Taiwanese nationalism

Tangwai politicians in Taipei in 1951.

No one can confirm when the concept of localism has started. Some say when the first large wave of Han people emigrated from mainland China to Taiwan in the mid-16th century, they must have wanted to maintain some independence from the control of the ruling class in their original hometown. Others say that only when the Kingdom of Tungning, with its capital at Tainan, was built by the Zheng family in 1662, did this concept appear.

Most Chinese contemporary scholars of Mainland China believe the roots of the localist movement began during the Japanese rule (1895 to 1945), when groups organized to lobby the Imperial Japanese government for greater Taiwanese autonomy and home rule. After the Kuomintang (KMT) took over Taiwan, the Taiwan home-rule groups were decimated in the wake of the February 28 Incident of 1947. The KMT viewed Taiwan primarily as a base to retake mainland China and quickly tried to subdue potential political opposition on the island. The KMT did little to promote a unique Taiwanese identity; often newly immigrated Chinese or "mainlanders" as they were called, working in administrative positions, lived in neighborhoods where they were segregated from the Taiwanese. Others, especially poorer refugees, were shunned by the Hoklo Taiwanese and lived among aborigines instead. The mainlanders often learned Hokkien. However, since Mandarin was enforced as the official language of the Republic of China and Taiwanese was not allowed to be spoken in schools, the mainlanders who learned Taiwanese found their new language skills to diminish. As Taiwanese, or any language other than Mandarin, was forbidden in the military posts, many mainlanders whose family lived in martial villages only spoke Mandarin and perhaps their home language (e.g. Cantonese, Shanghainese, etc.). The promotion of Chinese nationalism within Taiwan and the fact that the ruling group on Taiwan were considered outsiders by some were the reasons cited for both the Taiwan independence movement and localism.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KMT began a period of education reform, including a lift on Hokkien restrictions in schools and the restoration of previously suppressed private schooling. However, these private schools were staffed by regime loyalists and reliant upon government funding for support, meaning that they often provided the same program of political and cultural indoctrination as public schools. Furthermore, while speaking Hokkien in schools or military bases was no longer illegal, few opportunities were available for its use, as Mandarin continued to be the state-approved lingua franca.[1]

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a shift in power away from the KMT to people native to Taiwan. This, combined with cultural liberalization and the increasing remoteness of the possibility of retaking mainland China, led to a cultural and political movement which emphasized a Taiwan-centered view of history and culture rather than one which was China-centered or even, as before 1946, Japan-centered. Localism was strongly supported by President Lee Teng-hui.

The Bentuhua movement was sparked in the mid-1970s with the growing expression of ethnic discontent due to unequal distribution of political and cultural power between mainlanders and Taiwanese people. Beginning in the 1960s, Taiwan was enveloped by the problems of rapid industrial development, rural abandonment, labor disputes and the uneven distribution of access to wealth and social power. These changes, combined with the loss of several key allies, forced the KMT regime to institute limited reforms. The reforms permitted under Chiang Ching-kuo allowed indigenization to increase as leading dissidents generated a response to the government's failures. The dissident groups, united under the "Tangwai", or “outside the party” banner, called for the government to accept the reality that it was only the government of Taiwan and not China. The key demands of the Tangwai involved instituting democracy and seeking international recognition as a sovereign state. Taiwanese demanded full civil rights as guaranteed under the ROC constitution and equal political rights as those experienced by the Mainlander elite.

The Taiwanese cultural elite fully promoted the development of Xiang tu literature and cultural activities, including rediscovering Taiwanese nativist literature written under Japanese colonial rule. The tangwai movement revived symbols of Taiwanese resistance to Japanese rule in the effort to mobilize ethnic Taiwanese. The opposition to the KMT's China-centered cultural policies resulted in dissidents crafting new national-historical narratives that placed the island of Taiwan itself at the center of the island's history. The Taiwanese emerged as a frequently colonized and often oppressed people. The concept of bentuhua was finally expressed in the cultural domain in the premise of Taiwan as a place with a unique society, culture and history. This principle has been largely adopted for understanding Taiwan's cultural representation and expressed in a variety of cultural activities, including music, film and the literary and performing arts.

The pressures of indigenization and the growing acceptance of a unique Taiwanese cultural identity have met opposition from more conservative elements of Taiwan society. Critics argue that the new perspective creates a “false” identity rooted in ethnic nationalism as opposed to an “authentic” Chinese identity, which is primordial and inherent. Many mainlanders living on Taiwan complain that their own culture is marginalized by bentuhua, and initially expressed fear of facing growing alienation. In the past decade these complaints have subsided somewhat as Taiwan increasingly views itself as a pluralistic society that embraces many cultures and recognizes the rights of all citizens.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, gestures toward localism were increasingly adopted by pro-unification figures who, while supporting the Chinese nationalism of Chiang Kai-shek, saw it as appropriate, or at least advisable, to display more appreciation for cultures of Taiwan. Pro-unification politicians such as James Soong, the former head of the Government Information Office who once oversaw the limitation of Taiwanese dialects, began speaking in Hoklo on semi-formal occasions.

Efforts have been made by the Republic of China (Taiwan) government beginning in 2000 to distance itself from China and rollback earlier sinicisation efforts by taking actions such as removing Chinese influence from items within Taiwan control. While the nationalists may view such efforts as emphasising the importance of Taiwan's culture, this section addresses the perspective of those who likely support the Chinese reunification of all of Greater China under a single political entity.

Origin

Wild Lily Movement in Taipei.

At the end of World War II, Chinese Kuomintang forces took over Taiwan and soon began an effort to sinicise the population. Taiwanese urban elites were wiped out in the February 28 Incident. Mandarin Chinese became the only language allowed in media and school to the exclusion of other languages of Taiwan, as well as Japanese. Public institutions and corporations were given names that included the words "China" or "Chinese". School history and geography lessons focused on China with little attention paid to Taiwan. Street names in Taipei were changed from their original names to Chinese names that reflected the geography of China and Kuomintang ideals.[2][3]

With the end of martial law in 1987 and the introduction of democracy in the 1990s after the Wild Lily student movement, an effort began to re-assert Taiwanese identity and culture while trying to get rid of many Chinese influences imposed by the Kuomintang.

Name change campaign

Republic of China (Taiwan) passport.

Taiwan Post Co. post office in Taichung.

Between 2002 and 2007, the ROC government under Chen Shui-bian took steps to revise the terms "China", "Republic of China", "Taipei", and others that impart an association with the Chinese culture.[13][14][15][16]

In 2002, the "Name Rectification Campaign" made significant advances in replacing the terms "China", "Republic of China", or "Taipei" with the term "Taiwan" on official documents, in the names of Taiwan-registered organizations, companies, and public enterprises on the island, and in the names of businesses stationed abroad.[13] In 2003, the ROC Foreign Ministry issued a new passport with the word "Taiwan" printed in English on its cover.[17] Moreover, in January 2005, Taiwan adopted a Westernized writing format for government documents, denied that it was an attempt at desinicization, and promoted the actions as "a concerted effort at globalizing Taiwan's ossified bureaucracies and upgrading the nation's competitive edge."[18]

Campaigning in this area continued in March 2006, where the Democratic Progressive Party sought to change the Republic of China year designation used in Taiwan to the Gregorian calendar.[19] Instead of the year 2006 being referred to as the "95th year of the ROC"—with the 1912 founding of the Republic of China being referred to as "the first year of the ROC"—the year 2006 would be identified as 2006 in official usage such as on banknotes, IDs, national health insurance cards, driver's licenses, diplomas and wedding certificates.[19] This was viewed as the government trying another angle for desinicization by removing any trace of China from Taiwan.[19]

In February 2007, the term "China" was replaced by the term "Taiwan" on Taiwan postage stamps to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the February 28 Incident that began on 28 February 1947 that was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang (KMT).[20] In that same month, the name of the official postal service of Taiwan was changed from the Chunghwa Post Co. to The Taiwan Post Co.[21] The company's name was changed back on 1 August 2008, and the names on the postal stamps were reversed in late 2008, soon after the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-Jeou won back presidency and ended 8 years of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule.

In March 2007, the name plate of the ROC Embassy in Panama was revised both to include the word "Taiwan" in parentheses between the words "the Republic of China" and "Embassy" in both of its Chinese and Spanish titles, and to omit the ROC national emblem.[22]

Supporters of the name-change movement argue that the Republic of China no longer exists, as it did not include Taiwan when it was founded in 1912 and mainland China is now controlled by the Chinese Communist Party as the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding the legal status of Taiwan as a result of the Treaty of peace with Japan and Treaty of San Francisco after World War II, means that the Republic of China was merely a military occupier of Taiwan. As Japan relinquished its sovereignty over Taiwan without passing it to a specific country, it is argued that Taiwan ought to be deemed a land belonging to no country, whose international status has yet to be defined.

KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited Mainland China in 2005 to oppose the Taiwan independence movement.

Significant outcries surfaced both within Taiwan and abroad opposing the concept of Taiwan localization in the early years after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death, denouncing it as the "independent Taiwan movement" (Chinese: 台獨運動). Vocal opponents are primarily the 1949-generation Mainlanders, or older generations of Mainlanders living in Taiwan that had spent their formative years and adulthood on the pre-1949 mainland Republic of China, and native Taiwanese who identify with a pan-Han Chinese cultural identity. They included people ranging from academics like Chien Mu, reputed to be the last prominent Chinese intellectual opposing the conventional wisdom take on the May Fourth Movement, politicians like Lien Chan, from a family with a long history of active pan-Chinese patriotism despite being native Taiwanese, to gang mobsters like Chang An-lo, a leader of the notorious United Bamboo Gang.

The opposing voices were subsequently confined to the fringe in the mid 2000s Taiwan itself. Issues persist, particularly supporters of the Pan-Blue coalition, which advocates retaining a strong link to mainland China, dispute over such issues as what histories to teach. Nonetheless both of the two major political forces in Taiwan reached a consensus, and the movement has overwhelming support among the population. This is in part due to the 1949-generation Mainlanders have gradually passed on from the scene, and politicians supporting and opposing the Taiwanese independence movement both realize a majority of Taiwan's current residents, either because they are born in Taiwan to Mainlander parents with no collective memories of their ancestral homes, or they are native Taiwanese, thus feeling no historical connotations with the entire pre-1949 Republic of China on mainland China, support the movement as such.

In mainland China, the PRC government has on the surface adopted a neutral policy on localism and its highest-level leaders publicly proclaim it does not consider the localist movement to be either a violation of its One China Policy or equivalent to the independence movement. Nonetheless, the state-owned media and academics employed by organizations such as universities' Institutes of Taiwan Studies or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) periodically release study results, academic journal articles, or editorials strongly criticizing the movement as "the cultural arm of Taiwanese independence movement" (Chinese: 文化台獨) with the government's tacit approval, showing the PRC government's opposition towards localism.

Nowadays, another source of significant opposition to the localist movement remains in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Western world, who identify more with the historic pre-1949 mainland Republic of China or pre-localist movement ROC on Taiwan that oriented itself as the rump legitimate government of China. A great many are themselves refugees and dissidents who fled mainland China, either directly or through Hong Kong or Taiwan, during the founding of the People's Republic of China and the subsequent periods of destructive policies (such as the Land Reform, the Anti-Rightist Movement, Great Leap Forward, or the Cultural Revolution), Hong Kong anti-Communist immigrants who fled Hong Kong in light of the Handover to the PRC in 1997, or Mainlanders living in Taiwan who moved to the West in response to the localist movement. Conversely, the current population of Taiwan regard these overseas Chinese as foreigners akin to Singaporean Chinese, as opposed to the pre-localist era when they were labeled as fellow Chinese compatriots. The PRC has capitalized on this window of opportunity in making overtures to the traditionally anti-Communist overseas Chinese communities, including gestures in supporting traditional Chinese culture and dropping explicitly Communist tones in overseas communications. This results in a decline of active political opposition to the PRC from overseas Chinese when compared with the times before the localist movement in Taiwan.

In Hong Kong, Taiwanese localist movements have pushed localization or pro-Chinese Communist tilts among the traditionally pro-Republic of China individuals and organizations. A prominent example is Chu Hai College, whose academic degree programs were recognized officially by the Hong Kong SAR government in May 2004, and registered as an "Approved Post-secondary College" with the Hong Kong SAR government since July of the same year. It has since been renamed the Chu Hai College of Higher Education (珠海學院) and no longer registered with the Republic of China's Ministry of Education. New students from 2004 have been awarded degrees in the right of Hong Kong rather than Taiwan.

Even though it is a broad consensus currently regarding the overall ideology of localism, there are still deep disputes over practical policies between the three main political groups of Taiwan independence, Chinese reunification, and supporters of Chinese culture. Pro-independence supporters argue that Taiwan is and should be enhancing an identity which is separate from the Chinese one, and in more extreme cases advocates the removal of Chinese "imprints". Meanwhile, some would argue that Taiwan should create a distinctive identity that either includes certain Chinese aspect or exists within a broader Chinese one. Those who support Chinese reunification call for a policy of enhancing the Chinese identity. Groups that support Chinese reunification and Chinese nationalism have emphasized the distinction between localism and what some perceive as desinicization and argued that they do not oppose the promotion of a Taiwanese identity, but rather oppose the use of that identity to separate itself from a broader Chinese one. On the other hand, a few apolitical groups have claimed that most of the political factions merely use these points to win support for elections.

• Sinocentrism
• Sinicization
• Desinicization
• Pan-Green Coalition
• Taiwanese literature movement
• Taiwanese people
• Formosa Alliance
• Tangwai movement
• Taiwan independence movement
• Formosa Alliance
• Taiwanese people
• History of Taiwan
• February 28 Incident
• Qiandao Lake Incident
• Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Seediq Bale

2. Tzeng, Shih-jung, 2009. From Honto Jin to Bensheng Ren- the Origin and Development of the Taiwanese National Consciousness, University Press of America. ISBN 0-7618-4471-6

• 藍軍提論述三主軸 討論改黨名, Liberty Times