "Religious Repression of Uyghurs in East Turkestan". Venn Institute. Archived from the original on 27 March 2014. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
  57. Versteegh & Eid (2005), p. 383
  58. Su, Jinbao (8 November 2015). 临夏中阿学校第二十二届毕业典礼 金镖阿訇讲话2007 [Chinese-Arabic School Muslim Students Graduation Ceremony]. Archived from the original on 29 April 2017. Retrieved 27 May 2016 – via YouTube.
  59. Su, Jinbao (8 November 2015). 老华寺女校举行演讲仪式 上集 [Chinese Muslim Makes a Speech in Islamic Girls' School]. Archived from the original on 11 February 2017. Retrieved 27 May 2016 – via YouTube.
  60. nottc (11 September 2011). "Muslim in China, Graduation ceremony of a Islamic girls' school". Archived from the original on 1 April 2017. Retrieved 27 May 2016 – via YouTube.
  61. Beech, Hannah (12 August 2014). "If China Is Anti-Islam, Why Are These Chinese Muslims Enjoying a Faith Revival?". Time. Archived from the original on 13 June 2015. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  62. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2005), p. .
  63. Bovingdon (2010), p. .
  64. Savadove, Bill (17 August 2005). "Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  65. Crane, Brent (22 August 2014). "A Tale of Two Chinese Muslim Minorities". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 25 June 2015.
  66. Rudelson (1997), pp. 46–47.
  67. Gillette, Philip S. (1993). "Ethnic Balance and Imbalance in Kazakhstan's Regions". Central Asia Monitor. No. 3. p. 19. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
  68. Mackerras (2003), p. 118.
  69. Svanberg & Westerlund (2012), p. 202.
  70. Rudelson (1997), p. 81.
  71. Rudelson (1997), p. 129.
  72. Svanberg & Westerlund (2012), p. 205.
  73. Finley (2013), p. 236.
  74. Finley (2013), p. 237.
  75. Finley (2013), p. 238.
  76. Finley (2013), p. 240.
  77. "Xinjiang: The race card". The Economist. 3 September 2016. Archived from the original on 2 September 2016. Retrieved 3 September 2016.
  78. "An American agency denounces the treatment of Muslims in China". The Economist. 7 July 2017. Archived from the original on 9 July 2017. Retrieved 9 July 2017.
  79. "China Bans List of Islamic Names, Including 'Muhammad', in Xinjiang Region". Bloomberg News. 27 April 2017. Archived from the original on 18 August 2017. Retrieved 9 July 2017.
  80. Lipes, Joshua (31 October 2019). "Male Chinese 'Relatives' Assigned to Uyghur Homes Co-sleep With Female 'Hosts'". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 2 November 2019.
  81. Kang, Dake; Wang, Yanan (30 November 2018). "China's Uighurs told to share beds, meals with party members". Associated Press. Retrieved 18 January 2020.
  82. "Uighurs in China: Should we believe what we see?". www.telegraphindia.com. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  83. "China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization". Associated Press. 28 June 2020.
  84. Hill, Matthew (3 February 2021). "'Their goal is to destroy everyone': Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape". BBC News.
  85. "U.N. calls on China to free Uighurs from alleged re-education camps". Reuters. 31 August 2018. Archived from the original on 2 January 2019. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
  86. "Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China)" (PDF). Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 30 August 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 November 2018. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
  87. "Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2018" (PDF). Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 10 October 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
  88. Yellinek, Roie; Chen, Elizabeth (31 December 2019). "The "22 vs. 50" Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. 19 (22). Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  89. "China: Free Xinjiang 'Political Education' Detainees". Human Rights Watch. 10 September 2017. Archived from the original on 25 October 2018. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
  90. "China: Families of up to one million detained in mass "re-education" drive demand answers". Amnesty International. Archived from the original on 9 December 2018. Retrieved 4 January 2019.
  91. "Letter to UNHRC" (PDF). United Nations Human Rights Council. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  92. Buckley, Chris (16 October 2018). "China Breaks Silence on Muslim Detention Camps, Calling Them 'Humane'". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 4 January 2019. Retrieved 4 January 2019.
  93. Kuo, Lily (6 November 2018). "China says UN criticism of human rights record is 'politically driven'". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 5 January 2019. Retrieved 4 January 2019.
  94. Kuo, Lily (10 October 2018). "China 'legalises' internment camps for million Uighurs". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 4 January 2019. Retrieved 4 January 2019.
  95. Lei, Dongrui. "To do a good job in Xinjiang in the new era, Xi Jinping makes arrangements again". Xinhua News. Archived from the original on 27 September 2020. Retrieved 27 September 2020.
  96. Bovingdon (2010), pp. 24–25.
  97. Tschantret, Joshua (16 June 2016). "Repression, opportunity, and innovation: The evolution of terrorism in Xinjiang, China". Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (4): 569–588. doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1182911. S2CID 147865241.
  98. Wong, Edward (18 November 2008). "The Dead Tell a Tale China Doesn't Care to Listen To". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  99. Clarke (2011), p. 16.
  100. Millward, James (7 February 2019). "'Reeducating' Xinjiang's Muslims". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 29 January 2019. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
  101. Kim, Hodong (2004). Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877. Stanford University Press. pp. 180–181. ISBN 978-0-8047-6723-1.
  102. Tamura, Eileen (1997). China: Understanding Its Past. University of Hawaii Press. p. 129. ISBN 978-0-8248-1923-1.
  103. Forbes (1986), p. 45.
  104. Forbes (1986), pp. 46.
  105. Millward (2007), p. 341.
  106. Dillon (2014), p. 36.
  107. Millward & Tursun (2004), p. 80.
  108. Millward & Tursun (2004), p. 78.
  109. Benson (1990), pp. 40–41.
  110. Bhattacharji, Preeti. "Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 13 September 2018. Retrieved 12 September 2018.
  111. Guerif, Valentine. "Making States, Displacing Peoples: A Comparative Perspective of Xinjiang and Tibet in the People's Republic of China" (PDF). Refugee Studies Centre. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 November 2017. Retrieved 12 September 2018.
  112. Bovingdon (2010), p. 61.
  113. Shichor (2004), p. 138.
  114. Shichor (2004), p. 139.
  115. Ryan, William L. (2 January 1969). "Russians Back Revolution in Province Inside China". The Lewiston Daily Sun. Associated Press.
  116. Tinibai, Kenjali (27 May 2010). "Kazakhstan and China: A Two-Way Street". Transitions Online.
  117. Burns, John F. (6 July 1983). "On Soviet-China Border, the Thaw is Just a Trickle". The New York Times.
  118. Howell, Anthony; Fan, C. Cindy. "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 September 2018. Retrieved 12 September 2018.
  119. Veeck et al. (2011), pp. 102–103.
  120. Dillon (2003), p. 57.
  121. Clarke (2011), p. 69.
  122. Nathan & Scobell (2012), p. 278.
  123. Clarke (2011), p. 76.
  124. "Radio war aims at China Moslems". The Montreal Gazette. 22 September 1981. p. 11. Archived from the original on 6 May 2016. Retrieved 9 October 2016.
  125. Tinibai, Kenjali (28 May 2010). "China and Kazakhstan: A Two-Way Street". Bloomberg Businessweek. p. 1. Archived from the original on 5 July 2015.
  126. Meehan, Dallace L. (May 1980). "Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Military: implications for the decades ahead". Air University Review. Archived from the original on 13 May 2014.
  127. Clarke (2011), p. 78.
  128. Shichor (2004), pp. 149, 159.
  129. Patrick, Shawn M. (20 May 2010). The Uyghur Movement: China's Insurgency in Xinjiang (PDF) (Report). School of Advanced Military Studies. p. 32. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 October 2016. Retrieved 19 November 2016.
  130. Bellér-Hann (2007), p. 37.
  131. Bellér-Hann (2007), p. 38.
  132. Bellér-Hann (2007), p. 39.
  133. Bellér-Hann (2007), p. 40.
  134. Castets, Rémi (2003). "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows". China Perspectives. 49. Archived from the original on 11 May 2013. Retrieved 8 April 2016.
  135. 1997 Channel 4 (UK) news report on the incident on YouTube
  136. "Xinjiang to intensify crackdown on separatists". China Daily News. 25 October 2001. Archived from the original on 23 April 2016. Retrieved 11 April 2016.
  137. "China: Remember the Gulja massacre? China's crackdown on peaceful protesters". Amnesty International. 2 January 2007. Archived from the original on 22 November 2018. Retrieved 21 November 2018.
  138. "China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang". Human Rights Watch. October 2001. Archived from the original on 12 November 2008. Retrieved 4 December 2016.
  139. Dillon (2003), pp. 99–.
  140. Millward (2007), pp. 333–.
  141. Debata (2007), p. 170.
  142. Gladney, Dru C. (January 1998). "Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and its Subaltern Subjects". Cahiers d'Études Sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien (25). Archived from the original on 12 October 2016. Retrieved 29 August 2017.
  143. Hierman, Brent (May 2007). "The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988–2002". Problems of Post-Communism. 54 (3): 48–62. doi:10.2753/PPC1075-8216540304. S2CID 154942905.
  144. Winterbottom, Vaughan (14 August 2013). "No end in sight to Xinjiang unrest". China Outlook. Archived from the original on 25 September 2015. Retrieved 25 September 2015.
  145. Fan, Maureen (9 January 2007). "Raid by Chinese Kills 18 At Alleged Terror Camp". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 29 August 2017.
  146. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth (18 April 2008). "China confronts its Uyghur threat". Asia Times Online. Archived from the original on 3 June 2013. Retrieved 5 May 2013.
  147. Jacobs, Andrew (5 August 2008). "Ambush in China Raises Concerns as Olympics Near". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 10 April 2009. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
  148. "Guangdong toy factory brawl leaves 2 dead, 118 injured -- china.org.cn". www.china.org.cn. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 1 November 2016.
  149. "China prosecuted hundreds over Xinjiang unrest". The Guardian. London. 17 January 2011. Archived from the original on 20 January 2011. Retrieved 18 January 2011.
  150. Choi, Chi-yuk (22 July 2011). "Ban on Islamic dress sparked Uygur attack". South China Morning Post. Hotan, China.
  151. Krishnan, Ananth (21 July 2011). "Analysts see Pakistan terror links to Xinjiang attack". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 24 July 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  152. "Seven 'kidnappers' killed in China's Xinjiang". BBC News. 29 December 2011. Archived from the original on 3 December 2017. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
  153. Lee, Raymond (20 February 2014). "Unrest in Xinjiang, Uyghur Province in China". Al Jazeera Center for Studies. Archived from the original on 23 February 2017.
  154. "Deadly knife attack reported in China". www.aljazeera.com. Archived from the original on 24 September 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2016.
  155. "China's Xinjiang hit by deadly clashes". BBC News. 24 April 2013. Archived from the original on 26 April 2013. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  156. "Violence in western Chinese region of Xinjiang kills 21". CNN. 24 April 2013. Archived from the original on 3 June 2013. Retrieved 26 June 2013.
  157. "21 dead in Xinjiang terrorist clash". CNTV. 24 April 2013. Archived from the original on 26 April 2013. Retrieved 24 April 2013.
  158. "Violence erupts in China's restive Xinjiang". Al Jazeera. 24 April 2013. Archived from the original on 2 May 2013. Retrieved 26 June 2013.
  159. "State media: Violence leaves 27 dead in restive minority region in far western China". Washington Post. 26 June 2013. Archived from the original on 26 June 2013.
  160. Kaiman, Jonathan (25 November 2013). "Islamist group claims responsibility for attack on China's Tiananmen Square". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 11 September 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  161. "Kyrgyzstan says kills 11 Uighur militants near Chinese border". Reuters. 24 January 2014. Retrieved 10 December 2019.
  162. "Chinese embassy blast: Car bomb attack in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan". BBC News. Archived from the original on 30 November 2018.
  163. "Kyrgyzstan says kills 11 Uighur militants near Chinese border". Reuters. 24 January 2014. Archived from the original on 14 October 2017.
  164. "Unidentified Assailant kills 29 at Kunming Railway Station in China". Biharprabha News. Indo-Asian News Service. Archived from the original on 11 July 2015. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  165. Blanchard, Ben (1 March 2014). "China blames Xinjiang militants for station attack". Chicago Tribune. Reuters. Archived from the original on 2 March 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  166. "China charges four in Kunming attack, sentences 113 on terror crimes". Reuters. 30 June 2014. Archived from the original on 1 December 2015. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  167. "Four sentenced in China over Kunming station attack". BBC News. Reuters. 12 September 2014. Archived from the original on 27 May 2018. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  168. "Three get death for China train station attack". Reuters. 12 September 2014. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  169. "China's Netizens React To Kunming Station Attacks With Anger, Grief". BuzzFeed News. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  170. "China silent on deadly knife attack in Kunming railway station". Los Angeles Times. 19 April 2014. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  171. 「東トルキスタンイスラム運動」、昆明の無差別殺傷事件を支持＝新疆政策の再検討を要求―仏メディア. Record China. 19 March 2014. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017.
  172. Wong, Edward (20 April 2014). "Deadly Clash Reported on Border of China and Vietnam". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 January 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  173. Wong, Edward (21 April 2014). "Vietnam Returns Migrants to China After Deadly Border Clash". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 January 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  174. "Seven killed in China-Vietnam border shootout". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 19 April 2014. Archived from the original on 4 May 2014. Retrieved 4 May 2014.
  175. "7 die in shooting at China-Vietnam border". World Uyghur Congress. 19 April 2014. Archived from the original on 4 May 2014. Retrieved 4 May 2014 – via Washington Post.
  176. "Deadly China blast at Xinjiang railway station". BBC. 30 April 2014. Archived from the original on 30 April 2014. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  177. Li, Jing; Wan, Adrian (30 April 2014). "Security tightened after three killed in bomb, knife attack at Urumqi train station". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 23 May 2014.
  178. "Urumqi car and bomb attack kills dozens". The Guardian. 22 May 2014. Archived from the original on 23 February 2017. Retrieved 18 December 2016.
  179. Jacobs, Andrew (23 May 2014). "Residents Try to Move On After Terrorist Attack in China". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 4 August 2016. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  180. Denyer, Simon (22 May 2014). "Terrorist attack on market in China's restive Xinjiang region kills more than 30". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  181. Bodeen, Christopher (5 June 2014). "China Sentences 9 Persons to Death for Xinjiang Attacks". Time. Archived from the original on 6 June 2014.
  182. "Xinjiang violence: China says 'gang' killed 37 last week". BBC News. 3 August 2014. Archived from the original on 14 February 2018. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  183. Levin, Dan. "At Least 50 Killed in Xinjiang Violence, Officials Say". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 January 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  184. "22 Killed in Farmers' Market Attack in Xinjiang's Kashgar Prefecture". Radio Free Asia. 18 October 2014. Archived from the original on 12 November 2014. Retrieved 6 November 2014.
  185. "China says 15 killed in "terrorist attack" in Xinjiang". Yahoo! News. 29 November 2014. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 15 January 2017 – via Agence-France Presse.
  186. Abu Mansour Al-Gharib (2016) [رجب - 1437 هـ]. عملية أظهرت عجز سلطات الصين [Operation showed the inability of the Chinese authorities] (PDF). تركستان الإسلامية [Islamic Turkistan] (in Arabic). No. 19. p. 25. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 September 2016.
  187. "Chinese forces 'kill 17 in Xinjiang' after colliery attack". BBC News. 18 November 2015. Archived from the original on 15 June 2018. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  188. Murdoch, Lindsay (30 August 2015). "Bangkok bombing: Who are the Turkish terrorist group the Grey Wolves?". The Sydney Morning Herald. Archived from the original on 30 August 2015. Retrieved 30 August 2015.
  189. Cunningham, Susan (30 August 2015). "Thailand's Shrine Bombing - The Case For Turkey's Grey Wolves". Forbes Magazine. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  190. "Police arrest Erawan blast suspect". Bangkok Post. 29 August 2015.
  191. Nanuam, Wassana (7 April 2016). "Uighur, Chechen tourists placed under surveillance". Bangkok Post.
  192. "Uighur, Chechen tourists placed under surveillance". Thailand News. 7 April 2016. Archived from the original on 7 April 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
  193. "Uighur, Chechen tourists placed under surveillance in Thailand". Business Standard. Press Trust of India. 7 April 2016. Archived from the original on 19 April 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
  194. Balasubramanian, Jaishree (7 April 2016). "Uighur, Chechen tourists placed under surveillance in Thailand". Inida Today. Press Trust of India. Archived from the original on 20 April 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
  195. Charuvastra, Teeranai (8 April 2016). "Uighur, Chechen Militants in Thailand to Stage Attacks, Memo Warns". Khaosod. Archived from the original on 19 April 2016. Retrieved 10 April 2016.
  196. O'Grady, Siobhán (30 August 2016). "Questions of Responsibility Loom After Attack on Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 4 February 2017.
  197. Nechepurenko, Ivan (30 August 2016). "Suicide Bomber Attacks Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017.
  198. Dzyubenko, Olga (7 September 2016). "Kyrgyzstan says Uighur militant groups behind attack on China's embassy". Reuters. Archived from the original on 12 June 2017. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  199. "Five dead in attack in China's Xinjiang". Reuters. 28 December 2016. Archived from the original on 3 June 2017.
  200. "Knife-wielding attackers kill five in China's Xinjiang: govt". Reuters. 14 February 2017. Archived from the original on 14 October 2017.
  201. "China knife attack: Eight dead in Xinjiang region". BBC News. 15 February 2017. Archived from the original on 30 April 2018.
  202. "'Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education'". The Independent. 5 July 2019. Archived from the original on 22 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  203. "UN: Unprecedented Joint Call for China to End Xinjiang Abuses". Human Rights Watch. 10 July 2019. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  204. Rajagopalan, Megha; Killing, Alison (3 December 2020). "Inside A Xinjiang Detention Camp". BuzzFeed News.
  205. "'Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs". The Times. 17 December 2019. Archived from the original on 25 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  206. "China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide'". Der Spiegel. 28 November 2019. Archived from the original on 21 January 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  207. "Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture". Financial Times. 12 September 2019. Archived from the original on 14 April 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  208. "The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction". November 2019. Archived from the original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  209. "China's crime against Uyghurs is a form of genocide". Summer 2019. Archived from the original on 1 February 2020. Retrieved 27 April 2020.
  210. Carbert, Michelle (20 July 2020). "Activists urge Canada to recognize Uyghur abuses as genocide, impose sanctions on Chinese officials". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 20 October 2020.
  211. Steger, Isabella (20 August 2020). "On Xinjiang, even those wary of Holocaust comparisons are reaching for the word "genocide"". Quartz. Archived from the original on 23 October 2020. Retrieved 20 October 2020.
  212. "Menendez, Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Resolution to Designate Uyghur Human Rights Abuses by China as Genocide". foreign.senate.gov. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 27 October 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  213. "Blackburn Responds to Offensive Comments by Chinese State Media". U.S. Senator Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee. 3 December 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  214. Alecci, Scilla (14 October 2020). "British lawmakers call for sanctions over Uighur human rights abuses". International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  215. "Committee News Release - October 21, 2020 - SDIR (43-2)". House of Commons of Canada. 21 October 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  216. Pompeo, Mike (19 January 2021). "Genocide in Xinjiang". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 19 January 2021.
  217. Gordon, Michael R. (19 January 2021). "U.S. Says China Is Committing 'Genocide' Against Uighur Muslims". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 19 January 2021.
  218. Danilova, Maria (27 November 2018). "Woman describes torture, beatings in Chinese detention camp". AP NEWS. Archived from the original on 13 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  219. Stewart, Phil (4 May 2019). "China putting minority Muslims in 'concentration camps,' U.S. says". Reuters. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  220. Congressional Research Service (18 June 2019). "Uyghurs in China" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 December 2020. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  221. Blackwell, Tom (25 September 2019). "Canadian went to China to debunk reports of anti-Muslim repression, but was 'shocked' by treatment of Uyghurs". National Post. Archived from the original on 18 December 2020. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  222. "UN: Unprecedented Joint Call for China to End Xinjiang Abuses". Human Rights Watch. 10 July 2019. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  223. "Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang face 'political indoctrination': Human Rights Watch". Reuters. 9 September 2018. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  224. "Responsibility of States under International Law to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, China" (PDF). Bar Human Rights Committee. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 September 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  225. Enos, Olivia; Kim, Yujin (29 August 2019). "China's Forced Sterilization of Uighur Women Is Cultural Genocide". The Heritage Foundation. Archived from the original on 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  226. "China 'using birth control' to suppress Uighurs". BBC News. 29 June 2020. Archived from the original on 29 June 2020. Retrieved 7 July 2020.
  227. "China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization". Associated Press. 28 June 2020. Archived from the original on 16 December 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  228. "Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) - China". The World Bank. Retrieved 2 January 2021.
  229. CNN, Ivan Watson, Rebecca Wright and Ben Westcott (21 September 2020). "Xinjiang government confirms huge birth rate drop but denies forced sterilization of women". CNN. Archived from the original on 27 September 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2020.
  230. Bashir, Shaykh (1 July 2008). "Why Are We Fighting China?" (PDF). NEFA Foundation. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 September 2012. Retrieved 7 August 2010.
  231. "The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 11 September 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  232. Weiss, Caleb (30 April 2015). "Turkistan Islamic Party had significant role in recent Idlib offensive". The Long War Journal. Archived from the original on 21 July 2015. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
  233. Mehsud, Saud; Golovnina, Maria (14 March 2014). "From his Pakistan hideout, Uighur leader vows revenge on China". Reuters. DERA ISMAIL KHAN/ISLAMABAD. Archived from the original on 19 August 2017.
  234. Johnson, Ian. "Q. and A.: Nick Holdstock on Xinjiang and 'China's Forgotten People'". Sinosphere Blog. New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 August 2015. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  235. Zenn, Jacob (23 May 2014). "Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. 14 (10). Archived from the original on 12 July 2015. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  236. Acharya, Gunaratna & Pengxin (2010), p. 2.
  237. Foreign terrorist organizations (PDF) (Report). U.S. State Department. p. 237. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  238. "Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department Under E.O. 13224". U.S. State Department. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
  239. Pompeo, Michael. "In the Matter of the Designation of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement Also Known as ETIM as a "Terrorist Organization" Pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended". Federal Register. US Department of State. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  240. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aliases Abu Musab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim) (1999). Muslims in Central Asia and The Coming Battle of Islam. Archived from the original on 19 January 2016.
  241. "Turkistan Islamic Party Video Attempts to Explain Uyghur Militancy to Chinese". Raffaello Pantucci. 24 June 2011. Archived from the original on 17 June 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  242. Zenn, Jacob (10 October 2014). "An Overview of Chinese Fighters and Anti-Chinese Militant Groups in Syria and Iraq". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. 14 (19). Archived from the original on 25 June 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  243. "Zawahiri endorses war in Kashmir but says don't hit Hindus in 'Muslim lands'". The Indian Express. Reuters. 17 September 2013. Archived from the original on 24 January 2016. Retrieved 13 August 2015.
  244. Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (13 August 2015). "Ayman al-Zawahiri's Pledge of Allegiance to New Taliban Leader Mullah Muhammad Mansour". Middle East Forum. Archived from the original on 16 August 2015. Retrieved 13 August 2015.
  245. "Al-Qaeda urges fight against West and Russia". Cairo: Al Arabiya. Reuters. 2 November 2015. Archived from the original on 3 November 2015. Retrieved 2 November 2015.
  246. Abdelaty, Ali; Knecht, Eric (1 November 2015). Williams, Alison (ed.). "Al Qaeda chief urges militant unity against Russia in Syria". Reuters. Archived from the original on 20 November 2015. Retrieved 3 July 2017.
  247. Shih, Gerry (10 September 2016). "Rising Uighur militancy changes security landscape for China". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 9 June 2018.
  248. "TIP Enters Jihadist Mainstream". SITE Intel Group. 15 October 2010. Archived from the original on 11 May 2015. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  249. McGregor, Andrew (11 March 2010). "Will Xinjiang's Turkistani Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its Leader?". Terrorism Monitor. Jamestown Foundation. 8 (10). Archived from the original on 14 May 2016. Retrieved 11 April 2016.
  250. "China diary: Spare no effort to paint a picture". www.telegraphindia.com. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  251. Koetse, Manya. "CCTV Airs Program on Xinjiang's 'Vocational Training Centers': Criticism & Weibo Responses". Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  252. "EASTERN TURKISTAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT | United Nations Security Council". www.un.org. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  253. Cronk, Terri Moon (7 February 2018). "U.S. Forces Strike Taliban, East Turkestan Islamic Movement Training Sites". U.S. Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 8 February 2018. Retrieved 8 February 2018.
  254. "Consolidated TEXT: 32002R0881 — EN — 10.10.2015". eur-lex.europa.eu. Archived from the original on 11 December 2018. Retrieved 25 August 2016.
  255. "هؤلاء انغماسيو أردوغان الذين يستوردهم من الصين - عربي أونلاين". 3arabionline.com. 31 January 2017. Archived from the original on 14 August 2017. Retrieved 29 August 2017.
  256. Martina, Michael; Blanchard, Ben; Spring, Jake (20 July 2016). Ruwitch, John; Macfie, Nick (eds.). "Britain adds Chinese militant group to terror list". Reuters. Archived from the original on 14 August 2017.
  257. PROSCRIBED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS (PDF) (Report). Home Office. 17 July 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 October 2016. Retrieved 27 July 2016.
  258. Karagiannis (2009), pp. 67–.
  259. Karagiannis (2009), pp. 112–.
  260. Ansari, Massoud (3 August 2007). "The New Face of Jihad". Newsline. Archived from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 31 July 2007.
  261. Lansford, Tom (24 March 2015). Political Handbook of the World 2015. SAGE Publications. pp. 818–. ISBN 978-1-4833-7158-0.
  262. American Foreign Policy Council (2014), pp. 673–
    –Lovelace (2008), pp. 168–
    –Omelicheva (2010), pp. 131–
    –Reed & Raschke (2010), p. 206–
  263. "Anti Money, Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 / List Of Individuals, Entities And Other Groups And Undertakings Declared By The Minister Of Home Affairs As Specified Entity Under Section 66b(1)" (PDF).
  264. "Three groups active in Xinjiang banned - Pakistan". Dawn.Com. 24 October 2013. Archived from the original on 17 November 2016. Retrieved 29 August 2017.
  265. "Turkey lists "E. Turkestan Islamic Movement" as terrorists - People's Daily Online". En.people.cn. 3 August 2017. Archived from the original on 7 August 2017. Retrieved 29 August 2017.
  266. "Turkey-China Relations: From "Strategic Cooperation" to "Strategic Partnership"?". Middle East Institute. Archived from the original on 31 December 2019. Retrieved 31 December 2019.
  267. "List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE". The National (Abu Dhabi). Archived from the original on 6 May 2015. Retrieved 19 May 2015.
    –مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية [The Cabinet approves the list of terrorist organisations] (in Arabic). Emirates News Agency (WAM) وكالة أنباء الإمارات. 15 November 2014. Archived from the original on 17 November 2014. Retrieved 16 November 2014.
    –"UAE cabinet endorses new list of terrorist groups". Kuwait News Agency. 15 November 2014. Archived from the original on 29 November 2014. Retrieved 16 November 2014.
    –"UAE blacklists 5 Pakistani groups among 83 as 'militant organisations". The Express Tribune. AFP. 15 November 2014. Archived from the original on 18 November 2014. Retrieved 16 November 2014.
    –"UAE Cabinet approves list of designated terrorist organisations, groups". Emirates News Agency. 15 November 2014. Archived from the original on 30 January 2016. Retrieved 10 February 2016.
  268. "Governance Asia-Pacific Watch". United Nations. April 2007. Archived from the original on 24 August 2007. Retrieved 23 August 2007.
  269. "Who cares about the Uyghurs". The Economist. July 2019.
  270. "UN: Unprecedented Joint Call for China to End Xinjiang Abuses". Human Rights Watch. 10 July 2019. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 5 December 2019.
  271. "Ambassadors from 50 countries voice support to China's position on issues related to Xinjiang - Xinhua | English.news.cn". www.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  272. Ben Westcott and Richard Roth. "China's treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang divides UN members". CNN. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  273. 张悦. "Statement at UN supports China on Xinjiang". www.chinadaily.com.cn. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
  274. Lipes, Joshua (12 September 2019). "US Senate Passes Legislation to Hold China Accountable for Rights Abuses in Xinjiang". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 5 October 2019.
  275. "Uyghur bill demanding sanctions on Chinese officials passes US House of Representatives". ABC News. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  276. Westcott, Ben; Byrd, Haley (3 December 2019). "US House passes Uyghur Act calling for tough sanctions on Beijing over Xinjiang camps". CNN. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  277. "Anger in China as US House passes Uighur crackdown bill". Al Jazeera. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  278. Lee, Se Young; Brunnstrom, David (3 December 2019). "Trump comments, Uighur bill hurt prospects of U.S.-China deal". Reuters. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  279. Flatley, Daniel (4 December 2019). "U.S. House Passes Xinjiang Bill, Prompting Threat From China". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  280. Lipes, Joshua (17 June 2020). "Trump Signs Uyghur Rights Act Into Law, Authorizing Sanctions For Abuses in Xinjiang". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 17 June 2020.
  281. "Thailand forcibly sends nearly 100 Uighur Muslims back to China". the Guardian. 9 July 2015. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  282. Putz, Catherine. "Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China". The Diplomat (11 July 2015). Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  283. "Foreign reaction: Thailand condemned over Uighur". Bangkok Post. Associated Press. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  284. "HRW condemns Malaysia for deporting Uighurs". www.unhcr.org. Agence France Presse. Archived from the original on 11 January 2016. Retrieved 25 October 2015.
  285. Alexander Kriebitz and Raphael Max (2020). "The Xinjiang Case and Its Implications from a Business Ethics Perspective". Human Rights Review. 21 (3): 243–265. doi:10.1007/s12142-020-00591-0. S2CID 219509907. Retrieved 17 November 2020.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
  286. Murgia M, Shepherd C. "US universities reconsider research links with Chinese AI company". Financial Times. Retrieved 17 November 2020.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
  287. Shamil Shams (1 June 2017). "Istanbul attack: Why China's Uighurs are joining global jihadist groups". Deutsche Welle.
  288. Blanchard, Ben (11 May 2017). "Syria says up to 5,000 Chinese Uighurs fighting in militant groups". Reuters. Retrieved 24 July 2020.
  289. "Many don't speak Arabic, but these Chinese militants are thriving in Syria". Al Arabiya English. 22 April 2017. Retrieved 24 July 2020.
  290. Mohanad Hage Ali (2 March 2016). "China's proxy war in Syria: Revealing the role of Uighur fighters". Al Arabiya English. Retrieved 24 July 2020.
  291. "Turkey nightclub attack: Police 'detain several Uighurs' in raids". BBC News. 5 January 2017. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  292. CHARLIE CAMPBELL (21 July 2016). "Uighurs Joining ISIS Poses Security Problems for China". Time Magazine. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  293. Nodirbek Soliev (January 2017). "The Rise of Uyghur Militancy in and Beyond Southeast Asia: An Assessment". Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Sources

Further reading
Library resources about
Xinjiang conflict
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.