Anti-Russian sentiment

In 2001, a Chechen man, Goychaev, was sentenced to death for murder, rape and robbery. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. According to information from prosecutors, Goychaev's gang targeted Russians and murdered 10 in Chervlyonnaya (Shelkovsky District, Republic of Chechnya) between 1997 and 1999.[47] Goyachev was charged with genocide, however the court did not find him guilty of genocide because genocide was understood to be a crime against the peace and safety of humanity.[48][49] Russian NTV channel journalist Yelena Masyuk, who was captured by Chechens, said in 2009 that she had not seen any signs of ethnic cleansing in Chechnya that had been rumoured.[50]

Journalist Fatima Tlisova released an article in 2009 discussing the frequent occurrences of Russian Orthodox crosses being sawed off buildings and thrown off mountains in Circassia, due to the cross being associated with the people who initiated the mass expulsions of Circassians.[51]

The Kremlin and its supporters are sometimes criticised for using allegations of "Russophobia" as a form of propaganda to counter criticism of government policy.[52][34]

In 2006, poet and essayist Lev Rubinstein wrote that similarly to the term "fascism", the term "Russophobia" has become a political sticker slapped onto people who disagree with words or actions of people or organizations who position themselves as "Russian ones" in the ideological, rather than ethnic or geographical sense.[53]

Anti-Putin protest in Yerevan, 2 December 2013

After Nicholas II intensified russification policies and did not act following massacres by the Ottoman Empire against Armenians, anti-Russian sentiment among Armenian nationalist groups rose. After the Russian government confiscated Armenian Church lands in 1903, this led to attacks on Russian authorities and Armenians who cooperated with them by Armenians mobilised by the Dashnak party.[54]

In July 1988, during the Karabakh movement, the killing of an Armenian man and the injury of tens of others by the Soviet army in a violent clash at Zvartnots Airport near Yerevan sparked anti-Russian and anti-Soviet demonstrations.[55] In 2005, relations between Armenia and Russia were strained after the massacre of an Armenian family of 7 in Gyumri by a Russian serviceman stationed at the Russian base there.[56][57]

The 1990 Black January massacre prior to Azerbaijani independence and Russia's complicated role in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia increased the negative perception of Russia.[58] Under Abulfaz Elchibey's presidency in 1992-93, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were damaged due to his anti-Russian policies,[59] however under Ilham Aliyev, relations instead improved.[60]

According to a 2012 poll, 35% of Georgians perceive Russia as Georgia's biggest enemy, while the percentage was significantly higher in 2011, at 51%.[61] In a February 2013 poll, 63% of Georgians said Russia is Georgia's biggest political and economic threat as opposed to 35% of those who looked at Russia as the most important partner for Georgia.[62] The main reason behind this is due to events since the 1990s, when Russia supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, causing the Abkhaz–Georgian conflict, Georgian–Ossetian conflict and later war with Russia in 2008.[63] It was also followed by Georgian sympathy to the Chechens during the Chechen–Russian conflict of the 1990s.[64]

According to veteran German author, journalist and Russia-correspondent Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, there is deep disapproval of everything Russian in Estonia.[65] A poll conducted by Gallup International suggested that 34% Estonians have a positive attitude towards Russia, but it is supposed that survey results were likely impacted by a large ethnic Russian minority in the country.[15] However, in a 2012 poll only 3% of the Russian minority in Estonia reported that they had experienced a racially motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among ethnic minorities and immigrants in EU).[20]

According to Estonian philosopher Jaan Kaplinski, the birth of anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia dates back to 1940, as there was little or none during the czarist and first independence period, when anti-German sentiment predominated. Kaplinski states the imposition of Soviet rule under Joseph Stalin in 1940 and subsequent actions by Soviet authorities led to the replacement of anti-German sentiment with anti-Russian sentiment within just one year, and characterized it as "one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet authorities".[66] Kaplinski supposes that anti-Russian sentiment could disappear as quickly as anti-German sentiment did in 1940, however he believes the prevailing sentiment in Estonia is sustained by Estonia's politicians who employ "the use of anti-Russian sentiments in political combat," together with the "tendentious attitude of the [Estonian] media."[66] Kaplinski says that a "rigid East-West attitude is to be found to some degree in Estonia when it comes to Russia, in the form that everything good comes from the West and everything bad from the East";[66] this attitude, in Kaplinski's view, "probably does not date back further than 1940 and presumably originates from Nazi propaganda."[66]

Ever since Latvia regained its independence in 1991 various Russian officials, journalists, academics and pro-Russian activists have criticised Latvia for its Latvian language law and Latvian nationality law and repeatedly accused it of "ethnic discrimination against Russians",[67] "anti-Russian sentiment"[68] and "Russophobia".[69][70][71] In 1993 Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation and Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, declared that Latvia is preparing for an ethnic cleansing.[72] However, no Russians have ever been killed or even wounded for political, nationalistic or racist reasons in Latvia ever since it regained its independence.[73][74][75] In 2019 co-chairman of the Latvian Russian Union and former MEP Tatjana Ždanoka likened the situation of Russians and Russian speakers and their alleged persecution in Latvia to Jews before the World War II.[76][77][78]

In 2004, research conducted by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences titled "Ethnic tolerance and integration of the Latvian society" found that Latvian respondents on average rated their relations with Russians 7.8 out of 10, whereas non-Latvian respondents rated their relationship with Latvians 8.4 out of 10. Both groups believed that the ties between them were satisfactory, had not changed in the last five years and were to either remain the same or improve in the next five years. Respondents did mention some conflicts on an ethnic basis, but all of them were classified as psycholinguistic such as verbal confrontations. 66% of non-Russian respondents would also support their son or daughter marrying an ethnic Russian.[79] In a 2012 poll, only 2% of the Russian minority in Latvia reported that they had experienced a 'racially' motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among immigrants and minorities in EU).[20]

On the other hand, results of a yearly poll carried out by the research agency "SKDS" showed that the population of Latvia was more split on its attitude towards the Russian Federation. In 2008 47% percent of respondents had a positive view of Russia, while 33% had a negative one, but the rest (20%) found it hard to define their opinion. It reached a high in 2010 when 64% percent of respondents felt positive towards Russia, in comparison with the 25 percent that felt negative. In 2015, following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, however, it dropped to the lowest level since 2008 and for the first time, the people with a negative attitude towards Russia (46%) surpassed people with a positive attitude (41%).[80] In 2017 the respondents having a positive view of Russia slightly increased and reached 47%, but the respondents having a negative view of Russia decreased to 38%. The data wasn't differentiated between the respondent ethnicities, so it has to be noted that between 2008 and 2017, ethnic Russians made up more than a quarter of the population of Latvia.

According to The Moscow Times, Latvia's fears of Russia are rooted in history, including conflicting views on whether Latvia and other Baltic States were occupied by the USSR or joined it voluntary, as well as the 1940–1941 June and 1949 March deportations that followed and most recently the annexation of Crimea that fueled a fear that Latvia could also be annexed by Russia.[81] While Russian-American journalist and broadcaster Vladimir Posner also believed the fact that many Russians in the Latvian SSR did not learn Latvian also contributed to accumulation of an "anti-Russian sentiment".[82]

On a political level, Russians in Latvia have sometimes been targeted by anti-Russian rhetoric from some of the more radical members of both the mainstream and radical right parties in Latvia. In November 2010 correspondence from 2009 between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis and Latvian American doctor and member of the Civic Union Aivars Slucis was released by journalist Lato Lapsa.[83] In one of the letters titled "Do Latvians Surrender?"[84] Slucis complained of the current situation in Latvia and being unable to return and work in Latvia, because he "would not be able to treat Russians in the same way as Latvians".[84][85] Kristovskis responded with "I agree with your opinion and evaluation",[84] but warned against hysterical responses, cautioning party members to avoid discussions counterproductive to the party's political goals. After the leak the Civic Union ousted Slucis from the party for views “unacceptable to the party” and returned his financial contributions, while the opposition parties Harmony Centre and For a Good Latvia initiated an unsuccessful vote of no confidence against Kristovskis.[85][84]

Due to historical experiences, there is a fear prevailed in Lithuania that Russia has never stopped wanting to consolidate power over the Baltics, including fears of Russian plans for an eventual annexation of Lithuania as was seen in Crimea.[86] There are also concerns over Russia's increasing military deployment, such as in the Russian region of Kaliningrad, an exclave of Russia bordering Lithuania.[87][88]

Ever since the independence of Moldova, Russia has been repeatedly accused by various local politicians and elected officials of meddling in Moldovan politics,[89] notably from Andrian Candu, a Moldovan senator.[90] Russia's involvement with pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria further strained the relations between Russia and Moldova, and Prime Minister of Moldova Pavel Filip demanded Russia to quit the region.[91]

In 2018, the Parliament of Moldova “unanimously” adopted a declaration condemning what it called Russian attacks on national informational security and meddling in internal politics.[92]

In 2004, the leader of Svoboda Oleh Tyahnybok urged his party to fight "the Moscow-Jewish mafia" ruling Ukraine.[93] For these remarks Tyahnybok was expelled from the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction in July 2004.[94] The former coordinator of Right Sector in West Ukraine, Oleksandr Muzychko talked about fighting "communists, Jews and Russians for as long as blood flows in my veins."[95]

In May 2009, a poll held by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in Ukraine said that 96% of respondents were positive about Russians as an ethnic group, 93% respected the Russian Federation and 76% respected the Russian establishment.[96]

Desecration of the flags of Russia and Poland by the UNA-UNSO nationalists in Lviv, Ukraine, 1997

In October 2010, statistics by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine said that positive attitudes towards Russians have been decreasing since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6-7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7-8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.[97]

The right-wing political party "Svoboda",[98][99][100] has invoked radical anti-Russian rhetoric[101] and has electoral support enough to garner majority support in local councils,[102] as seen in the Ternopil regional council in Western Ukraine.[103] Analysts explained Svoboda's victory in Eastern Galicia during the 2010 Ukrainian local elections as a result of the policies of the Azarov Government who were seen as too pro-Russian by the voters of "Svoboda".[104][105] According to Andreas Umland, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,[106] Svoboda's increasing exposure in the Ukrainian media has contributed to these successes.[107] According to British academic Taras Kuzio the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010–2014) fabricated this exposure in order to discredit the opposition.[108]

After Ukraine regained its independence, only a small minority of nationalists expressed strong anti-Russian views; the majority hoped to have good relations with Russia. In 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the attitude to Russia changed sharply. In April 2017, a poll by Sociological group "RATING" found that 57% of respondents expressed a "very cold" or "cold" attitude toward Russia while 17% expressed a "very warm" or "warm" attitude.[109]

A caricature of a Russian traditional matryoshka doll as a negative symbol of communism; Prague, Czech Republic.

Russia remains continuously among the most negatively perceived countries among Czechs in polls conducted since 1991, and just 26% of Czechs responded that they had a positive opinion about Russia in November 2016.[110][111][112]

In 2005, The New York Times reported after the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza that "relations between the nations are as bad as they have been since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989."[113] Jakub Boratyński, the director of international programs at the independent Polish think tank Stefan Batory Foundation, said in 2005 that anti-Russian feelings have substantially decreased since Poland joined the EU and NATO, and that Poles feel more secure than before, but he also admitted that many people in Poland still look suspiciously at Russian foreign-policy moves and are afraid Russia is seeking to "recreate an empire in a different form."[114] According to Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Moscow-based think tank Center for Political Technologies, much of the modern anti-Russian feelings in Poland is caused by grievances of the past.[114] One contentious issue is the Katyn massacre in 1940 as well as the Stalinist-era ethnic-cleansing operations including the deportation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Poles, even though the Russian government has officially acknowledged and apologized for the atrocity.[115]

According to a 2013 BBC World Service poll, 19% of Poles viewed Russia's influence positively, with 49% expressing a negative view.[116]

Hungary's relations with Russia are shadowed by the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 which was crushed with the help of Russian troops[117] as well the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 which was brutally crushed by the Red Army and was followed by the mass arrest and imprisonment of Hungarians.[118][119][120] The current government of Viktor Orbán is seen as friendlier toward Russia.[121] According to a 2019 survey by Pew Research, 3% of Hungarian respondents had a favourable opinion of Russia, 32% had a somewhat favourable opinion, 31% had a somewhat unfavourable opinion and 16% had a very unfavourable opinion.[122]

Anti-Russian sentiment dates back to the conflict between the Russian and Ottoman empires in the 18th and early 19th centuries and the ceding of part of the Moldavian principality to Russia by the Ottoman Empire in 1812 after its de facto annexation, and to the annexations during World War II and after by the Soviet Union of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the policies of ethnic cleansing, Russification and deportations that have taken place in those territories against ethnic Romanians. Following WWII, Romania, a former ally of Nazi Germany, was occupied by Soviet forces. Soviet dominance over the Romanian economy was manifested through the so-called Sovroms, exacting a tremendous economic toll ostensibly as war-time reparations.[123][124][125][126]

The emergence of anti-Russian sentiment in the Danubian Principalities, the precursors to unified Romania which became independent of the Ottoman Empire with the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople concluding the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War, arose from the post-1829 relationship of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, and was caused by mutually economic and political grievances of two influential classes that were often odds also with each other. As per the 1829 treaty, Russia was named the protector of the two principalities, allowed to occupy them, and also drafted a quasi-constitution known as the Organic Regulations which formed a powerful assembly of 800 boyars (the local landowning economic elite) nominally under the authority of the less nominal prince, the document crafted with strong support from the boyars. The boyars, a "reactionary oligarchy" as described by Misha Glenny, stopped short any hint of liberal reform, and the growing urban elite began to associate Russia with the slow progress of reform and the obstacles they faced in building an industrial base. On the other hand, the boyars themselves began to sour on Russia during the 1830s and 1840s due to their economic conflict of interest with Russia. After the Ottomans withdrew from the three forts along the Danube basin, the boyars exploited the highly fertile land to drastically increase Romanian wheat production, such that eventually future Romania consisting of Wallachia unified with Moldavia would become the fourth-largest wheat producer in the world. Whereas before 1829 Wallachian and Moldavian wheat had been limited to Ottoman markets, Russia increasingly felt threatened by growing competition in its jurisdiction that it feared could drive down the price of Russian wheat. Accordingly, Russia exploited its role as protector of the Principalities to let the Danube silt up, sabotaging the possible market competitor. As a result of this as well as "Russian foot-dragging on the economy", the boyars too became increasingly resentful of Russian domination. The rapid erosion of public relations with Russia led to a revolution in 1848, in which the newly emerging Romanian intellectual and political class sought the help of the Ottomans, their old hegemon, to drive out Russian influence—although, after pressure applied by Russia, the Russian and Ottoman armies joined forces to squash the movement.[127]

Norway's diplomatic and cultural ties with the West have complicated continuing relations with Russia.[128] A 2017 poll of Norwegians found that 58% believe that Vladimir Putin and Russia pose a security threat.[129]

Russian officials escalated the tensions. A Russian deputy foreign minister stated in Oslo that Russia views the October 2018 Trident Juncture NATO military exercises in Norway to be "anti-Russian" in nature.[130][131] Russian expansion in the arctic has contributed to increasing mutual distrust between Russia and Norway.[132] Norway's perceptions of Russian militarism and regional antagonism, as well as Norway's hosting of the US Marine Corps in the country, have contributed to the deterioration of relations between Norway and Russia.[133][131]

Edvard Isto's painting Attack (1899) symbolizes the beginning of Finland's Russification. The two-headed eagle of Russia is tearing away the law book from the Finnish Maiden's arms.

In Finland, anti-Russian sentiment has been studied since the 1970s. The history of anti-Russian sentiment has two main theories. One of them claims that Finns and Russians have been archenemies throughout history. The position is considered to have been dominated at least the 1700s since the days of the Greater Wrath. This view largely assumes that through the centuries, "Russia is a violent slayer and Finland is an innocent, virginal victim".[134]

The Finnish Civil War in 1918 between the Reds and the Whites—won by the Whites—left behind a popular wave of anti-Russian and anti-Communist feelings in Finland.[135]

According to polls in 2004, 62% of Finnish citizens had a negative view of Russia.[15] In a 2012 poll, 12% of Russian immigrants in Finland reported that they had experienced a racially motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% of immigrants in the EU).[20]

France has a longstanding historical relation with Russia dating back from Middle Ages even though both countries started to establish stronger diplomatic ties not before the westward expansion of Russia under the Romanov Dynasty from the 18th century. Relations between France and Russia varied depending the periods but anti-Russian sentiment was common in France after the French defeat by the Russians in the 1812 War.[136][137] Fyodor Dostoyevsky also noted in A Writer’s Diary (1873-1876) the following: "Europeans do not trust appearances: “Grattez le russe et vous verrez le tartare”, they say (scratch a Russian and you’ll find a Tatar). That may be true, but this is what occurred to me: do the majority of Russians, in their dealings with Europe, join the extreme left because they are Tatars and have the savage’s love of destruction, or are they, perhaps, moved by other reasons?"[138]

According to a 2017 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 36% of French people have a favorable view of Russia, with 62% expressing an unfavorable view.[139] In return numerous French scholars and politics argue that France had a longstanding positive opinion about Russia and regret that France from the late 2000s tends to follow American positions against Russia blindly.[140]

CDU anti-Soviet poster in West Germany in 1953

Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich listening to Konrad Meyer at a Generalplan Ost exhibition, 20 March 1941.

Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party regarded Slavic peoples (especially Poles and East Slavs) as non-Aryan Untermenschen (subhumans).[141] As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space") to achieve German expansion eastwards (Drang nach Osten) at the expense of the inferior Slavs. Hitler believed that "the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacity of the German element in an inferior race."[142]

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler expressed his plans for the Slavs:

As for the ridiculous hundred million Slavs, we will mold the best of them as we see fit, and we will isolate the rest of them in their pig-styes; and anyone who talks about cherishing the local inhabitants and civilizing them, goes straight off into a concentration camp![143]

Plans to eliminate Russians and other Slavs from Soviet territory to allow German settlement included starvation. American historian Timothy D. Snyder maintains that there were 4.2 million victims of the German Hunger Plan in the Soviet Union, "largely Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians," including 3.1 million Soviet POWs and 1.0 million civilian deaths in the Siege of Leningrad.[144] According to Snyder, Hitler intended eventually to exterminate up to 45 million Slavs by planned famine as part of Generalplan Ost.[145]

Influenced by the guidelines, in a directive sent out to the troops under his command, General Erich Hoepner of the 4th Panzer Army stated:

The war against Russia is an important chapter in the German nation's struggle for existence. It is the old battle of the Germanic against the Slavic people, of the defense of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the demolition of present-day Russia and must, therefore, be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron resolution to exterminate the enemy remorselessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the contemporary Russian Bolshevik system are to be spared.[146]

"The Russian menace", an English cartoon from 1877 showing Russia as a monstrous octopus devouring neighboring lands, especially the Ottoman Empire.

Not until early 19th century Russia and Russians were traditionally perceived in the United Kingdom with unflattering stereotypes and ignorance; the 1782 edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica Russia was described as “a very large and powerful kingdom of Europe” populated with brutal, vicious, drunken savages, with a despotic government.[147] Still, the onset of a significant anti-Russian sentiment, after nearly 300 years of friendly British-Russian relations,[148] is associated with 19th century conflicts, notably the Crimean War[149] and the Anglo-Afghan wars, with the latter seen as representing Russia's territorial ambitions regarding the British Empire in the British India. This competition for spheres of influence and colonies (see, e.g. The Great Game and Berlin Congress) fueled anti-Russian sentiment in Britain. British propaganda at the time took up the theme of Russians as uncultured Asiatic barbarians.[150]

Rudyard Kipling, especially popular in Russia for his The Ballad of East and West poem and The Adventures of Mowgli animation (1967-1971) that was referenced by Putin in 2011,[151] has also applied the term 'Oriental', in its derogatory meaning, to the Russian people. In The Man Who Was (1890, never translated to Russian), he wrote: "Let it be clearly understood that the Russian is a delightful person till he tucks in his shirt. As an Oriental he is charming. It is only when he insists upon being treated as the most easterly of western peoples instead of the most westerly of easterns that he becomes a racial anomaly extremely difficult to handle. The host never knows which side of his nature is going to turn up next".[152][153]

The American professor Jimmie E. Cain Jr has stated that these views were then exported to other parts of the world and were reflected in the literature of late the 19th and early 20th centuries.[149]

Up until the establishment of the Soviet Union, the United States had a cordial relationship with the Russian Empire. With the collapse of the Tsarist government, the relationship has turned into a hostile one. During the Cold War years, there was frequent confusion and conflation of terms "Russians" and "Communists"/"Soviets"; in 1973, a group of Russian immigrants in the US founded the Congress of Russian Americans with the purpose of drawing a clear distinction between Russian national identity and Soviet ideology, and preventing the formation of anti-Russian sentiment on the basis of Western anti-communism.[154] Members of the Congress see the conflation itself as Russophobic, believing "Russians were the first and foremost victim of international Communism".[155]

According to Russian philosopher Oleg Ryabov, “the otherness of the USSR” as a whole was the main ideological goal of American cinema on this topic, but not the only one: "To sum up, gender discourse was a weapon of the Cold war, performing an important function in the process of the USSR's otherness: social deviation was also presented as gender deviation. Hollywood representations of the Soviet gender system were an element of the construction of the "red threat". At the same time, they served as a way to maintain and correct not only political but also gender relations in American society itself, as a significant component of the discourse of "mysticism of femininity" described in the bestseller by Betty Friedan. Finally, I would like to emphasize that many plots and images of American cinema were used in the anti-communist discourse of the perestroika with its "return to normalcy" slogans, including the "natural relations between men and women."[156][157]

According to film critic Evgeny Bazhenov, the American cinematographers were exploiting every possibility, including pseudo-Cyrillic and creative typography with the inverted hammer and sickle to represent the G in a poster for the movie The Russians Are Coming, the Russians Are Coming (1966) to dehumanize the ideological enemy. Meanwhile, the Soviet filmmakers could never do the same quite effectively, contributing to the USSR-Russia's[lower-alpha 4] eventual failure in the Cold War.[171][lower-alpha 5] According to American researcher Arlene Audergon, an addition of personal dislike reason to the other two common reasons of conflict between mammals — fighting for resources and fighting for territory — is the most common tactic for demonizing the enemy which very often precedes the violent conflict stage itself.[177]

In 2015, the Russian philologist Igor Bazhenov also pointed out the weakest spot of Soviet propaganda: "Readers' letters, a correspondence "from the fields", simple articles by non-professionals had nullified all the attempts to smooth things over and had brought the discussion of gender contradictions to an aggressive level. We read the official propaganda: 'In the eyes of female workers, a man is not an enemy and oppressor at all; on the contrary, he is, first of all, a comrade in the common bleak lot, a faithful ally in the struggle for a better future' (Alexandra Kollontai, On the history of the movement of women workers in Russia). Neutral and even peaceful. What is in the reciprocal letters of the readers? Rejection of a conciliatory position and outright hatred towards men: 'A man will come from the field, go to rest, and a woman will milk the cows, clean up the house, look after the children, sheathe, wash, feed everyone. He, the shaggy dog[lower-alpha 6], will fizzle out and you haven't gone to bed yet!'[179] In 2020, Igor Bazhenov stated the approximate equality of Soviet and Western propaganda: "In general, both the USSR and the US played the propaganda [game] by the same rules."[180]

In 2007, senator Brad Sherman suggested the anti-Russian stance of U.S. politicians is mostly based on reflexes considering the still active Jackson–Vanik amendment and the completely opposite American foreign policy towards China with its human rights record being worse. He said: "Most of them grew up in Soviet times when the U.S. was making every possible effort to surround, weaken and humiliate Russia."[184]

Territory of "Russians"[185] timeline according to the Zbigniew Brzezinski plan

State	Values of the "Western world"[186]	Square Km	Result
USSR (1922—1991)	Anti-communism equals Anti-Nazism	22 400 000	Destroyed
RF (current)	Anticolonialism[187] equals Human Rights: protecting minority rights	17 100 000	Work in progress
RF minus Siberia		4 000 000	Future
≈ Grand Duchy of Moscow		2 500 000

In 2017, Vladimir Putin went as far as to compare the hatred of American politicians toward Russians to Anti-Semitism.[188] The more common explanation is the traditional hatred between Jews and Samaritans, with Samaritans being as modern Russians who had been occupied by the Mongols for hundreds of years and thus have lost their original status of "full-blooded" Eastern Europeans, in the eyes of other Europeans, forever.[189][190][lower-alpha 7] According to the marginal perception of the views of Polish-American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, the next partitioning of modern Russia into smaller parts should remain the main strategic goal of American foreign policy until fully completed.[lower-alpha 8][193] According to Prof. Valentin Katasonov, the economist, since the early 1990s, the project has been on a path to being completed by the ever-present local colonial administration.[194] In accordance to the left-wing perception of these popular views, the colonial administration was not allowed to display its antagonism towards the Western policy and negotiate some alleviations for 'Papuans'[lower-alpha 9], as peoples of Russia have always been perceived by the West, to decrease the speed of their extermination.[lower-alpha 10] The slogan "to put Russia in its place" for these people means the restoration of fully colonial administration instead of half-colonial Putin's administration — the CIA-through-Chubais-chosen oligarchs of the 1990s, globalists who are often called compradors with 90% of their businesses in the US-controlled offshore zones — are 'balanced' by Putin's oligarchs who are a threat to the international security because they're not like the first group of oligarchs.[198][199][200][lower-alpha 11][lower-alpha 12]

In 2013, John McCain published an article for Russians about Putin's russophobia and tall-poppy syndrome.[208] A standard Russian right-wing nationalist propaganda, just like in the other post-Soviet countries, was based on statistics: "'Lenin's national policy' had been constructing political, cultural and economic relations in the USSR in a way they mostly began to resemble a proverb 'one with a plow, and seven with a spoon'. Moreover, it was not a random mistake, not a bias, but it was a conscious policy of Bolsheviks who believed it was necessary to humiliate the Russian people due to their detested "great power" (Russian: великодержавный шовинизм, romanized: velikoderzhavnyj shovinizm — chauvinism due to great power) in order to exalt the others. Even the head of the Soviet government, Rykov, was dismissed from his position after declaring that 'he considers it unacceptable the other peoples live at the expense of the Russian peasant'".[209][lower-alpha 13]

[215][lower-alpha 14]

Since the collapse of the USSR, there have been constant intellectuals' attempts to lobby for Russians' spiritual "Irishness", including the victim status, domestically instead of the lower prestige "Slav" or "Russian" status and international suspicions on Pan-Slavism and other flawed qualities associated with communism, Romanov and Rurik dynasties.[lower-alpha 15][220] Some individuals were even bringing the humorous arguments like inability to resist the dance (à la Martha Graham's 1991 autobiography Blood Memory,[221] Russian famine of 1601–03[lower-alpha 16], or similar name for an animal and the word "Irish": lynx (Russian: рысь, romanized: rys', Russian pronunciation: [ˈrɨsʲ]) was the third most popular totem beast in Russia after a bear [m.] and a wolf [m.] who are juxtaposed to a local image of trickster fox [f.] Lisa Patrikeyevna, possibly even contributing to country's name. Vladimir Pozner said: "What is Russian? I do not know. I just say they're similar to the Irish, in my opinion."[224][225][226] In 2019, Russian-language musicologist Mikhail Kazinik spoke on a subject of "[Russian] bear" being a slur even in the 19th century: "I don't want to list all the names they used to give each other. Mussorgsky used to call Tchaikovsky a treacle, a saccharin, a poll-parrot (Russian: патока, сахарин, попка, romanized: patoka, sakharin, popka). Tchaikovsky used to call Mussorgsky a bourbon, a monster, a bear (Russian: бурбон, монстр, медведь, romanized: burbon, monstr, medved')".[227][228]

Polling has charted that at the end of the Cold War, American views of Russia warmed considerably, with 62% of Americans expressing a positive view of Russia in 1989 and 66% at the turn of the century, as opposed 29% and 27% retaining negative views in those years.[229] Although Russia recovered from brief spikes in negative views in 1999, 2003 and 2008, in 2013 the formerly majority positive view of Russia among American respondents critically declined and this perception was replaced by a majority negative view of 60% by 2014. This time, instead of recovery, Russia's public image experienced progressively more severe deterioration. By 2019, a record 73% of Americans had a negative opinion of Russia as a country, and formerly dominant positive opinions had been cut from 66% down to 24%. In 2019, the share of Americans considering Russia to be a "critical" threat to national security reached a majority of 52% for the first time. Whereas in 2006 only 1% of Americans listed Russia as "America's worst enemy" by 2019 32% of Americans, including a plurality of 44% of Democrats, shared this view,[229] with a partisan split having emerged in 2017. The sharper distaste among the Democrat population stands in contrast to the prior history of American public opinion on Russia, as Republicans were formerly more likely to view Russia as a greater threat.[230]

According to a 2013 Poll, 59% of Americans had a negative view of Russia, 23% had a favorable opinion, and 18% were uncertain.[231] According to a survey by Pew Research Center, negative attitudes towards Russia in the United States rose from 43% to 72% from 2013 to 2014.[18]

Recent events such as the Anti-Magnitsky bill,[232] the Boston Marathon bombing[233] Russia's actions following the Ukrainian crisis,[18] the Syrian Civil War, the alleged allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, the mistreatment of LGBT people in Russia following the passage of a 2013 anti-LGBT propaganda law in the country, the seizure and destruction of banned Western food imports in Russia starting in August, 2015, and the alleged collusion between Donald Trump's presidential campaign and Russia[234] are many examples of events which have been deemed to have caused a rising negative impression about Russia in the United States.

Tax March in Washington, D.C. in 2017

In May 2017, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said on NBC's Meet The Press that Russians were "almost genetically driven" to act deviously.[235][236] Freelance journalist Michael Sainato criticized the remark as xenophobic.[237]

On July 2, 2020, the Lincoln Project, a group of anti-Trump Republicans, released Fellow Traveler, an ad saying in Russian with English subtitles that "Comrade Trump" had been "chosen" by Vladimir Putin and had "accepted the help of Mother Russia." The ad featured communist imagery such as the hammer and sickle, as well as photographs of Bolshevik revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and Soviet leaders from Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev. Eliot Borenstein, Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at NYU, has criticized the Lincoln Project's "Russophobic" ad, saying: "How would we feel about a two-minute video filled with Stars of David, men in Orthodox garb, sinister snapshots of Bibi, and soldiers in tanks, all to the tune of “Hava Nagila”? If that doesn't make you uncomfortable, I'm not sure what to tell you."[238]

Russians and Russian Americans are usually portrayed as ruthless agents, brutal mobsters and villains in Hollywood movies.[239][240][241] In a 2014 news story, Fox News reported, "Russians may also be unimpressed with Hollywood's apparent negative stereotyping of Russians in movies. "The Avengers" featured a ruthless former KGB agent, "Iron Man 2" centers on a rogue Russian scientist with a vendetta, and action thriller "Jack Ryan: Shadow Recruit" saw Kenneth Branagh play an archetypal Russian bad guy, just to name a few."[242][243][244][245][246]

In June 2020, Russian American professor Nina L. Khrushcheva wrote: "Normally, I would not side with the Kremlin. But I cannot help wondering whether the Russophobia found in some segments of America's political class and media has become pathological."[247]

The history of early anti-Russian sentiment in New Zealand was analyzed in Glynn Barratt's book Russophobia in New Zealand, 1838-1908,[248] expanded to cover the period up to 1939 in an article by Tony Wilson.[249]

According to Wilson, negative attitude towards the Russian Empire had no roots in the country itself but was fueled by the attitude of the British Empire, at a time when New Zealand was still a British colony. It was aggravated by lack of information about Russia and contacts with it due to the mutual remoteness. Various wars involving the Russian Empire fueled the "Russian scare". The new negative attitude was brought by Jewish immigration after Anti-Jewish pogroms in the Russian Empire. That immigration was halted as a combined result of Russophobia and anti-Semitism. As of 1916, there were 1242 settlers of Russian origin in the country, including 169 Jews. During World War I anti-Russian sentiment was temporarily supplanted by anti-German sentiment for evident reasons; however, soon after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the fear of Marxism and Bolshevism revived Russophobia in the form of "Red Scare". Notably, local Russians had no issues with Russophobia. By late 1920s pragmatism moderated anti-Russian sentiment in official circles, especially during the Great Depression. Sympathetic views were propagated by visitors to the Soviet Union, such as George Bernard Shaw, impressed by Soviet propaganda.[249]

Rudolph P. Matthee (Munroe Chaired Professor of History at the University of Delaware) noted in his book The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730, dealing with the Safavid period (1501–1736), that the Iranians "had long despised Russians for their uncouthness".[250] In the first half of the 19th century, Russia annexed large parts of Iranian territory in the Caucasus; With the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), Iran was forced to cede what is present-day Azerbaijan, Armenia, eastern Georgia and southern Dagestan to Russia.[251] This fuelled anti-Russian sentiment which led to an angry mob storming the Russian embassy in Tehran and killing everyone in 1829. Among those killed in the massacre was the newly appointed Russian ambassador to Iran, Aleksander Griboyedov, a celebrated playwright. Griboyedov had previously played an active role in negotiating the terms of the treaty of 1828.[252][253] Soviet involvement in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish separatist movements also fueled negative attitudes.[254]

In 2009, negative attitudes to Russia among the Iranian opposition was also observed due to Russian support of the Iranian government.[255]

According to the Jamestown Foundation, while previously not known for being anti-Russian, Kazakhstan since independence has grown increasingly hostile to both Russia and China. Russian commentator Yaroslav Razumov alleges that "anti-Russian articles are a staple of the Kazakh media".[256] Recently, Kazakh nationalists have criticized people who prefer speaking in Russian than Kazakh despite being one of the two official languages in the country.[257] In 2014, ethnic Kazakhs were enraged with the statement of Russian president Vladimir Putin that "Kazakhs never had any statehood" before independence.[258][259]

Conflicts between Russia and China started with the Tsardom of Russia during the Sino-Russian border conflicts.[260] By 1689, conflict with China, then under Qing dynasty, had ended until the Opium Wars launched by Britain in the 19th century. At this point, with the Qing dynasty plagued by its own civil wars, Russia expanded and asserted their hegemony by conquering Outer Manchuria.[261] Russia would continue to sponsor various groups, both pro and anti-Chinese, helping to destabilize China with the Dungan rebellion and Russian occupation of Ili.[262] Towards the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Russia invaded Manchuria and was among a major participant that crushed the Boxer Rebellion against European powers.[263][264]

With the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in Russia, the Soviet Union was founded. Nonetheless, tensions between the USSR and China remained high. The Soviet Union waged the 1929 war against China, which ended in Soviet victory.[265] The Soviet Union would continue following Imperial Russia's expansion of influence by sponsoring a number of various militia groups destabilizing China, especially in Xinjiang which resulted in the Kumul Rebellion, Soviet invasion of Xinjiang and followed by the Islamic rebellion and Ili Rebellion in 1937 and 1944.[266] The Soviet invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1945 following Japanese control increased anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiment as a result of war crimes committed by Soviet troops, including rape and looting.[267][268][269][270][271][272]

According to a 2013 survey 73% of Turks look at Russia unfavorably against 16% with favorable views.[273]

Historically, Russia and Turkey fought several wars and had caused great devastation for each nation. During the old Tsardom of Russia, the Ottomans often raided and attacked Russian villagers. With the transformation into Russian Empire, Russia started to expand and clashed heavily with the Turks; which Russia often won more than lost, and reduced the Ottoman Empire heavily. The series of wars had manifested the ideas among the Turks that Russia wanted to turn Turkey into a vassal state, leading to a high level of Russophobia in Turkey.[274] In the 20th century, anti-Russian sentiment in Turkey was so great that the Russians refused to allow a Turkish military attache to accompany their armies.[275] After the World War I, both Ottoman and Russian Empires collapsed, and two nations went on plagued by their civil wars; during that time Soviet Russia (who would later become Soviet Union) supported Turkish Independence Movement led by Mustafa Kemal, leading to a warmer relations between two states, as newly established Turkish Republic maintained a formal tie with the Soviet Union.[276] But their warm relations didn't last long; after the World War II, the Bosphorus crisis occurred at 1946 due to Joseph Stalin's demand for a complete Soviet control of the straits led to resurgence of Russophobia in Turkey.[277]

Anti-Russian sentiment started to increase again since 2011, following the event of the Syrian Civil War. Russia supports the Government of Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey supports the Free Syrian Army and had many times announced their intentions to overthrow Assad, once again strained the relations.[278] Relations between two further went downhill after Russian jet shootdown by Turkish jet,[279] flaring that Russia wanted to invade Turkey over Assad's demand; and different interests in Syria. Turkish media have promoted Russophobic news about Russian ambitions in Syria, and this has been the turning point of remaining poor relations although two nations have tried to re-approach their differences. Turkish military operations in Syria against Russia and Assad-backed forces also damage the relations deeply.[280]

An anti-Russian satirical map produced in Japan during the Russo–Japanese War.

Most Japanese interaction with Russian individuals – besides in major cities such as Tokyo – happens with seamen and fishermen of the Russian fishing fleet, therefore Japanese people tend to carry the stereotypes associated with sailors over to Russians.[281][282] According to a 2012 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 72% of Japanese people view Russia unfavorably, compared with 22% who viewed it favorably, making Japan the most anti-Russian country surveyed.[283]

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